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ABSTRACT
Lin, Mei-Hua. Ph.D., Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology Program,
Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2008.
Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Information Use, and Sensemaking During Unfolding
Events.
In complex domains such as commerce, military operations, transportation, and
humanitarian efforts, practitioners are sometimes overwhelmed by uncertain,
contradictory, and dynamic information. They must obtain, organize, interpret, and use
this information often under time pressure and high stakes during sensemaking. While
sensemaking is a gateway to information management, sensemaking also depends on
information management; the gathering and use of information provides the raw material
for sensemaking. These processes work together to help people understand complex
situations but are vulnerable to cultural as well as individual variation in cognition. This
study investigated individual cognitive and personality differences that may affect
information management and sensemaking. Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking was
expected to influence information use and sensemaking (Lin & Klein, 2008).
I investigated sensemaking using two scenarios in which dispositional and
situational information was introduced sequentially. Each time new information, either
dispositional or situational, was presented, participants identified problems and made
decisions. I expected that analytic thinkers would make dispositional attribution and
holistic thinkers would make situational attribution. Participants also selected and rated
the relevance of the information presented. In addition, participants recalled information
from an earlier scenario. I used moderated multiple regression analyses and correlation
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analyses to understand the relationships between individual differences, information use,
and sensemaking.
Five important research findings emerged:
•

Analytic-Holistic thinking was related to initial sensemaking judgments

particularly with limited information. This suggests that when faced with a
sensemaking opportunity, people are not a blank slate. They bring with them
cognitive patterns, past experiences, and beliefs that both set a framework for
sensemaking, and determine how information is selected, judged, interpreted, and
remembered. This can interfere in situations when a common understanding is needed
to deal with complex problems.
•

Analytic and holistic thinkers used information differently during sensemaking.

Holistic thinkers changed their sensemaking based on new information and were
more influenced by the types of information presented. This relationship was weaker
for analytic thinkers. The effect of AH thinking on information presented disappeared
when new contradictory information was presented. While characteristic of a person
was important in initial sensemaking, information content influenced sensemaking in
the long run.
•

In contrast to AH thinking, two personality variables, the Need for Cognitive

Closure and the Need for Cognition, were more related to information recall than to
information use and sensemaking. While people high in need for cognition recalled
more information, people high in need for cognitive closure recalled less. The
complex influences of individual variation in cognition and personality on
sensemaking suggest the need for additional research.
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•

Attribution, a component of AH thinking, was related to information use. It

explained situational information use while overall AH thinking did not. This
suggests the usefulness of AH thinking components for specific information use.
•

The sensemaking context provided an opportunity to investigate information use

and how people remember information. People who selected and rated dispositional
information to be relevant remembered primarily this information. People who
selected and rated situational information as more relevant recalled both situational
and dispositional information. This suggests distinctive individual information
management strategies. Some people considered the breadth of information during
sensemaking while others focus on specific information.
This is a new research area that investigates the individual cognitive and
personality differences in information use during sensemaking. The findings suggest the
importance of understanding sensemaking over time, information management, and
additional contextual and cultural factors. While this study has generated an initial
understanding of this complex issue, more research is needed to describe the interplay of
cognition, personality, and contextual constraints on the complexity of sensemaking and
information management.
Organizations face many challenges. Like individuals, organizations need to make
sense of their environment through effective information management. People in
organizations must make sense of dynamic information that can fluctuate overtime.
Organizations have people with different expertise, cognitive patterns, personalities, and
cultural roots. Research in this area provides guidance for communication patterns,
conflict resolutions, decision making, and information management.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Challenges in Organizations
The advancement of technology has facilitated globalization and created a global
flow of information. Globalization created opportunities as well as new challenges.
People from distant lands are reachable, economies are becoming more interdependent,
and problems around the world require and receive international involvement.
Information is key to understanding and it is not static but rather dynamic and complex
over time. Individuals in domains including national security, discoveries, and global
business, use information to make sense of their dynamic environment and what changes
mean for their organization.
The challenge of dynamic information flow has implications for how people
manage information and how they make sense of it. Through sensemaking, they need to
recognize and detect changes, anomalies, and problems. Sensemaking depends on the
availability and interpretation of information from the information environment (Choo,
1998a). Information management is crucial for sensemaking as it provides the needed
raw material. Both individual factors such as absorptive ability (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990), attribution biases (Fiske & Taylor, 1993), personality (Tetlock, 1992), cognitive
style, and cognitive complexity (Hayes & Allinson, 1998, 1994), and contextual factors
such as social networks (Anderson, 2002), power, goals, and incentives and control
systems (O’Reilly, 1983) may affect the information management process. They add to
the complexity of information management and sensemaking.
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In a volatile environment, it is important for an organization to make sense of its
internal and external environment to ensure survival. This means that organizations must
interpret information in a way that will affect decision making and lead to productive
actions. When sensemaking fails, businesses may fail, when it is successful,
organizations can be adaptive. Similar to an organization, an individual decision maker
needs to interpret information from his or her internal environment through sensemaking.
Research is needed to examine variations in how and where decision makers obtain the
information they use in decision making (Jones & MacLeod, 1986).
This dissertation addresses how individual cognition affects information processes
and sensemaking. Figure 1 represents the framework for this study. This framework is
consistent with the notion that behavior is a function of an individual and his or her
environment (Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1935). Here the behavior is the sensemaking
outcome. The environment is defined as the internal and external information
environment including contextual constraints (Anderson, 2002; O’Reilly, 1983).
Individuals are described by their cognition and personality differences. In a complex
environment individuals have to identify the problem and make decisions but are
bounded by the context as well as by the information that is available. Individuals bring
with them cognitive and personal tools that influence the judgment of the available
information to affect their sensemaking.
In the following sections, I will first describe the general process of sensemaking,
its importance, and its variations identified in the research literature. I will discuss two
sensemaking outcomes: problem identification and decisions. Second, I present the
complexities of information management. Here, I will explore the information
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manipulations used in this study. Third, I will describe how a cognitive dimension,
Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking and its four components, influence individual process
information and sensemaking. Finally, I will describe how personality differences can
influence information use. Two potentially important personality factors are presented. In
the section following these, I will present the method, results, and discussion.
Sensemaking
Sensemaking refers to the placement of information into frameworks, the
identification of surprises and anomalies, redressing problems as a situation changes, and
constructing meaning, interacting in pursuit of understanding, and patterning (Weick,
1995). Individuals attend to the information from the external environment that is
relevant to form possible explanations. As part of sensemaking, they identify and solve
problems.
In dynamic environments, we face an unpredictable stream of changing events
and information. While much of the available information may be ignored, some of it
demands explanation, interpretation, and action. “Why did that happen?” “What does
this mean?” “What should we do now?” We must organize, interpret, and use the
information to make sense of continual changes but identifying what is relevant and what
is just noise can be difficult (Choo, 1998b). People use their past experiences to
reinterpret situations and to form possible explanations as new information becomes
available.
Weick’s Approach
Weick’s general model of sensemaking suggests five key steps in the sensemaking
process (see Figure 2) (Daft & Weick, 1984; Huber, 1991; Milliken, 1990; Thomas,
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Clarke, & Gioia, 1993). Sensemaking begins when a person notices or identifies a
change, anomaly, surprise, problem, chaos or important issue in the stream of information
(Milliken, 1990; Koppes & Billings, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The
recognition of any of these conditions can initiate the gathering of additional information
(i.e. Hambrick, 1981, 1982; Thomas, Gioia, & Ketchen, 1997). Categorizing information
allows us to verify findings by comparing similar cases, past and present. This may
suggest plausible explanations or propose effective actions. Information is interpreted as
it is gathered (Thomas et al., 1997). Interpretation leads to actions or decisions (Daft &
Weick, 1984). Actions can produce changes in the environment or other performance
outcome (Thomas, Shankster, & Mathieu, 1994) that reflect the effectiveness of one’s
sensemaking. This in turn can lead to closure, propel additional actions, or suggest
reinterpretations (Thomas et al., 1994). In this way, sensemaking is a dynamic and
ongoing process.
Klein et al.’s Data Frame Approach
Klein, Phillips, Rall and Peluso (2007) suggested a data/frame model of
sensemaking to describe the deliberate effort undertaken to understand events (see Figure
3). They proposed that incoming information suggests frames – mental models for
organizing and understanding. These frames are similar to Minsky’s (1975) notion of
frames as structures for representing known situations. They may include information
about dynamic relationships among components, expectations for the future, and
appropriate actions. These frames, in turn, delineate what counts as data and guide the
search for additional information. Contradictions and inconsistencies may provide cues
for elaborating the frame or reconsidering previously discarded data (re-framing). If
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people cannot explain events by elaborating on their initial accounts, they may question
their frame, perhaps reject it, and shift to another in their repertoire. People differ in how
hard they work to preserve their original frame. They may, for example, be lured down a
‘garden path’ to explain away inconsistent data by deciding that the data is unreliable.
They may also rebuild a new frame based on available data. Some people may track
several frames simultaneously and, as events develop, compare these frames to find
which one fits best. Both Weick’s and Klein et al.’s frameworks identify crucial
sensemaking processes. Their formulations suggested several questions about
sensemaking and the variation it exhibits.
The Present Study
These different sensemaking models and approaches posit several important
processes: detecting and identifying problem, information gathering and use, making
sense of information for explanation, and taking actions or making decisions. They also
represent the dynamic nature of sensemaking.
Based on the models, five points are important during sensemaking. First, during
sensemaking, we have to identify the problem or anomaly in order to act on it (Weick,
1995). Identifying a problem is important but what is considered a problem may differ
from one person to another. Hence, varying cognition and personality can influence
problem identification. This is especially true when problems are ill-defined. When
problem identification differs, sensemaking will also differ.
Second, when people are faced with an opportunity for sensemaking, they are not
blank slates. Past experiences, beliefs, and values provide ‘frames’ to guide sensemaking
(Klein et al, 2007). Hence, the availability of a frame may differ from one person to
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another. People use their past experiences to suggest frame(s) for a specific situation and
these frames guide further exploration. When people have had different experiences, they
are likely to use different frames.
Third, people may differ in what they count as causal explanation when trying to
identify a problem. When causal explanations are broad, it is likely that additional factors
will be considered as potential sources of problems. With increased potential sources of
problems, causal explanation of an event may become more complex. People who differ
in causal beliefs will accept different causal explanations (Nisbett, 2003). This difference
is important because sensemaking explain ongoing events in a way that generates and
shapes future actions.
Fourth, when gathering and using information during sensemaking, what is the
range and the type of information, a person will consider during sensemaking. Even
when there is a common goal for understanding, people vary in the scope and the types of
information to which they attend. Because attention filters the raw material available, it is
a critical step for sensemaking. Information is selected based on its relevance to the
current state of the situation and the explanatory frames that are being used (Klein et al.,
2007). Because people use differing frames, the information they select can differ. This
means they have different material accessible for sensemaking.
Lastly, even when people have a good sense of a situation, new information may
be presented. In dynamic situations, people can face contradictory information and this
has been exacerbated with the advent of the Internet. People differ in how individuals
differ in their openness to new and to contradictory information (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).
Inconsistent information propels the questioning and changing of frames during
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sensemaking. New contradictions may change problem identification as well as
decisions.
In this study, these five points provided the guidelines for developing a
sensemaking assessment tool. This assessment tool uses scenarios to simulate a
sensemaking situation. Information is introduced sequentially. Sensemaking and
information management processes were assessed periodically. Hence, the assessment
tool has the following two characteristics. First, the scenarios probe for changes as well
as for an understanding of those changes. The tool measured: quantitative and qualitative
changes in sensemaking. Here, quantitative sensemaking describes the changes, and
qualitative sensemaking is used to understand the reason for the changes. Two
quantitative sensemaking outcomes were selected: Problem Identification (PI) and
Decision (see oval 3 in Figure 1). The qualitative sensemaking is exploratory in this
study. Second, information was presented sequentially (see oval 2 in Figure 1) to
represent the nature of information gathering, information types, and information
judgments. The section below describes the two quantitative sensemaking outcomes. The
second characteristic, sequential information presentation, is described in a later section.
Problem identification
Problem identification is a part of both making sense of an event and solving
problems. To do this, individuals must attend to relevant information, form possible
explanations from past experiences, and reinterpret situations with the new information.
This study focused on two types of PI: dispositional and situational (oval 3 in Figure 1).
Dispositional problems would suggest that factors affecting a problem are dispositions or
internal characteristics of a person (e.g. abilities, motivations, personality, beliefs,
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intentions, etc.). Situational problems would suggest that factors other than the person
affected a problem. These include situational forces that facilitated a problem (e.g.
contextual constraints, time pressures, goals, etc.).
Decision
Decision making in complex dynamic situation is inherently biased; it is not based
on comprehensive rationality where perfect information is used to maximize utility, and
neither does it use information according to some specific and ordered preference.
Instead, decision making involves imperfect expectations, limited and focused
information search, selective perception, and information processing. This study focused
on two types of decisions: dispositional and situational (oval 3 in Figure 1). A
dispositional decision suggests a decision to solve the problem by taking action towards a
person (e.g. firing, warning, training etc.). A situational decision suggests a decision to
solve the problem by taking action towards the situation (e.g. changing company policy,
changing structure, changing industry rules and regulations etc.).
Sensemaking uses available information. The effectiveness of sensemaking is as
good as the available information. Thus, information management is crucial process for
sensemaking. Below is a description of information management and information
properties examined in this study.
Information Management
Individual information management processes are important for sensemaking and
have high stakes. In organizations, managers must make important decisions by making
sense of the internal and external environment (Weick et al., 2005). They have to sort
through a flux of information to detect problems and make decisions based on the
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information at hand. However, a situation can change with new information, and
managers may have to readdress, and redefine the problem, and make new decisions.
These complex processes involve the interplay of many factors and constraints.
Information provides the raw material for sensemaking, and the amount, type, and
relevance of information may influence sensemaking, and vice-versa. This study
simulated the challenges a person faces with sequential and varying information (oval 2
in Figure 1). It traces the changing of problem identification and decision judgments at
each point when information was received.
Information Properties
Several factors influence the selection of information for processing or
interpretation. First, attention influences the amount of information selected. A broader
rather than focused attention provides a larger information pool. Second, information is
selected or ignored depending on its perceived relevance. The more relevant it is, the
more likely it would be interpreted. Perceived relevance, therefore, can influence the type
of information selected for sensemaking. Third, following the theory of cognitive
dissonance, individuals are more likely to use information that confirms their existing
belief structures (Festinger, 1957). Hence, individuals with different belief structures or
someone who is not susceptible to cognitive dissonance may select different information.
Because of the implications of cognition on attention, relevance, and cognitive
dissonance (Choi, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2004; Choi & Nisbett, 2000), I focused on two
information properties: types of information and amount of information.
Type of information: Attribution
Two factors influence the types of attributional information people need. First, an
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individual’s need for different types of information can be determined by his or her
values, beliefs, previous experiences as well as a particular problem or a goal (O’Reilly,
1983). For example, one’s initial frame or initial understanding of a situation not only
influences what counts as explanation but also drives the search for particular
information. Second, cognitive dissonance theory posits behavior-attitude consistency
(Festinger, 1957). When faced with cognitive dissonance, a person can adopt ways to
reduce the effectiveness of discrepant information from his or her current beliefs by
derogating the source, excluding the source from communication, or distorting the
information (O’Reilly, 1980). Hence, the use of attributional information may depend on
its consistency with one’s belief structures and one’s susceptibility to cognitive
dissonance.
In the present study, attributional information refers to information that
contributed to how a person draws causal explanations. Information presented can be
dispositional or situational in nature. Dispositional information is information that
described personal attributes, such as personality, beliefs, feelings, and attitudes towards
an event, object, or person (Bhawuk, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Situational information is
information that described external cues such as information surrounding the person and
how those cues influence events.
In order to simulate the challenges a person may face when incoming and varying
information is received, the material designed in this study presented information at two
points in time. Information presentation was manipulated based on the attributional
characteristics described above. This manipulation, consistent with Figure 1, introduces
the information environment or the contextual constraints available to the participant
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during sensemaking. While, the information presentation served as the manipulation,
individuals might only use information that was relevant for judgments. Hence, this study
also examined the extent to which each dispositional and situational information item was
judged relevant for sensemaking.
Amount (Quantity)
Information management is a process for organizing information (Choo, 1998b).
Information varies in amount. In this study, the amount of information is defined as the
number of informational items selected by an individual during sensemaking. While the
amount of information was not manipulated, it serves as a measure of information need.
The dilemma for a person during a complex situation regarding information is: How
much information do I need? How much can I retain? Is too little or too much
information better? Shortage of information prevents the consideration of all the facts
prior to making a decision. Excesses of information make it difficult to identify the most
important and relevant information. In this information age, obtaining information can be
quick but processing it may not be as rapid, so the concern may be overload not scarcity
(Choo, 1998b; O’Reilly, 1980). Information explosion increases the difficulty of
gathering and selecting the right kind of information, leading to a loss of sense (Weick,
1995). In order to manage information and avoid overloading, data from the external
environment needs to be selected, organized, and interpreted with care. The important
questions are: Will there be differences in how individuals with their limited capacities
gather, select and integrate information from the vast amount available? How would
these differences influence the sensemaking process?
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People differ in the amount of information they need. Some people might need
more information before making decisions while others may avoid excess information.
Because of different belief structures, they might have preferences for different kinds of
information in varying amounts. Consistent with the earlier types of information, this
study also examined the amount of dispositional and situational information needed for
sensemaking.
In the previous sections, I explained sensemaking and information management
processes, then presented and suggested ways to tap sensemaking outcomes and
important information characteristics that individuals may prefer. In the next section, I
explain how individuals may differ in their judgments of information and how that may
affect sensemaking. As mentioned earlier, past experiences influence sensemaking. As
individuals’ experiences are embedded in a cultural context that influences their thinking
(Berry, 1986; Hutchins, 1995; Klein, 2004), I propose cognitive patterns would affect the
way they manage information and make judgments (see oval 1 in Figure 1). One purpose
of this study was to examine the influence of a cultural cognitive dimension, AH
thinking, on information processes (Choi et al., 2004) and sensemaking. While AH
differences were found cross-culturally, AH thinking also varies a within group (Choi,
Koo, & Choi, 2007; Lin, 2004). Hence, the present study is the first study that examines
AH difference within a national group in the context of information use and sensemaking.
Cultural Cognitive Dimension: Analytic-Holistic Thinking
Globalization and Complexities
With globalization, an organization’s environment becomes increasingly large
and complex. Multinational interactions are important and inevitable. Teams are likely to
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be diverse and crucial to solving complex problems. As organizations span national
borders, complications can arise with national differences in information management
and sensemaking. Sensemaking, that is constructing meaning from what has been sensed
about the environment, is problematic because information about the environment,
especially in an international context, can be ambiguous and therefore subject to multiple
interpretations. When people from different nations work together on complex problems;
the processes underlying sensemaking can vary greatly. Each national group brings a
distinct view of the world and different mental models and categories (Klein, 2004).
Different causal frames for sensemaking can lead to different interpretations of situations
(Bhagat, Harveston & Triandis, 2002), different problems, and different decisions.
Hence, a within group study without the variability introduced with national differences
is the first step to understanding the complexities of sensemaking.
AH thinking distinguishes important differences in perception, judgment of
information, and attribution. This study examined this dimension and its effect on
information evaluation and sensemaking. AH thinking was treated as an individual
difference in this study.
Analytic-Holistic Thinking
Analytic and holistic differences can be understood from two perspectives. First,
the Ecocultural Model posits different ecological constraints facilitated field independentinterdependent and cognition (Berry, 1976). For example, groups who engaged in hunting
and gathering exhibit field independent perception while those engaged in farming
exhibit field dependent perception (Berry, 1986). These ecocultural constraints provided
a lens through which members of a group see the world (Klein, 2004).
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A second perspective for understanding AH cognitive differences came from two
ancient philosophic traditions: Greek Aristotelian philosophy and Chinese Confucius
philosophy (Nisbett, 2003). The individual’s sense of personal agency, tradition of
debate, and social and political systems as well as different strategies to understand the
world facilitated different cognition (see Cromer, 1993; Lloyd, 1991; Nisbett, 2003 for
details). The Greeks Aristotelian philosophy facilitated analytic thinking and the Chinese
Confucius philosophy cultivated holistic thinking.
Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Information Management, and Sensemaking
A main difference between analytic and holistic thinkers is the inclusion of
context. Holistic thinkers are more likely to include the context than analytic thinkers.
This resulted in several differences (see Table 1). Analytic thinkers view the world as
composed of separate elements that can be understood independently; they focus on
objects and dispositions while holistic thinkers focus on the relationships among different
elements and context (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & Norenzayan, 2001).
Choi, Koo, and Choi (2007) proposed four components subsumed under AH
thinking. These components provided the conceptual basis for the present analysis.
Attention defines the scope of information considered or needed: Analytic thinkers focus
on central features in the field while holistic thinkers attend to the field as a whole.
Causal Attribution directs the search for explanations to situational or dispositional
causes. Analytic thinkers target dispositional causes while holistic thinkers also include
situational causes. Tolerance for Contradiction describes the difference between analytic
differentiation - polarizing goals and options to define the most important on one hand,
and holistic naïve dialecticism - merging goals and options by synthesis on the other.
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Perception of Change describes beliefs about change, whether phenomena are viewed as
linear by analytic thinkers or as cyclical, non-static patterns by holistic thinkers. These
differences in cognition can influence sensemaking. These components provide a general
understanding of AH thinking and are described later in detail (also see Lin & Klein,
2008 for a comprehensive review). Perception of Change will not be followed through as
no hypothesis was formed based on this component.
One goal of this study was to examine how Analytic-Holistic orientations in
cognition influence the way people view information and use it in PI and making
decisions. In the present study, a problem or an anomaly can be attributed to the
dispositions of a person or the characteristics of a situation. Similarly, a person can make
the decisions to take action with the person or to make changes to the situation. These PI
and decision judgments were measured four times in the study. Because of differences in
belief structures about causes, I expect higher holistic thinking tendencies will have
higher initial situational PI and initial decisions judgments (Hypotheses 1 and 4). Because
holistic people consider both situational and dispositional information in making
attributions, no hypotheses on initial dispositional judgments were included. The overall
score on the Analytic-Holism Scale (Choi et al., 2007) was used to define analyticholistic tendency. A higher score indicates holistic thinking. The specific hypotheses
based on the contribution of AH thinking are as follow:
H1: Analytic-Holistic (AH) scores will be positively correlated with initial
situational problem identification judgment.
Because of the differences in attention scope, belief in causal structure, and
different strategies dealing with information, I expect analytic and holistic thinkers to
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vary in their information use at each introduction of new information, resulting in
different PIs and decisions during sensemaking. In order to examine how analytic and
holistic thinkers use information to affect judgments, consistent with the framework in
Figure 1, a person’s analytic-holistic tendency will affect the use of certain information to
make sense of the situation. Because holistic thinkers orient to the context, they are more
inclusive in their information use. Below are the hypotheses that test AH thinking as a
moderator of information presentation (IP) and judgments. Influences will be reflected in
the judgment of PI (Hypotheses 2 and 3) and decisions (Hypotheses 5 and 6) after new
information is presented.
H2: The interaction between AH score and Information Presentation (IP) 1 will
significantly affect both situational and dispositional problem identification
(PI) judgments in Time 2, after controlling for PI judgments in Time 1, IP 1,
and AH score. The slope between IP 1 and both situational and dispositional
PI judgments in Time 2 will be steeper for people high in holistic thinking
than people low in holistic thinking. 1See Footnote
H3: The interaction between AH score and IP 2 will significantly affect both
situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3, after controlling for PI
judgments in Time 2, IP 2, and AH score. The slope between IP 2 and both
situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3 will be steeper for
people high in holistic thinking than people low in holistic thinking.

A visual misrepresentation of the slopes was inconsistent with the conceptual logic of the relationship
between Analytic-Holistic Thinking and information use. The hypothesis on simple slopes analysis was
changed to reflect the logic of the hypothesis. The subsequent Hypotheses 3, 5, and 6 also reflected this
change.

1
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H4: AH score will be positively correlated with initial situational decision
judgment.
H5: The interaction between AH score and IP 1 will significantly affect both
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 2, after controlling
decision judgments in Time 1, IP 1, and AH scores. The slope between IP 1
and both situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 2 will be
steeper for people high in holistic thinking than people low in holistic
thinking.
H6: The interaction between AH score and IP 2 will significantly affect both
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 3, after controlling
decision judgments in Time 2, IP 2, and AH score. The slope between IP 2
and both situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 3 will be
steeper for people high in holistic thinking than people low in holistic
thinking.
Components of Analytic-Holistic Thinking
The three components, Attention, Causal Attribution, and Tolerance for
Contradiction, considered in this study stem from the AH distinction (i.e. Nisbett, 2003;
Nisbett et al., 2001). I define each component; describe the supporting research; outline
implications to information management and sensemaking in the following sections, and
present the research hypotheses.
Attention: Field vs. Parts
Attention helps define the scope of information available for consideration, and
this may limit the information available for sensemaking in a complex environment.

17

Consistent with early mother-child communication patterns, holistic thinkers look
towards the relationship between the object and the field (Fernald & Morikawa, 1993).
This leads to attention to the whole picture and emphasizing relationships and
interconnections, a more field interdependent view. Analytic thinkers look to individual
objects rather than to the field as a whole (Fernald & Morikawa, 1993). The focus is on
individual parts, a more field independent view.
Importance of context: perceptual. Several studies have measured the
differences in attention using field dependence, a measure of the extent to which people
differentiate objects from the context (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Witkin, Lewis,
Hertzman, Machover, Meissner, & Karp, 1954). Cross-cultural research in attention and
cognition had shown that holistic thinkers were more field-dependent and analytic
thinkers more field independent (Nisbett, 2003). Masuda and Nisbett (2001) found that
Japanese participants, typically holistic thinkers, recalled more contextual information
(i.e. background stimuli), and relationships among objects than were American
participants, typically analytical thinkers. Japanese were also better than Americans at
remembering objects with original presented backgrounds than when objects were placed
with novel backgrounds. This further support the hypothesis that holistic thinkers had
difficulty in separating objects from their context. In other studies, East Asians were also
found to be more context or field dependent than Westerners (Kitayama, Duffy,
Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda,
2006). East Asians included contextual information while Westerners attended to focal
information at the expense of contextual information.
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This attentional difference is further supported in a study of the activation of
frontal and parietal brain regions associated with attentional control (Hedden, Ketay,
Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008). Activation was greater when individuals were given a
culturally non-preferred judgment task than a culturally preferred judgment task,
indicating a greater need for attention for the unfamiliar task. They found consistent
results with between and within cultural group comparison.
Differences in attention were not limited to perception in the physical
representation, but extended to emotional judgments in a social representation. Masuda
and colleagues (2008) showed a sample of Americans and Japanese participants a central
cartoon figure with either Happy, Neutral, or Sad facial expression together with four
smaller background cartoon figures also with either Happy, Neutral, or Sad expression.
East Asians modulated their judgments of the central figure by the emotions of the
background figures while the Americans did not. If a neutral figure was surrounded by
happy figures, the East Asians rated the figure as more happy. Their judgment of emotion
reflected that they attended to the social context of the cartoon figure, not to the figure
alone. Here again, holistic thinkers would have more peripheral social information
available for later use. Klein and colleagues (2006) extended this finding with additional
East Asian groups.
Importance of context: information. The role of attention was also seen when
people made sense of a complex situation. People in individualistic cultures who see the
‘self’ as independent of the immediate social environment are more likely to focus on
knowledge about personal attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). On the other hand,
people in collectivistic cultures who see the ‘self’ as functioning within the immediate

19

social environment are more likely to focus on external cues and how those cues
influence events. In solving a complex computer simulated decision making task, Asian
Indians and Germans were asked to take the role of a developmental aide worker and
work to improve the conditions of a semi-nomadic tribe over time by requesting
necessary information (Strohschneider & Guss, 1999). Even though Indian participants
generally asked for less information than the German participants, they asked for more
background and contextual information, such as the social conditions, in their effort to
accomplish the task.
In a similar study, Gelfand, Spurlock, Sniezek and Shao (2000), extended the role
of attention to judgments of information usefulness. Participants were given relational or
individual information about a target person across four situations. Chinese students saw
relational information such as social groups, family, social class, as more useful for
predicting own and target’s behavior, whereas U.S. students favored individual
information such as personal accomplishments. Because of this difference, it is likely that
analytic and holistic thinkers would have different information available for
sensemaking.
The role of attention was also seen when people were asked to establish a motive
for an ambiguous situation. Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, and Park (2003) found the broader
attention associated with holistic thinking had implications for the amount of information
one considered in a sensemaking situation. Americans, with their analytic thinking,
excluded more information as irrelevant than did a sample of Koreans. The same
difference was found when Americans were compared to samples of Japanese, Korean,
and Taiwanese students (Klein et al., 2006). Consistent with the earlier findings,
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Westerners attended to a more focused range of information while East Asians attended
to information that was more diverse.
Relation to sensemaking. Sensemaking starts with awareness of an anomaly or a
problem. It continues to the selection and evaluation of a frame to provide a sense of the
situation. When cultural groups differ in their attention to visual fields, to social contexts,
and to problem spaces, they are likely to notice different anomalies. In addition,
differences in attention and the reliance on context suggest that the relevance of
information and the meaning of information may be influenced by context. When people
vary in the range of information they consider relevant, they will have available different
examples and counter examples for use in sensemaking. Holistic thinkers appear to use
information more intuitively because they have more information available to consider.
Analytic thinkers favor rule or cost-benefits analysis because they attend to a narrow set
of information (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). Taken together, attention
directs PI and sets the stage for subsequent sensemaking.
Attention influences the scope of information pool for sensemaking. Analytic
thinkers see each piece of information as relatively independent of its context (Markus,
Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). In contrast, holistic thinkers looked for contextual cues in
each piece of information (Kagitcibasi, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis,
1995). In order to examine the range of information one considers during sensemaking, I
hypothesized that holistic people with a wider attention scope will select more
information (Hypothesis 7) and find this information to be more relevant (Hypothesis 8)
during sensemaking while analytic people, with a more focused attention, will select less
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information. A higher attention score represents broader attention. Based on this
reasoning, the hypotheses are:
H7: Attention scores will be positively related to the percentage of information
items selected.
H8: Attention scores will be positively related to the rated relevance of available
information.
Causal Attribution: Dispositional vs. Situational
Attribution describes how people assign cause (Heider, 1958) and this has
implications for the selection and the use of information. Dispositional attribution
identifies internal causes such as competence, personality, and values as most
explanatory. Situational attribution looks also to external causal factors such as task
demands, environment barriers, and surrounding people. Analytic thinkers typically
attribute behavior to the actor’s disposition while overlooking situational causes. Holistic
thinkers use both situational and dispositional factors to identify the driving forces for
behavior and events (i.e. Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Lin, 2004; Morris & Peng,
1994). Differences were also found in the way they use information to explain causes.
Differences in causal explanation. Research in Western settings finds that people
attributed behavior to the actor’s disposition, while giving less importance to situational
causes of behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 1993; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, &
Krull, 1988; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977; Van Boven, Kamada, & Gilovich,
1999). This contradicted the attribution theory that warned that one should not explain
behavior with dispositions when it could be explained by the situation. The law of
noncommon effects (Jones & Davis, 1965) and discounting principal (Kelley, 1967) are
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examples that illustrate the attribution process. This tendency of attribution occurred so
frequently that it was dubbed the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (FAE) (Ross et al.,
1977) or correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In this study, dispositional
attributors were expected to be more susceptible to this ‘error.’
Three studies illustrate that people use different causal frames for explanation
during sensemaking. First, Miller (1984) presented Americans and Hindu Indians with a
scenario describing a motorcycle accident and asked “Why did the driver leave the
passenger at the hospital without staying to consult about the seriousness of the
passenger’s injury?” Americans were more likely to attribute the behavior to the
disposition of the driver, such as irresponsibility or the drive to succeed at work. The
Indians, in contrast, were more likely to mention situational attributions, such as
responsibilities and obligations at work. One accident, different attributions.
Next, Morris and Peng (1994) found different causal explanations for naturalistic
events. They examined media treatment of two well-covered mass murders, one by a
Chinese graduate student and the other by an Irish-American postal worker. The English
language newspaper accounts reflected significantly more dispositional attributions such
as “having a very bad temper,” and “had repeatedly threatened violence.” The Chinese
language newspaper provided more situational explanations such as “was isolated from
the Chinese community,” and “followed the example of a recent mass slaying in Texas.”
A laboratory investigation of these probable causes was consistent with the journalistic
report. American students included more dispositional causes and rated them as more
important while the Chinese students included both dispositional and situational causes
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and rated both as important. Taken together, this research confirmed attribution
differences.
Finally, Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, and Kitayama (2006) showed
differences in causal explanations of success. They examined Japanese and American
media responses for explanations of Olympic performances. The Japanese medal winners
responses to a journalist’s question, “How did you succeed?” included more categories
describing athletes’ positive and negative personal attributes, but also more background,
and social and emotional experience. American media accounts included fewer categories
and emphasized positive personal characteristics and features of the competition. Result
from a follow-up laboratory study found Americans chose dispositional information as
relevant while the Japanese used more categories and found situational information more
compelling to explain success. In all three examples, attribution guided the selection of
causal frameworks, dispositional or situational, to explain events.
Information use in causal explanation. While causal frames influence the
relevance of information, research also suggested the power of information to influence
causal attribution differences. Choi and Nisbett (1998) manipulated situational
information saliency to determine causal attribution. They found no differences between
Koreans and Americans in dispositional attribution when situational information was
limited, but Americans were more likely than Koreans to ignore information when
situational information was salient. They stay with their dispositional frame while
Koreans were likely to change frames by incorporating the situational information. In
making sense of two organizational scenarios, Lin (2004) presented Malaysians and
Americans with both dispositional and situational information in two scenarios. The
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study found Malaysians to be more holistic in their thinking than Americans. They
remembered significantly more situational information and identified both dispositional
and situational explanations while Americans rated situational causes as less likely than
Malaysians. The different value placed on situational information would be expected to
lead to different explanations during sensemaking.
Relation to sensemaking. Because people vary in the causal explanations they
use, I expect them to begin with different causal frames, they attend to, value, and accept
different information. They use information differently to explain situations and make
predictions about later events (i.e. Choi et al., 1999; Choi & Nisbett, 1998). These
differences shape their sense of the problem space and direct decision making and
planning.
Causal attribution influences the information selected and used for sensemaking.
Dispositional attributors believe that causes are determined by the attributes of a person.
The focus on dispositional information means they will consider less information and use
fewer categories of information. Situational attributors believe in a causal interaction
between the environment and the person. The focus on both dispositional and situational
information will increase the information items selected. A higher attribution score
represents a higher tendency for a situational causal explanation. The hypotheses are as
follow:
H9: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to percentage of
information items selected.
A consideration of the context by situational attributors increases the selection of
situational information and the judgment of relevance during sensemaking.
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H10: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the percentage of
situational information items selected.
H11: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to mean of situational
information rated as relevant.
To replicate Markus and colleagues (2006) study on categories of information, I
hypothesized that situational attributors will use more categories during sensemaking.
H12: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the number of
categories of information selected.
Contradiction: Differentiation vs. Dialectical
Tolerance for Contradiction describes how people typically manage divergent
information. The first approach, characteristic of analytic thinkers, uses differentiation
and avoids contradictions whenever possible by polarizing goals and options (Peng &
Nisbett, 1999). Consistent with Western logical systems, where each statement must be
true or false but not both, information, goals, and options are polarized to define the most
important. The second approach uses naïve dialecticism. Holistic thinkers deal with
contradiction dialectically by searching for the “Middle Way” between opposing
propositions, retaining basic elements of each by synthesizing them. Holistic thinkers
tolerate contradiction because they see truth in opposing views (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).
Peng and Nisbett (1999) compared dialectical and non-dialectical proverbs from
traditional Chinese and American cultural folk wisdom. Dialectical proverbs contain
contradiction such as “beware of your friends not your enemy” while non-dialectical
proverbs contain no contradiction such as “for example is not proof.” The Chinese
sources have four times as many dialectical as compared to American sources suggest
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contradiction plays a larger role in the Chinese folk wisdom. American participants
preferred non-dialectical proverbs while the Chinese participants preferred dialectical
proverbs. Similar results were obtained using Yiddish proverbs as a control for
familiarity of proverbs.
Tolerance for contradiction influences openness to opposing positions during
sensemaking. Choi and Nisbett (2000) investigated the judgment of contradiction using
the Good Samaritan paradigm. Koreans and Americans reacted differently to a
contradictory conclusion. Koreans, displayed more hindsight bias, showed less surprise
when told a character described as religious, generous, and helpful but under time
pressure and stress did not provide help to a victim. The Americans were more surprised
with the conclusion which contradicted their expectation. The same finding was
confirmed with a story where the target was described negatively but ended up
performing a positive action.
To study this same distinction, Peng and Nisbett (1999) asked participants to
judge how true pairs of contradictory statements were. The Chinese, thinking
dialectically, judged two statements as non-contradictory and as parts of a whole rather
than as dichotomous descriptions. They accepted the seeming contradictions as multiple
perspectives of a single truth (Chu, Spires, & Sueyoshi, 1999; Nakamura, 1985). In
contrast, differentiating reasoning, typical of Westerners, seek constancy. Contradictory
propositions were unacceptable by formal logic. Hence, contradictory statements cannot
both be true. Propositions were considered in a restricted context rather than embedded in
a broader context (Cromer, 1993). Thus, Westerners saw contradictory statements as
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opposing. They polarized contradictions, deciding which position was correct, and
explaining away other positions.
Relation to sensemaking. During sensemaking, tolerance for contradiction may
influence the way goals are chosen. Differentiation thinkers to seek the best goal may
reduce cognitive dissonance by avoiding or quickly dismissing divergent information and
options but may favor information that supports the goal. This simplification may reduce
information overload (O’Reilly, 1980; Weick, 1979) but may also exclude information
needed as new information emerges and existing frames are reexamined or changed.
Dialectical thinkers seek to assimilate contradictory positions for an intermediate goal
mean they are more comfortable with divergent information and experience less
dissonance (Choi et al., 1999; Hiniker, 1969). Seeing more information as related (Choi
et al., 2003), they seek to fit information to form a bigger picture of the complex
situation. They may be more prone to information overload but may also be more
prepared for changes and surprises. These differences between dialectical and
differentiation reasoners provide conflicting paths in complex situations.
During sensemaking, information is used to reduce ambiguity (Weick, 1995).
People who avoid opposing information may err in not considering alternate positions.
People who are comfortable with contradiction may remain open to new information
longer. They may track several frames simultaneously so that they can merge frames or
modify them. Their readiness to change their sense of the situation and their decisions
depending on the situation can prolong the sensemaking process. These differences can
hinder collaboration when high tolerance people are more flexible in decision making and
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view the low tolerance people as rigid. Low tolerance people seek to complete work
would view high tolerance people’s flexibility as indecisive.
Tolerance for contradiction affects PI and decisions in sensemaking. People high
in tolerance for contradiction believe that some truths exist in two opposing positions and
may retain an intermediate position. They may not identify causes as conflicting and thus,
may choose several approaches to solve the problem. During sensemaking, people who
have a low tolerance for contradiction believe that two opposing views cannot be correct
at the same time and will choose the cause that contributes most to the problem. This
belief will also affect decision judgments. A higher score on tolerance for contradiction
suggests a greater likelihood to synthesize opposing positions and prefer an intermediate
solution. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H13: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute
difference between their final dispositional and situational problem
identification judgments than people with low tolerance for contradiction.
H14: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute
difference between their final dispositional and situational decision
judgments than people with low tolerance for contradiction.
Personality Differences And Information Use
People differ in their propensities for processing information. Several personality
variables are associated with information processing (Anderson, 2002). People may
handle the same information in different ways. They may prefer different forms of data
and information, like different sources, and handle unreliable information in different
ways. In addition, making sense out of this information can be overwhelming during time
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pressure and the changing environment. Personality differences can influence how people
handle information during these situations and have implication on decision effectiveness
(Anderson, 2002; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Hence, the need for cognitive closure and
the need for cognition are included in this study to give a broader perspective on
individuals’ information selection and use.
Need for Cognitive Closure
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) defined the need for cognitive closure as a
dispositional construct that is manifested through differences in desire for predictability,
preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and closemindedness. It is related to an individual’s motivation with respect to information
processing and judgment. Individuals motivated to attain cognitive closure were more
likely to use early information in forming judgments compared with individuals
motivated to avoid closure (Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).
These individuals with high dispositional need for cognitive closure also considered less
information before making judgments, yet they were more confident in their judgment
and required less time to form it (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). They had the tendency to
commit FAE (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Veronica, 2000) and were less susceptible to
persuasion (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
The need for cognitive closure has been linked to attribution. Chiu and colleagues
(2000) found that dispositional attribution varies as a function of the need for closure.
People with high cognitive closure were more likely to make attributions to individual
dispositions whereas those with low cognitive closure made situational attributions.
Consistent with this past research, I posit that cognitive closure will be related to the type
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of information considered during sensemaking. Because dispositional attribution may be
an easier process (Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985; Winter & Uleman, 1984), those
with high cognitive closure will look for dispositional information rather than for
situational information (Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001) while those with low
cognitive closure may equally attend to both kinds of information. A higher score
represents a higher need for cognitive closure. This reasoning leads to the following
hypothesis:
H15: Need for Cognitive Closure scores will be positively related to the
percentage of dispositional information items selected.
As described earlier, the tendency to dispositional attribution in the presence of
available situational explanation is called FAE. FAE is common in dispositional
attributors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) and also in people with a higher need for closure
(Webster, 1993). While research has shown that both individually contributed to FAE, I
explore the joint effect of attribution and need for cognitive closure on FAE. Because
individuals high in need for closure are motivated to achieve closure, they may be more
likely to make dispositional attributions. Together with the tendency to make
dispositional attribution, people high in both need for cognitive closure and dispositional
attribution are more likely to be susceptible to FAE. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H16: There will be a significant interaction between Attribution scores and the
Need for Cognitive Closure scores on final dispositional PI judgments. The
slope between Attribution and final PI judgments will be steeper for people
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high in need for closure than people low in need for closure to reflect their
dispositional tendency for PI.
Need for Cognition
The need for cognition describes the amount of thought an individual typically
puts forth in daily activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982). Individuals high in intrinsic motivation to exercise their mental faculties are
characterized as high in need for cognition (chronic cognizers) whereas individuals low
in intrinsic motivation to engage in effortful cognitive endeavors are characterized as low
in need for cognition (chronic cognitive misers) (Cacioppo et al., 1996). These individual
differences were found to influence the acquisition or processing of information relevant
to dilemmas or problems. High levels of cognition are found to be negatively related to
the tendency to ignore, avoid, or distort new information (Venkatraman, Marlino, Kardes,
& Sklar, 1990). People high in need for cognition sought out, scrutinized, and used
relevant information when making decisions and solving problems more than did people
with low need for cognition (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992).
Individuals with high need for cognition were more likely to seek information
across domains. They were more likely to have acquired, thought about, and reflected
back on information to make sense of events. In contrast, individuals with low need for
cognition were more likely to rely on other people, cognitive heuristics, or social
comparison processes. The need for cognition is expected to affect the amount of
information gathered during sensemaking. A person with a lower need for cognition is
likely to select less information items while someone with a higher need for cognition
may want and select more information. Based on this research, I hypothesized:
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H17: The Need for Cognition scores will be positively related to the percentage of
information items selected.
The relationship of the need for cognition and AH thinking might itself influence
the tendency for a person to commit FAE. Because individuals high in need for cognition
have the intrinsic motivation to process and consider more information, they may be less
likely to make dispositional attributions. Because individuals high in holistic thinking
will take the context into account when making judgments, they may also be less likely to
make dispositional attributions. Together, people high on both need for cognition and
holistic thinking are less likely to be susceptible to FAE. The reasoning leads to the
following hypothesis:
H18: There will be a significant interaction between AH scores and Need for
Cognition scores on the final dispositional PI judgments. The slope between
AH scores and final PI judgments will be steeper for people low in need for
cognition than people high in need for cognition to reflect their dispositional
tendency for PI.
In the next section, I described the methods design to assess the changes in
sensemaking and the materials used to tap individual differences described earlier in this
study.
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II. METHOD
Research Design
This research used a mixed factorial design. There were two between subject
factors and a within subject factor. The between subject factors were 2 (Scenario Order) x
2 (Information Presentation Order). Participants received the two scenarios in a
counterbalanced order resulting in two scenario orders. In each scenario, dispositional
(D) information and situational (S) information were presented sequentially to tap
information use and change in judgments. The counterbalancing of information
presentation order created two versions of information presentation in each scenario. One
version began with information that suggested a dispositional cause followed by
information that suggested a situational cause (D-S). In the other version, the order was
reversed (S-D). Participants received both scenarios either in D-S order or S-D order.
The main order I am interested in is Information Presentation (D versus S). While
the information presentation is different, the content in each scenario was the same. Each
participant received both scenarios and the same content. Hence, all participants received
the same materials, making a within subject factor.
The 2 (Scenario Order) x 2 (Information Presentation Order) design created four
booklets. Participants were each given a booklet with one of the specific order shown in
Table 2. For example, participants with Booklet 1 received Scenario 1 followed by
Scenario 2, both with a D-S information presentation order in both scenarios. Participants
also completed five questionnaires, a memory task, and a demographic sheet.
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Materials
There were two types of materials. Table 3 shows an overview of the measures
used in this study. The first was the Sensemaking Assessment Package that included two
unfolding scenarios, here labeled Sensemaking Scenarios, with questions inserted to
assess the outcome measures, and a Memory Recall task. Different sections in each
scenario presented the unfolding of the scenario. Figure 4 illustrates the five sections of a
scenario where Sections A to E describe the sequences in the unfolding scenarios while
the Response column in Table 3 shows what was measured in each Section.
The second type of material measured the predictor variables: Analytic-Holism
Scale (AHS), Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog), Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC),
and Tolerance Ambiguity Scale (TAS). See Response column in Table 3 for the measures
in each section of the questionnaires. Each of these measures is described in the section
below.
Sensemaking Assessment Package: Sensemaking Scenarios
Sensemaking Assessment Development
The final sensemaking assessment was developed in six pilot studies. Pilot
Studies 1, 2, and 3 developed the sensemaking scenarios based on interviews,
information development, and evaluation of scenarios and information. In Pilot Study 1,
undergraduates were interviewed to find relevant scenarios and to understand the use of
information. In Pilot Study 2, information for each scenario was developed from the
interviews and earlier research materials (Lin, 2004). Undergraduates rated how relevant
each information item was to dispositional cause and situational cause. Items were rewritten to clarify the scenarios. In Pilot Study 3, graduate students evaluated information
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items, overall scenarios for the balance and strength of information, and scenarios interest
for undergraduates. Changes were made iteratively to refine scenarios.
Pilot Study 4 further developed the two scenarios into sensemaking assessments
by incorporating the outcome measures: problem identification (PI) judgments, decision
judgments, information selection, information relevance, information need, information
trust, and qualitative sensemaking. In Pilot Study 5, the sensemaking assessments
together with other measures used in the study were tested. Completion time was noted.
A memory task was added. In Pilot Study 6, the sensemaking assessment package was
finalized to incorporate needed improvement and changes for the final sensemaking
assessment package for the study. See Appendix A for details of each pilot study.
Final Sensemaking Assessment Scenarios
Two sensemaking assessment scenarios were developed from the pilot studies,
Production Dilemma (PD) and Westerly Foundation (WF). Production Dilemma involved
a chaotic commercial production department and a CEO who wanted a fair report on the
activities of the department. Westerly Foundation involved a non-profit organization that
was facing a shortage of funds and the Board of Directors who wanted recommendation
to solve the problem. See Appendix B for the two sensemaking scenarios.
As illustrated in Figure 4, there were five sections in each final scenario. Each
scenario started with an initial problem presentation that suggested a dilemma between
two possible causes, the particular person or the changes in the organization. Participants
were asked to make the initial PI and decision judgments as to what they think happened
and what they would decide to do [Section A]. They were then asked to select
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information from different categories of information to help make sense of the problem
[Section B].
Each scenario then presented additional information that represented dynamic
changes in the stories [Section C and D]. Either information about the person is presented
first, followed by changes in the situation, or vice-versa. In each scenario, there were
thirteen items in each of the two information presentation manipulations with a total of 26
items. In the information presentation that suggested dispositional or person cause, there
were eleven dispositional items and two situational items. In the information presentation
that suggested a situational cause, there were eleven situational items and two
dispositional items. In these sections, participants were asked to re-judge causes and
decisions as they received the additional information, and they evaluated the relevance of
the information presented at each point.
Participants were then presented all twenty six information items and they again
selected information [Section E]. Here, they made the final PI and decision judgments.
Ratings of information need and trust were also collected.
Sensemaking Assessment Outcomes in Each Scenario
As the sensemaking assessment generated the outcomes used to analyze the study
hypotheses, it is important to describe how these outcomes were measured. See Appendix
B for all items and Table 4 for combined and individual scenario reliabilities. Below are
the descriptions of each outcome:
Problem identification. Two types of problems were identified: situational and
dispositional. For items, three for each type of PI, participants were asked “How likely do
you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).”
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These were measured at four points in the scenario. Situational PI items reliabilities for
the two combined scenarios from Time 1 to Time 4 were .63, .72, .65, and .74 (n=6),
respectively. Dispositional PI items reliabilities from Time 1 to Time 4 were .79, .88, .83,
and .81 (n=6), respectively.
Decision. There were two types of decisions: situational and dispositional. Six
items measured the decisions, three for each type of decision. Participants were asked
“How likely are you to recommend these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).” These were also measured four times. The reliabilities for the two combined
scenarios from Time 1 to Time 4 were .69, .75, .71, and .73 for situational decision items
(n=6) and .71, .75, .67, and .66 for dispositional decision items (n=6).
Information selection. There were two parts in the scenarios where information
selection was assessed. The first information selection was before Information
Presentation (IP) 1. Nine categories each with a range of 3-5 information items in each
category were presented. A total of 36 items were presented. Participants were asked to
“Mark ‘X’ for items that will best help you understand the problem.” The responses were
dichotomous, either an item was marked or it was not. The reliability for Information
Selection 1 for the combined scenarios (n=72) was .92.
The second information selection was after IP 2 but before the final judgments. It
consisted of the 26 information items created for the study. Participants were asked to
“Please select information that is relevant for your report by marking ‘X’ in the boxes
below.” The responses were dichotomous, either an item was marked or it was not. The
reliability for Information Selection 2 for the combined scenarios (n=52) was .84.
Categories of information selection. In Information Selection 1, nine categories
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of information tested the range of categories of information used. Selection of a category
was defined as having at least one item selected from that category. For example, if the
item ‘Group Composition’ was selected, that means the category ‘Work Group
Information’ was selected. The reliability for category selection for the combined
scenarios (n=18) was .89.
Information relevance. There were two types of information: dispositional and
situational were used for the two information manipulation presented. There were thirteen
items for dispositional items and thirteen situational items for a total of 26 information
items. The relevance of these information items were assessed after each information
presentation. Participants were asked “Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very
Relevant) how relevant is each item.” The reliabilities for the combined scenarios for
situational items (n=26) was .86 and .87 for dispositional items (n=26).
Information need. One item was used to assess information need. Participants
were asked “Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to
investigate the problem.” This was measured four times.
Information trust. One item was used to assess information trust. Participants
were asked “How much do you trust the information that was presented to you?” They
rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot). This was measured twice, one time in each section
of the information presentation.
Qualitative sensemaking. In parallel with the measures describe above, an open
ended question, “What do you now think happened?”, was asked four times to find what
participants thought happened in the scenario (see Appendix B). These queries tap
sensemaking qualitatively to chart how participants change their assessment of the
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scenarios as additional and contrary information is given. This measurement of
sensemaking allows participants to justify their PI in the scenarios. Appendix C showed
the sequence of coding for responses and the description of the response codes.
The open ended question, asked four times, provided four responses. In the
scenario participant first responded to the initial frame with limited information [Respond
1 (R1)] (the first page of Appendix C illustrates an example). Next, participants receive
the first information presentation [Information Presentation 1 (IP1)]. The first
information presentation could be consistent (=) or inconsistent (≠) with participants’ first
response. Participant could stay with (=) or change (≠) their first response in the second
response [R2] based on the first information presentation. They then received a second
information presentation [IP2] in which the content was always contrary to content of the
first information presentation. The second information presentation could be consistent
(=) or inconsistent (≠) with the second response. Participants could stay with (=) or
change (≠) their second response in the third response [R3]. Before the fourth response
[R4], no new information was given but participants were presented with all previous
information and they selected the information deemed important for the scenario.
Open ended responses were coded for situational, dispositional, or both types of
explanations. For each open ended response, a participant’s need for more information
was also coded as present or absent. The four open ended responses yielded codes that
depended on the consistency of a participant’s initial explanation and on the first
information presented as well as on subsequent response to the second information
presentation. In Appendix C, combinations of qualitative sensemaking patterns based on
responses over information presentation are illustrated for a person with an initial
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dispositional response. From the qualitative data collected from participants, nine
sensemaking patterns were identified (see second page of Appendix C for Codes
descriptions).
Participant responses were coded in the following way: The occurrence of the first
question taps a participant’s Initial Frame of the problem. Individuals who were able to
give a reason(s) for the problem by identifying causal factors were those who started
sensemaking with an initial frame. They stated cause(s) in the open ended question. For
example, “In my experience financial problems are caused by poor planning by
management.”
The first and second information presentations allow for changes in the second
and third responses. The responses to these information presentations tapped two other
forms of sensemaking, Questioning and Preserving. In questioning a frame, a participant
was ready to change their understanding of the situation. They may not trust the
information they were given. For example, “It is not Andy’s fault as I previously thought.
I don’t believe what his co-workers said about him because I think they were just using
Andy.” In preserving a frame, participants are establishing a base to maintain their
previous understanding of the situation. They will hold to their original conclusion even
if they are presented with new contradictory information and will use information
consistent with the conclusion to strengthen the conclusion. For example, “It is Andy’s
fault as I previously thought. I know the previous supervisor may think well of him but
there are so many negatives about Andy.”
Sensemaking Assessment Package: Memory Recall Task
Included in the Sensemaking Assessment Package was the memory recall task.

41

This task assessed the kind of information items participants remembered from the first
scenario they received. To do this, they completed a memory recall task. Participants
were reminded about the first scenario they were presented with in the study. For
example, “Earlier in this session, you were presented with the [Scenario Name]
scenario.” They were then presented with the initial problem from the scenario. For
example, “You are an advisor for non-profit organizations…Your job is to understand the
situation and recommend action.” Participants were then asked to recall as many
information items as they could from the scenario. This task measured the number and
type of information items a participant recalled. See Appendix D for memory recall task.
Coding
Information was coded for Dispositional-Situational information and ConfirmingDisconfirming information. Dispositional-Situational information was coded into three
mutually exclusive categories: Dispositional Target (DT), Dispositional Non-Target
(DNT), and Situational (S). Confirming-Disconfirming information was coded into two
exclusive mutually categories: Confirming and Disconfirming.
Dispositional Target information recall was defined as recall of information that
was related to internal attributes of the target person such as personality, beliefs, feelings,
physical attributes, etc (i.e. Michael or Andy). Some examples are “Michael is new to
non-profit organization” and “Andy is a troublemaker.” Dispositional Non-Target
information recall was defined as recall of information that was related to internal
attributes of a non target person such as personality, beliefs, feelings, or physical
attributes, etc. For example, information about other directors and employees in WF and
Chris and other employees in PD are non target information. Some examples are “Mr.
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Spector set up foundation policy” and “Chris is the new supervisor.” Situational
information recall was defined as recall of information that was related to external factors
of a person (i.e. events surrounding the person, industry and organizational information,
economy, etc.). Some examples are “two other foundations were set up” and “new
machines were brought in.”
Confirming Information was information that was consistent and supported a
current sense of a situation. This was defined as information that confirmed a cause to be
the problem. For example, “Andy is a troublemaker” supported an individual to be the
problem and “The economy is facing a recession” supported the situation to be the
problem. Disconfirming Information was information that was inconsistent and could
change the current sense of a situation. This was defined as information that refuted a
cause to be the problem. For example, “Andy knows a lot about the production process”
refuted an individual to be the problem and “The management met with and explained the
planned changes to production workers” refuted the situation to be the problem. When
information recall was neither confirming nor disconfirming, each category received an
absent code. See Appendix E for Memory Coding description.
Analytic-Holism Scale (AHS)
In order to measure an individual’s Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking, I used the
Analytic-Holism Scale (AHS; Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007). This scale is relatively new in
cross cultural research but it is one of the few psychometrically valid scales available to
measure AH thinking. The score on AHS was used as a moderator (H2, H3, H5, & H6)
and predictor (H1, H4, & H18) in this study. The three subscales on AHS, Attention,
Causal Attribution, and Contradiction, were also used as predictor scores for hypotheses
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(H7-H8; H9-H12, H16; H13-H14, respectively). See Appendix F for the scale.
This scale consisted of 24 items measuring the four components of AH thinking
on a 7-point Likert scale. Five items from Perception of Change subscale and one from
Contradiction subscale were reverse coded items. A higher score signifies a higher
holistic tendency. Example items include “The whole is greater than the sum of its
parts,” “Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes
are not known.” “It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes,”
and “Future events are predictable based on present situations.”
Choi and colleagues (2007) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .73 for the overall
scale, and .67, .76, .71, and .71 for Attention, Causal Attribution, Contradiction, and
Perception of Change subscales, respectively. The present study has an alpha of .60 for
the overall scale, and 62, .71 .52, and .48 for Attention, Causal Attribution, Contradiction,
and Perception of Change subscales, respectively. Choi et al. (2007) found that a fourfactor model (χ2 (246) = 802.61, χ 2/df = 3.26, GFI = .88) had a better fit. As in Choi and
colleagues (2007), all subscales were significantly correlated with the overarching scale
(AHS). In the present study, Perception of Change subscales not related to Contradiction
and Causal Attribution.
The Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog)
In order to measure the need for cognition, an individual’s tendency to engage in
and enjoy thinking, I used the short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog;
Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). The score on the NfCog was used as a predictor and
moderator (H17 and H18, respectively). See Appendix G for the scale.
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The original scale had 34 items and the short form has 18 items on a 5-point
Likert scale. Half of the items were reverse-scored items. Example items form the short
form include “I would prefer complex to simple problems,” “Thinking is not my idea of
fun,” and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.” The two forms
were correlated at .95. One factor structure accounted for 37% of the variance. It
represents a single continuum of interindividual variations in the general tendency to
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors. The scale has a Cronbach alpha of .90
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Cronbach’s alpha value for the present study was .87.
The Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC)
The need for cognitive closure describes an individual’s motivation to attain a
conclusion or desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort with
ambiguity, decisiveness; and, close-mindedness. To measure this, I used the short form of
the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCC; Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2005). The score on
NFCC was used as a predictor and moderator (H15 and H16, respectively). See Appendix
H for the scale.
The NFCC (long form) consists of five subscales: Preference for Order,
Preference for Predictability, Decisiveness, Discomfort with Ambiguity, and Closed
Mindedness. It has a Cronbach's alpha of .84 and the reliability of the subscale ranges
from .62 to .82. The test-retest reliability coefficient over a 12-week period is .86
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This scale has 42 items.
A short form of NFCC consists of 16 items on a 6-point Likert scale. Example
items include “I prefer activities where it is always clear what is to be done and how it
need to be done,” and “I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place.”

45

Two items form a lie score are “I never been late for work or for an appointment,” and
“I have never hurt another person’s feelings.” Pierro and Kruglanski (2005) found
attenuated correlations between shortened revised NFCC and previous version of NFCC
in U.S. and Italian samples are .92 and .93, respectively. Reliability was satisfactory at
.80 in a U.S. sample and .79 in an Italian sample. Cronbach’s alpha value for the present
study was .73.
Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale
MacDonald (1970)’s scale of tolerance for ambiguity measures an individual’s
perception of ambiguous or inconsistent situations as desirable; or tendency to perceive
or interpret ambiguous environment as threatening or undesirable, was used for
exploration in this study. It has 20 items. This is a dichotomous scale with true-false
responses. Example items include “I don’t like to work on a problem unless there is a
possibility of coming out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answers,” and “Sometimes I
rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things I’m not supposed to do.” The scale
had an alpha of .78. Cronbach’s alpha value for the present study was .48. See Appendix
I for the scale.
Demographics
Participant’s gender, age, ethnic identity, level of education, GPA, and working
experience information was collected. See Appendix J for demographic sheet.
Procedure
Data was collected in groups of 10 or fewer participants. Each session took
approximately 90 minutes. First, participants were provided a description of the study and
were asked their consent to participate. They were then given the package of testing
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materials and instructions on how to proceed. Written instructions were included with
each section of materials. Participants completed each scenario at their own pace. After
participants completed both scenarios, they completed the questionnaires in the following
order: Analytic-Holism Scale, the Need for Cognition Scale, the Need for Cognitive
Closure Scale, Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale, and the memory recall task. Finally, they
completed a demographic sheet. Participants were then debriefed and questions were
answered.
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III. RESULTS
In the first section, I describe the sample and scenario characteristics. In the
second section, I present hypotheses testing using correlation analyses and moderated
multiple regressions. Lastly, I explored additional analyses: the relationships among the
individual measures, memory recall, and qualitative sensemaking using two exploratory
measures.
Sample and Scenario Characteristics
Sample Characteristics
Three hundred and thirty six undergraduates from Introductory Psychology
courses participated in this study. Twenty four participants were excluded from the
sample based on exclusion criteria of foreign born, incomplete data, or misunderstanding
of instructions. The final sample included 312 participants. As described in the Method
section, there were four booklets. Seventy eight participants received one of the four
booklets. The sample consisted of 26.6% male and 73.4% female with an average age of
19.61 years (SD = 3.66). Participants were primarily freshmen (72.4%) and Caucasian
American (64.7%). A majority majored in Health Sciences (34.0%), followed by
Social/Behavioral Sciences (15.1%). See Table 5 for detailed demographics information
on schooling, childhood background, and work experience.
Scenario Differences
Because two scenarios were used, scenarios were compared for outcome differences
using repeated measures and multilevel random coefficient (MRC) modeling analyses.
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Analyses were performed on outcomes related to selection of categories, the percentage
of information items selected, the percentage of types of information items selected,
relevance judgments of types of information, problem identification (PI) and decision
judgments, and the differences for final judgments.
Using repeated measure analyses, scenarios did not differ for information
selection - the number of categories selected, percentage of information items selected,
percentage of situation information items selected, and percentage of dispositional
information items selected. However, differences were found for ratings of situational
information relevance, Pillai’s trace = .11, Wilks’s lambda = .89, F = 39.18, p < .001;
dispositional information relevance, Pillai’s trace = .01, Wilks’s lambda = .99, F = 3.91,
p < .05; and overall information relevance, Pillai’s trace = .02, Wilks’s lambda = .98, F =
6.54, p < .05. See Table 6 for details.
Using MRC modeling analyses as suggested in Bliese and Ployhart (2002), PI and
decision judgments over four measurement times were compared between scenarios
while controlling for scenario order and information presentation order. Scenarios,
scenario order, and information presentation order were level-2 variables while Time was
a level-1 variable. For PI judgments, scenarios were not significantly different for either
dispositional PI or situational PI. For decision judgments, scenarios were significantly
different only for dispositional decision, B = 0.11, df = 2179, t = 2.13, p < .05.
The difference scores between the final situational and dispositional PI judgments
for the two scenarios were compared. I also compared the difference scores between the
final situational and dispositional decision judgments. Scenarios were significantly
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different for the PI judgments, Pillai’s trace = .10, Wilks’s lambda = .90, F = 36.02, p <
.001 but not for the decision judgments. See Table 6 for details.
In order to simplify analyses for hypotheses testing, I first used combined scores
of both the scenarios to provide general findings. I additionally conducted hypotheses
testing on individual scenarios with associated outcomes differences found in analyses of
scenario differences. These include dispositional decision judgments, information
relevance, and the difference between the final PIs judgments. For the additional
analyses, combined scores were used.
Hypotheses Testing
I examined three sets of research hypotheses. The first set looked at AH thinking
with PI (H1, H2, H3) and decision judgments (H4, H5, H6). Specifically, how AH
thinking influenced initial PI and decision judgments (H1, H4) and how it interacted with
the two information presentations to affect subsequent PI and decision judgments (H2,
H3, H5, H6). The second set, components of AH thinking, was hypothesized to be related
to the information characteristics: Information selection (H7, H9, H10, H12) and
Information relevance (H8, H11). Additionally, Tolerance for Contradiction was posited
to relate to the absolute difference scores between two PI and two decision judgments
(H13, H14). The third set examines two individual personality differences in information
selection (H15, H17) and the combination of each of these individual differences with
AH thinking in affecting PI judgments (H16, H18). The hypotheses were assessed using
correlation analyses or moderated multiple regressions as appropriate.
Analytic-Holistic Thinking
There were several commonalities among the hypotheses tested here. First,
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Analytic-Holistic thinking was hypothesized to influence initial situational PI and
decision. Because holistic thinkers use a situational causal framework during
sensemaking, they would begin with situational causes. Hypotheses 1 and 4 test this
assumption using correlational analyses. Second, because analytic and holistic thinkers
might seek different types of information, they might use information differently to
identify problems and make decisions. This was tested using two sequential information
presentations. Hypotheses 2, 3, 5 and 6 test this assumption using moderated multiple
regressions.
Moderated multiple regression is a form of hierarchical multiple regression that
uses a hierarchical entry of the predictor variables to determine if the relationship
between one of the predictors and a criterion variable is influenced by a third moderating
variable. A significant interaction indicates a moderating effect and will be followed by a
simple slopes analysis. This analysis is used for hypotheses with moderators, H2, H3, H5,
H6, H16, and H18. In Hypothesis 2, the moderated multiple regression is described in
detail, while subsequent hypotheses following similar steps are briefly described.
H1: AH scores will be positively correlated with initial situational PI judgments.
To test Hypothesis 1, the mean overall Analytic-Holistic (AH) scores and the
initial situational PI judgment scores [Combined: Problem Identification Sit T1] 2 were
correlated. The AH scores were significantly correlated with initial situational PI
judgment scores, r = .13, p < .05. Hypothesis 1 was supported. People higher in holistic
thinking were more likely to identify problems to be situational in their initial judgment.
See Table 7.

2

Brackets here and in later results indicate labels in tables.
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H2: The interaction between AH scores and Information Presentation (IP) 1 will
significantly affect both situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 2, after
controlling for PI judgments in Time 1, IP1, and AH scores. The slope between IP1
and both situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 2 will be steeper for high
holistic thinking than people low in holistic thinking.
To test Hypothesis 2, the influence of AH thinking on the relationship between
IP1 and the PI judgments, moderated multiple regression analyses were used. Analyses
were examined independently for situational PI and dispositional PI judgment outcomes.
Situational PI judgment. Situational PI judgment at Time 2 was selected as the
outcome. I regressed this on situational PI judgment at Time 1, IP1, AH scores, and the
interaction term of IP1 and AH scores in three steps. In Step 1, situational PI judgment at
Time 1 was entered to predict situational PI judgment at Time 2. In Step 2, IP1 and AH
scores were entered. In Step 3, the interaction term computed as a cross-product of
predictors (IP1 x AH scores) was entered. See Table 8 for results.
In Step 1, situational PI judgment at Time 1 predicted situational PI judgment at
Time 2. Variance accounted for by this initial model was significant, R2 = .19, F (1, 310)
= 71.15, p < .001, indicating that situational PI judgment at Time 1 predicted situational
PI judgment at Time 2. In Step 2 two other predictors, IP1 and AH scores, were added.
The variance accounted for by this model was R2 = .32. The incremental variance was
significant, Δ R2 = .14, Δ F (2, 308) = 30.73, p < .001, revealing that the addition of
information presentation and AH thinking increased the predictive power of the model. In
Step 3, when the interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .33. The
incremental variance was also significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 5.13, p < .05. The
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interaction term was significant, B = .45, t = 2.27, p < .05, indicating that the situational
PI judgment at Time 2 depended upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.
A significant interaction of IP1 and AH scores on situational PI judgments
suggested that AH thinking influenced how information was used in making situational
PI judgments. This allowed for further simple slope analyses.
A simple slope analysis describes the effect of AH tendency on the relationship
between IP1 and the situational PI judgments. These simple slopes are the regression of
the outcome, situational PI judgments at Time 2, on the predictor, IP1 at specific values
of the moderator, AH scores. Two means of AH scores, representing one standard
deviation above and below the mean of AH scores, were created to indicate high and low
AH thinking (Aiken & West, 1991). These generated two simple regression lines of
situational PI judgment on IP1 as a function of two levels of AH thinking. See Figure 5.
These regression lines were not parallel reflecting the interactions effects. The
relationship between situational PI judgments and IP1 changed as a function of AH
scores. The slope for people with higher holistic scores was steeper than that of people
lower in holistic thinking, as hypothesized. This shows that higher holistic thinking used
the situation information presented in a way that is reflected in their situational PI
judgment. However, the effect is significant but small, as indicated by incremental
variance of 1%. Another interpretation is that they are more susceptible to situational
information presentation. Hypothesis 2 was supported for situational PI judgment.
Dispositional PI judgment. The moderated multiple regression analysis was
repeated for dispositional PI judgment at Time 2. See Table 8 for results. Variance
accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .08, F (1, 310) = 28.02, p < .001, indicating
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that dispositional PI judgment at Time 1 predicted dispositional PI judgment at Time 2.
The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .60. The incremental variance was
significant, Δ R2 = .51, Δ F (2, 308) = 196.14, p < .001. In Step 3, when the interaction
term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .78. The incremental variance was also
significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 9.23, p < .01. The interaction term was significant,
B = -.67, t = -3.04, p < .01, indicating that the dispositional PI judgment at Time 2
depended upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.
The interaction of IP1 and AH score on dispositional PI judgments at Time 2
supports the interaction effect in Hypothesis 2. AH thinking influences how information
was used when making judgments during sensemaking. The simple slopes analysis for
dispositional PI judgment is similar to that described for situational PI judgment. Two
regression lines of high and low AH scores were graphed. See Figure 6.
The non-parallel regression lines indicate that the relationship between
dispositional PI judgments and IP1 changed as a function of AH scores. Again, the
steeper slopes were for people with higher holistic scores than people lower in holistic
scores. The slopes showed that people higher in holistic thinking seemed to be more
susceptible to whatever information they are presented. When dispositional information
was presented, they rated dispositional PI judgment to be higher and when situational
information was presented, they judged the dispositional PI to be lower. Again, effect is
significant but small. Hypothesis 2 was supported for dispositional PI judgment.
H3: The interaction between AH scores and IP2 will significantly affect both
situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3, after controlling for PI
judgments in Time 2, IP2, and AH Scores. The slope between IP2 and both
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situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3 will be steeper for people high in
holistic thinking than people low in holistic thinking.
Hypotheses 3 followed the same analyses as Hypotheses 2 except that the
outcome scores were judgments at Time 3. In Step 1, I controlled for judgments at Time
2. Step 2 and 3 followed those in Hypothesis 2 except that IP2 replaced IP1. Again
situational and dispositional PI judgments were investigated independently. See Table 8
for results.
Situational PI judgment. In Step 1, the variance accounted for was significant,
R2=.18, F (1, 310) = 66.50, p < .001. Situational PI judgment at Time 2 predicted
situational PI judgment at Time 3. In Step 2, the variance accounted for was R2 = .26
when IP 2 and AH scores was added. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 =
.09, Δ F (2, 308) = 17.62, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .26.
The incremental variance with the added interaction term was not significant, Δ R2 = .00,
Δ F (1, 307) = 1.73, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = .22, t = 1.32, p
> .05. Situational PI judgment at Time 3 did not depend on the interaction of IP2 and AH
scores. Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Dispositional PI judgment. The variance accounted for Step 1 was not
significant, R2 = .00, F (1, 310) = .39, p > .05. Dispositional PI judgment at Time 2 did
not predict dispositional PI judgment at Time 3. See Table 8 for results. The variance
accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .28 with an incremental variance of Δ R2 = .28, Δ F (2,
308) = 60.70, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .29. The
incremental variance, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = .77, p > .05 and the interaction term, B =
-.22, t = -.88, p > .05, were not significant. Dispositional PI judgment at Time 3 did not
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depend upon the interaction of IP 2 and AH scores. Hypothesis 3 was not supported. A
simple slope analysis would not be meaningful.
H4: AH scores will be positively correlated with initial situational decision
judgments.
To test Hypothesis 4, the mean overall AH scores and the initial situational
decision judgment scores [Combined: Decision Sit T1] were used in a correlation
analysis. The AH scores were significantly correlated with the initial situational PI
judgment scores, r = .17, p < .01. Hypothesis 4 was supported. People higher in holistic
thinking were more likely to recommend a situational solution in their initial judgment.
See Table 7.
H5: The interaction between AH scores and IP1 will significantly affect both
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 2, after controlling decision
judgments in Time 1, IP1, and AH scores. The slope of IP1 and both situational and
dispositional decision judgments in Time 2 will be steeper for people high in holistic
thinking than people low in holistic thinking.
The analyses for Hypotheses 5 and 6 were consistent to those three steps
described in Hypotheses 2 and 3, respectively, using decision judgment scores rather than
PI judgments at their respective measurement times. See Table 9 for results.
Situational decision judgment. In Step 1, situational decision judgment at Time 1
predicted situational decision judgment at Time 2. The variance accounted for was R2 =
.19, F (1, 310) = 74.78, p < .001. In Step 2, the variance accounted for was R2 = .43. The
incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .24, Δ F (2, 308) = 64.29, p < .001. In Step
3, when the interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .43. The
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incremental variance was also significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 4.89, p < .05. The
significant interaction term, B = .45, t = 2.21, p < .05, indicates that the situational
decision judgment at Time 2 depended upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.
A significant interaction of IP1 and AH scores on situational decision judgments
outcome suggested that AH thinking influences how information was used when making
decision judgments in sensemaking supporting the interaction effect in Hypothesis 5. The
simple slopes analysis in Figure 7 shows the relationship between IP1 and the situational
decision judgments at two levels, high and low, of AH thinking.
As in earlier analyses, the slope was steeper for people higher holistic thinking
than people lower holistic thinking. Higher holistic thinkers used situational information
to affect their situational decision judgments. When dispositional information was
presented, they used dispositional information to be wary of adopting a situational
decision showing a lower situational judgment. The incremental variance of 1% indicates
the effect is small. Hypothesis 5 was supported for situational decision judgment.
Dispositional decision judgment. As reported in the scenario differences section,
differences over time were found for the dispositional decision judgment. The analysis
associated with this variable first used combined score then scores from each scenario. I
used dispositional decision judgment at Time 2 as the outcome. Variance accounted for in
Step 1 was significant, R2 = .15, F (1, 310) = 53.06, p < .001. See Table 9 for results.
Dispositional decision judgment at Time 1 predicted dispositional decision judgment at
Time 2. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .56. The incremental variance was
significant, Δ R2 = .42, Δ F (2, 308) = 146.81, p < .001. In Step 3, when the interaction
term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .57. The incremental variance, Δ R2 =
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.01, Δ F (1, 307) = 6.20, p < .05 and the interaction term, B = -.52, t = -2.49, p < .05,
were significant. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 2 depended upon the
interaction of IP1 and AH scores.
A significant interaction of IP1 and AH scores on dispositional decision
judgments outcomes suggested that AH thinking influences how information was used
when making dispositional decision judgments. This supported the interaction effect of
Hypothesis 5.
The simple slopes analysis in Figure 8 shows the relationship between IP1 and the
dispositional decision judgments at high and low AH thinking. As in earlier analysis, the
slopes suggest that people higher in holistic thinking are more susceptible to whatever
information they are presented. When dispositional information was presented, they
judged dispositional decisions to be higher, when presented with situational information,
they judged the dispositional decisions to be lower. Again, effect is significant but small.
Hypothesis 5 was supported for dispositional decision judgment.
Dispositional decision judgment: Analysis by scenario. The same analysis was
performed independently for each scenario. See Table 10 for details. The WF result
showed a significant interaction as did the combined scenarios results. The PD scenario
had a non-significant interaction. In PD, the variance accounted for in Step 1 was
significant, R2 = .11, F (1, 310) = 39.23, p < .001. The variance accounted for in Step 2
was R2 = .25. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .14, Δ F (2, 308) = 27.80,
p < .001. In Step 3, when the interaction term was added, variance accounted for was R2
= .25. The incremental variance, Δ R2 = .00, Δ F (1, 307) = .30, p > .05 and the
interaction term, B = .17, t = .55, p > .05, was not significant. Dispositional decision
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judgment at Time 2 did not depend upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.
In WF, variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .18, F (1, 310) =
69.62, p < .001. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .45. The incremental
variance was significant, Δ R2 = .27, Δ F (2, 308) = 74.57, p < .001. In Step 3, when the
interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .46. The incremental
variance, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 3.97, p < .05 and the interaction term, B = -.55, t = 1.99, p < .05, was significant. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 2 depended upon
the interaction of IP1 and AH scores. The simple slopes analysis in Figure 9 shows
similar direction as the combined scores except when situational information is presented,
people higher in holistic thinking did not judge dispositional judgment to be lower.
H6: The interaction between AH scores and IP2 will significantly affect both
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 3, after controlling decision
judgments in Time 2, IP2, and AH scores. The slope of IP2 and both situational and
dispositional decision judgments in Time 3 will be steeper for people high in holistic
thinking than people low in holistic thinking.
Situational decision judgment. In Step 1, the variance accounted for was R2 =
.22, F (1, 310) = 87.62, p < .001. See Table 9 for results. The variance accounted for in
Step 2 was R2 = .33. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .11, Δ F (2, 308) =
24.81, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .33. The incremental
variance was not significant when the interaction term was added, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1,
307) = 2.36, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = .29, t = 1.54, p > .05,
indicating that the situational decision judgment at Time 3 did not depend upon the
interaction of IP2 and AH scores.
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Dispositional decision judgment. Variance accounted for in Step 1 was
significant, R2 = .05, F (1, 310) = 14.56, p < .001. See Table 9 for results. Dispositional
decision judgment at Time 2 predicted dispositional decision judgment at Time 3. The
variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .25. The incremental variance was significant,
Δ R2 = .20, Δ F (2, 308) = 41.50, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 =
.26. When the interaction term was added, the incremental variance was not significant Δ
R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 3.87, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = -.47, t
= -1.97, p > .05. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 3 did not depend upon the
interaction of IP 2 and AH scores. Because the interaction terms were not significant
Hypothesis 6 was not supported using combined scores. No simple slopes analyses were
required for the combined scores.
Dispositional decision judgment: Analysis by scenario. Because there were
differences between the scenarios for disposition decision judgments, the same analysis
was performed independently for each scenario. While the PD scenario had a significant
interaction, the WF scenario as the combined scenarios did not show a significant
interaction. In WF, variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .13, F (1, 310)
= 44.67, p < .001. See Table 10 for details. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2
= .24. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .13, Δ F (2, 308) = 24.95, p <
.001. In Step 3, variance accounted for was R2 = .25, with a non significant incremental,
Δ R2 = .00, Δ F (1, 307) = .03, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = -.05,
t = -.16, p > .05. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 3 did not depend upon the
interaction of IP2 and AH scores.
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In PD, variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .02, F (1, 310) =
6.65, p < .05. See Table 10 for details. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .14.
The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .12, Δ F (2, 308) = 20.70, p < .001. In
Step 3, when the interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .16, with a
significant incremental, Δ R2 = .02, Δ F (1, 307) = 6.79, p < .05. The interaction term was
significant, B = -.86, t = -2.61, p < .05. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 3
depended upon the interaction of IP2 and AH scores.
The simple slopes analysis in Figure 10 shows the relationship between IP2 and
the dispositional decision judgments at high and low AH thinking for PD scenario. The
slope was steeper for people with higher holistic scores than for people lower in holistic
thinking. People higher in holistic thinking seemed to be more susceptible to whatever
information they were presented. When dispositional information was presented, they
judged dispositional decisions to be higher. When presented with situational information,
they judged the dispositional decisions to be lower. Hypothesis 6 was supported for the
PD scenario.
In summary, the results in H1 and H4 showed that higher holistic thinking was
related to higher initial situational PI and decision judgments. In all cases for significant
interactions, slopes of high AH were steeper than low AH, supporting all interactions
hypotheses. It did not matter if judgments were dispositional or situational, people higher
in AH thinking were more sensitive to both situational and dispositional information
presented. All effects, however, were small. Specific results in H2 and H5 (except for
WF) showed that AH thinking interacted with the first information presentation to affect
both situational and dispositional PI and decision judgments at Time 2. These interaction
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effects did not carry over at Time 3 as examined in H3 and H6 (except for PD). The
judgments at Time 2 accounted for much of the variance of judgments in Time 3. AH
thinking did not appear to have an effect on later judgments; it did not predict judgments
while information presentation did (See Lower portion of Table 8 and 9: Step 2).
Components of AH Thinking
AH thinking components, Attention, Causal Attribution, and Tolerance for
Contradiction, influence on the percentage of information items selected, information
rated as relevant, the judgment differences between dispositional and situational PIs, and
the differences between dispositional and situational decision judgments, were
investigated.
Attention
People higher in holistic thinking, with wider attention scope, were assumed to
seek more peripheral information in their sensemaking. This was expected to result in a
higher percentage of information items selected and higher ratings of information
relevance. Hypotheses 7 and 8 tested these outcomes, respectively, using correlation
analyses.
H7: Attention scores will be positively related to the percentage of information items
selected.
To test Hypothesis 7, the mean of Attention scores of the AHS [Attention] and the
mean percentage of items selected from Information Selection 1 and Information
Selection 2 [Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)] were used. The attention
scores were not significantly correlated with percentage of items selected, r = -.04, p >
.05. Hypothesis 7 was not supported. A wider attention scope did not influence the
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selection of information items. Additional separate analyses of attention on Information
Selection 1 and Information Selection 2, respectively, were also not significant. See
Table 13.
H8: Attention scores will be positively related to the rated relevance of available
information.
In order to test Hypothesis 8, the mean of Attention scores of the AHS [Attention]
and the mean rating of information relevance [Combined: Overall Info Relevance] were
used. The attention scores were not significantly correlated with mean information
relevance, r = .06, p > .05. I tested the individual scenarios as the relevance scores were
different for the two scenarios. The correlations were non significant, WF: r = .03, p >
.06 and PD: r = .07, p > .05. Hypothesis 8 was not supported. A wider attention scope did
not influence the relevance judgments of information items. See Table 14.
Causal Attribution
Because people with holistic thinking were expected to include context in their
causal attribution, it was hypothesized that they would include a variety of information in
their sensemaking, resulting in a higher percentage of information items selected, a
higher percentage of situational information items selected, higher rating for situational
information relevance, and a more diverse use of information categories. Hypotheses 9 to
12 tested each of these outcomes, respectively, using correlation analyses.
H9: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the percentage of
information items selected.
To test Hypothesis 9, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal
Attribution] and the mean percentage of items selected from Information Selection 1 and
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Information Selection 2 [Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)] were used. The
mean of attribution scores was not significantly correlated with the percentage of items
selected, r = .10, p > .05. A situational perspective of causality did not increase the
percentage of information items selected. Additional separate analyses of attribution on
Information Selection 1 and Information Selection 2, respectively, were also not
significant. See Table 13.
H10: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the percentage of
situational information items selected.
To test Hypothesis 10, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal
Attribution] and the mean percentage of situational items selected in Information
Selection 2 [Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2] were used. The mean of
attribution scores were significantly correlated with the percentage of situational items
selected, r = .18, p < .01. This indicated that people with a situational perspective on
causal attribution selected more situational information. Hypothesis 10 was supported.
See Table 13.
H11: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to mean of situational
information rated as relevant.
To test Hypothesis 11, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal
Attribution] and the mean rating of situational information relevance [Combined: Sit Info
Relevance] were used in a correlation analysis. The mean of attribution scores were
significantly correlated with mean of situational information relevance, r = .18, p < .01.
Hypothesis 11 was supported. This indicated that people with a situational perspective on
causal attribution rated situational information as more relevant. In the individual
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scenarios, the relationship was not significant for WF, r = .09, p > .05 but was significant
for PD, r = .22, p < .001. See Table 14.
H12: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the number of categories
of information selected.
To test Hypothesis 12, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal
Attribution] and the number of information categories selected [Combined: Numbers of
Category Selected] were used in a correlation analysis. The mean of attribution scores
were not significantly correlated with the number of information categories selected, r =
.04, p > .50. Hypothesis 12 was not supported. Attribution did not influence the use of
information categories. See Table 13.
Tolerance for Contradiction
Because people with holistic thinking see truths in two seemingly opposing views,
they were more likely to use dialectical reasoning when dealing with ‘conflicting’
situations. That is, they would synthesize two approaches instead of contrasting them.
This would result in people higher in holistic thinking showing a smaller difference
between dispositional and situational options of PI and if decision judgments. Hypotheses
13 to 14 tested each using correlation analysis, respectively.
H13: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute difference
between their final dispositional and situational PI judgments than people with low
tolerance for contradiction.
To test Hypothesis 13, the mean of Tolerance for Contradiction scores of AHS
[Contradiction] and the absolute difference scores between the ratings of final
dispositional and situational PI judgments [Combined: Abs Difference in PI T4] were
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correlated. A larger absolute difference score indicates that the judgments were polarized.
The mean of tolerance for contradiction scores were not significantly correlated with the
absolute difference between the dispositional and situational PI judgments, r = .03, p >
.05. The relationship was also not supported in the individual scenarios, WF: r = .03, p >
.05 and PD: r = .01, p > .05. Hypothesis 13 was not supported. This means the tolerance
for contradiction did not affect the choice between the two PI judgment options. See
Table 15.
H14: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute difference
between their final dispositional and situational decision judgments than people with
low tolerance for contradiction.
To test Hypothesis 14, the mean of Tolerance for Contradiction scores of AHS
[Contradiction] and the absolute differences between final judgments in decision
judgments [Combined: Abs Difference in Decision T4] were correlated. A larger absolute
difference score indicated that the judgments were polarized. The mean of tolerance for
contradiction scores was not significantly correlated with the absolute difference between
the dispositional and situational decision judgments, r = .03, p > .05. These were also not
significant in the individual scenarios, WF: r = .03, p > .05 and PD: r = .01, p > .05.
Hypothesis 14 was not supported. This means tolerance for contradiction did not affect
the choice between the two decision judgments. See Table 15.
In summary, of the three components of AH thinking investigated, only causal
attribution showed a significant relationship with information selection and information
relevance. Attribution was related to situational information items selected and situational
information relevance but not related to overall percentage of information items selected
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and to categories of information used. Attention seemed unrelated to information
characteristics. This could be because participants read all information presented in each
scenario, that is, they were forced to attend to all information, not selective attention. The
tolerance for contradiction was not related to the absolute difference score between both
PI and decision judgments.
Individual Personality Differences
In order to find if individual differences measures were related to sensemaking
process, two personality variables associated with individual information processing
characteristics were included: The Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) and the Need for
Cognition (NfCog).
The Need for Cognitive Closure
Because people with high NFCC seek quick conclusions, they were expected to look
for and use information that would support this goal. Because dispositional attribution
was posited to be easier to process (Winter et al., 1985; Winter & Uleman, 1984),
Hypothesis 15 tested if the NFCC score was correlated with the percentage of
dispositional items selected. Because a disposition conclusion might be easier to reach,
people with high need for cognitive closure and dispositional attribution would also be
more likely to attribute to dispositions when situational explanations were available or
FAE. This was tested in Hypothesis 16 using a moderated multiple regression.
H15: The Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) scores will be positively related to the
percentage of dispositional information items selected.
To test Hypothesis 15, the mean of NFCC scores [The Need for Cognitive
Closure] and the percentage of dispositional information items selected in Information
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Selection 2 [Combined: % Dis Information Selected 2] were used in a correlation
analysis. The mean of NFCC scores were significantly correlated with the percentage of
dispositional information items selected, r = -.19, p < .001. However, these correlations
were negative, opposite from the hypothesized results. This was also significantly
negative for percentage of situational items selected, r = -.17, p < .001. Hypothesis 15
was not supported. See Table 13.
H16: There will be a significant interaction between Causal Attribution scores and the
NFCC scores on final dispositional PI judgments. The slope of Causal Attribution and
final PI judgments will be steeper for people high in need for closure than people low
in need for closure to reflect their dispositional tendency for PI.
To test Hypothesis 16, the Causal Attribution scores on the AHS and the NFCC
scores were used to predict dispositional tendency reflecting the fundamental attribution
error (FAE). A significant joint effect of attribution and NFCC on final dispositional PI
judgment while controlling for final situational PI judgment, Attribution scores, and
NFCC scores would reflects dispositional tendency. Analysis was carried out in three
steps. In Step 1, situational PI judgments were entered to predict dispositional PI
judgment. In Step 2, Attribution scores and NFCC scores were entered to predict
dispositional PI judgment. In Step 3, the cross-product term of Attribution scores and
NFCC scores was entered to predict dispositional PI judgment.
Variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .02, F (1, 310) = 7.02, p <
.05. Situational PI judgment predicted dispositional PI judgment. In Step 2, variance and
incremental variance accounted was significant, R2 = .04, Δ R2 = .02, Δ F (2, 308) = 3.16,
p < .05. As a set, Attribution scores and NFCC scores predicted dispositional PI
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judgment. Individual coefficients show Attribution but not NFCC significantly predicted
the outcome. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .04. When interaction term
was added, the incremental variance was not significant, Δ R2 = .00, Δ F (1, 307) = .52, p
> .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = -.02, t = -.72, p > .05. Dispositional
PI judgment did not depend upon the interaction of Attribution and the NFCC.
Hypothesis 16 was not supported. No simple slope analysis was required. See Table 16
for details.
The Need for Cognition
People high in the need for cognition, enjoy thinking, were expected to look for
and use more information. Hypothesis 17 tested this assumption using correlation
analysis. Because of the wider selection of information and the willingness to explore
cognition, people with high need for cognition and high in AH thinking might be less
likely to commit FAE. This was tested in Hypothesis 18 using moderated multiple
regressions.
H17: The Need for Cognition (NfCog) scores will be positively related to the
percentage of information items selected.
To test Hypothesis 17, the mean of NfCog scores [The Need for Cognition] and
the mean percentage of items selected from Information Selection 1 and from
Information Selection 2 [Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)] were used. The
mean of NfCog scores were not significantly correlated with the percentage of items
selected, r = .07, p > .05. Hypothesis 17 was not supported. Additional separate analyses
of attention on Information Selection 1, r = .04, p > .05, and Information Selection 2, r =
.08, p > .05, respectively, were also not significant. See Table 13.
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H18: There will be a significant interaction between AH scores and the NfCog scores
on the final dispositional PI judgments. The slope of AH scores and final PI
judgments will be steeper for people low in need for cognition than people high in
need for cognition to reflect their dispositional tendency for PI.
To test Hypothesis 18, the overall AH scores and the NfCog scores were used to
predict dispositional tendency. The steps in this analysis were similar to those used in
Hypothesis 16. In Step 1, situational PI judgments were entered to predict dispositional
PI judgments. In Step 2, AH scores and NfCog scores were entered to predict
dispositional PI judgment. In Step 3, the cross-product term of AH scores and NfCog
scores was entered to predict dispositional PI judgment.
Variance accounted in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .02, F (1, 310) = 7.02, p < .05,
indicating situational PI judgment predicted dispositional PI judgment. See Table 16 for
results. In Step 2, variance and incremental variance accounted for was not significant, R2
=

.02, Δ R2 = .02, Δ F (2, 308) = .28, p > .05. As a set, AH thinking and need for cognition

did not predict dispositional PI judgment. In Step 3, when the interaction term was added,
the variance and incremental variance accounted for was not significant, R2 = .03, Δ R2 =
.01, Δ F (1, 307) = .71, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = .18, t = .63,
p > .05. Dispositional tendency did not depend upon the interaction of AH thinking and
the need for cognition. Hypothesis 18 was not supported. No simple slope analysis was
required.
In summary, hypotheses related to the need for cognitive closure and the need for
cognition did not show an effect on the hypothesized information selection. Perhaps these
two personality differences affect other processes in sensemaking rather than information
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characteristics. Each hypothesized moderating effect was also not significant. The need
for cognitive closure did not it interact with attribution to affect dispositional tendencies.
The need for cognition did not interact with AH thinking to affect dispositional
tendencies.
Additional Analysis
To provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between AH thinking,
information management, and sensemaking, several post hoc analyses were undertaken.
First, I explored the relationships among the individual scales used in the study. As AH
thinking is a new scale, it is important to understand how it relates to other individual
measures. Second, I examined the types of information recalled as a different
measurement of the attention process of participants during sensemaking. This revealed
what kind of information participants deemed relevant for sensemaking. Lastly, the
patterns of qualitative sensemaking responses were explored.
Relationships Among Individual Differences Scales
I compared the overall AH scores and the components score with the other scales
used in the study. Overall AH scores was not related to the NfCog but the Causal
Attribution subscale was related, r = .18, p < .05. People with high need of cognition
were also people with a situational approach to causal attribution. A person who includes
situational aspects in causal attribution showed a higher need for cognition. See Table 7.
Overall AH scores was not related to the NFCC but the Perception of Change
subscale was, r = -.12, p < .05. The correlation showed that people with a nonlinear
perspective have a lower need for cognitive closure. A belief about the flexibility of the
universe appears to be inconsistent with the need for cognitive closure. Attention was

71

positively correlated with the NFCC, r = .12, p < .05. The correlation showed that people
with wider attention scope have a higher need for cognitive closure. This could be
because their wider attention requires a higher need for closure in order to prevent
information overload. See Table 7.
The overall AH scores and subscales were not related to Tolerance for Ambiguity.
The lack of relationships between AHS and the other scales indicated that AHS was
measuring construct different from these other individual scales. See Table 7.
Table 7 also showed that the other scales in the study were moderately related to
each other. The NfCog was negatively correlated with the NFCC, r = -.49, p < .001.
People with higher need for cognition have lower need for cognitive closure. People with
higher need for cognition are less of a cognitive miser show less need for cognitive
closure. Whereas people with low need of cognition are cognitive misers show a higher
need for cognitive closure. This supported previous research (Petty & Jarvis, 1996;
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
The NfCog was positively correlated with Tolerance for Ambiguity, r = .34, p <
.001. People with higher need for cognition have higher tolerance for ambiguity. This
relationship makes sense as people with high need for cognition enjoy thinking, they have
the ability and motivation to try to disentangle information, making them less ambiguous,
therefore, may have a higher tolerance for ambiguity. This supported previous research
(Weary & Edwards, 1994). See Table 7.
The NFCC was negatively correlated with Tolerance for Ambiguity, r = -.39, p <
.001. People with higher need for closure do not tolerate ambiguity. Whereas a lower
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need for cognitive closure may be comfortable with ambiguity. This supported previous
research (Weary & Edwards, 1994). See Table 7.
In summary, the overall AH scores was not related to the personality measures
included in the study. This suggests AH thinking is different from these personality
measures. Two components of AH thinking, perception of change and attention, were
related to the need for cognitive closure. Previous research showed attribution to be
related to the need for cognitive closure while this present study found perception of
change and attention, but not attribution, was related to the need for cognitive closure.
The personality measures were related to each other, suggesting a commonality among
them as suggested by previous research (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Memory Recall
Because individuals remember what they attend to and that are relevant, a
memory recall task provides a powerful tool to understanding the types of information
participants seek and find relevant. Participants were given a memory recall task of their
first scenario at the conclusion of the study. Information was coded into categories of
information as described previously in the Method section. See Appendix I for Memory
Coding description.
Ten participants’ data were used to establish coding reliability. Two coders
independently coded the memory recall data after reliability was obtained. Each
participant recalled more than one information item. This resulted in a total of 173 cases.
Inter-rater reliability was established for each code. A kappa of .89, .57, and .75 was
attained for Dispositional Target (DT), Dispositional Non Target (DNT), and Situational
(S) respectively. A kappa of .84, and .69 was attained for Confirming and Disconfirming,
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respectively. When all cases were coded, an inter-rater reliability was again established.
A total of 2660 cases for 312 participants yielded a kappa of .90, .43, .77, .76 and .82 for
DT, DNT, S, Confirming, and Disconfirming, respectively.
The mean information items recalled in the sample was 8.53 (SD = 3.75). The
mean number of accurate items information recalled in the sample was 7.48 (SD = 3.57).
The mean information recalled for DT, DNT, and S, Confirming and Disconfirming in
the sample was 3.89, .54, 3.05, 6.16, and 1.52, respectively. When a memory recall item
was rare or ambiguous, the coders discussed and came to a unanimous agreement on the
codes.
Memory Recall and Individual Differences
The result reported here combined dispositional non target (DNT) information
with situational (S) information. Dispositional non target information was information
that was external to the target (Andy or Michael). Hence, it was grouped as contextual.
The 2 (Dispositional, Situational) and 2 (Confirming, Disconfirming) provided
four types of information: Dispositional Confirming, Dispositional Disconfirming,
Situational Confirming, and Dispositional Disconfirming. I compared the individual
difference measures and the types of information recalled. See Table 18. Only the overall
AH scores was related to memory recall for two types of information, dispositional
disconfirming and situational confirming, r = .11, p < .05, and r = .15, p < .01,
respectively. These two types of information lean toward situational attribution. People
higher in need for cognition remembered more dispositional confirming, situational
confirming, and disconfirming information, r = .17, p < .001, r = .21, p < .01, and r = .14,
p < .05, respectively. A higher need for cognition may have reduced the focus to all
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information. People with high need for cognitive closure remembered less dispositional
confirming, situational confirming, and disconfirming information, r = -.17, p < .001, r =
-.16, p < .001, and r = -.14, p < .05, respectively. A higher need for cognitive closure may
have facilitated a weaker focus on all types of information.
In summary, AH thinking was only related to two types of information recall
while the need for cognitive closure and the need for cognition seemed to relate more to
types of information recall. While people with high need for cognitive closure remember
less information, people with high need for cognition recall more information.
Memory Recall and Information Selection
I examined the types of items selected from the sensemaking scenarios, and the
types of information later recalled. See Table 19. The dispositional items selected were
related only to dispositional information recalls. For example, dispositional confirming
items selected was related to dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .17, p <
.001. This was also the case for disconfirming items selected. Dispositional
disconfirming and situational disconfirming items selected were only related to
dispositional disconfirming and situational disconfirming information recalled
respectively, r = .11, p < .05 and r = .19, p < .001. On the other hand, situational
confirming items selected were related to both situational confirming and disconfirming
information recalled, r = .27, p < .001 and r = .19, p < .001, respectively, and to
dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .11, p < .05.
Situation and dispositional items selected and the types of information recalled
also followed these patterns. Dispositional items selected were only related to
dispositional confirming information recall, r = .14, p < .05, while situational items
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selected were related to all three types of information recall, r = .12, p < .05 for
dispositional confirming items, and r = .24, p < .001 and r = .22, p < .001 for situational
confirming and disconfirming items, respectively.
In summary, while dispositional and disconfirming items selected were related
only to the respective memory recall, situational confirming items selected were related
to more diverse information recalled.
Memory Recall and Information Relevance
I then examined the types of items rated as relevant from the sensemaking
scenarios and the types of information recalled. See Table 19. The patterns showed that
Dispositional items relevance were only related to the respective memory recall. For
example, dispositional confirming items relevance were related to dispositional
confirming information recalled, r = .20, p < .001 and dispositional disconfirming
information recalled, r = .13, p < .05. Dispositional disconfirming items relevance were
related to dispositional disconfirming information recalled, r = .13, p < .05. On the other
hand, situational confirming items relevance is related to both dispositional confirming
information recalled, r = .20, p < .001, and dispositional disconfirming information
recalled, r = .13, p < .05. It was also related to situational confirming information
recalled, r = .17, p < .001. Situation and dispositional items relevance and the types of
information recalled also followed these patterns. Dispositional items rated as relevant
were related to both dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .13, p < .05, and r
= .11, p < .05 for dispositional disconfirming information recalled. Situational items rated
as relevant were related to dispositional confirming and disconfirming information
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recalled, r = .17, p < .05 and r = .13, p < .05, respectively, and to situational confirming
information recalled, r = .14, p < .05.
In summary, while dispositional and disconfirming items rated as relevant were
related only to the respective memory recall, situational confirming items rated as
relevant were related to more diverse information recalled. These patterns are consistent
with those of information selection and memory recall.
Memory Recall and Problem Identification and Decision
I examined the final PI and decision judgments and the types of information
recalled. See Table 19. The patterns showed that final dispositional PI was related to
dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .18, p < .05. Final situational PI was
related to situational confirming information recalled, r = .16, p < .001. Final decision
judgments were not related to any types of information recalled. In summary, PI was
consistent with the types of information recalled.
Qualitative Sensemaking
In order to tap qualitative sensemaking, an open ended question, “What do you
now think happened?,” was asked four times. Participants’ responses were coded. See
Appendix C. There were 624 responses coded from 312 participants. Due to missing and
unclear responses, 41 (6.6%) responses were not coded. Four other responses (.6%) were
given a special code of ‘withholding’. Participants with these responses, responded to the
first and second open ended question as ‘not sure yet’ or ‘more information is needed.’
They withheld from responding until all information was presented. Five hundred seventy
nine responses were each given one of the nine sensemaking codes in Appendix C. Two
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trained coders coded the data independently and all coding was discussed. A rater
agreement was established for every response.
The nine codes were conceptually divided into two groups. See Table 20. The
first group was from people who had switched their frames to be consistent with the new
information. They did this at both information presentations. Responses that received
Code 4 and Code 5 were in this group. The only difference between Code 4 and Code 5 is
that people assigned Code 4 had received information consistent with their initial frame
in the first information presentation while people assigned Code 5 did not received
inconsistent information.
The second group consisted of people who resisted change in their frames to at
least one of the two information presentations. Responses that fall into this group were
those assigned all other codes besides 4 and 5.
Forty two percent (42%) of the responses displayed Code 4. There were 16.3%,
Code 5, and 14.3%, Code 1. Code 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had less than 10% each. See Table
20 for details. There are 58.3% (n = 364) who switches with new information while
34.8% (n = 215) resisted new information.
To understand sensemaking within the two scenarios, the above codes were
described for each scenario. For WF, there were a total of 312 responses; 20 (6.4%)
responses that were not coded due to missing and unclear response while 3 responses
(1.0%) were ‘withholding’ responses. There were 51.3% responses that displayed Code 4
and 16.7% had Code 5. There were 10.3% with Code 1 while Code 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had
less than 5% each. When the codes were combined, 67.9% (n = 212) compared to 24.7%
(n = 77) changes sensemaking based on the information they received.
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For PD, there were a total of 312 responses; 21 (6.7%) responses were not coded
due to missing and unclear responses while 1 response (.3%) was a ‘withholding’
response. There were 32.7% responses that displayed Code 4 and 16.0% had Code 5.
There were 18.3% with Code 1 while Code 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had less than 10% each.
When the codes were combined, 48.7% (n = 152) compared to 44.2% (n =138) switches
their sensemaking based on the information they received.
To investigate if participant’s responses were related to AH thinking and
qualitative sensemaking, those who switched based on information presentation were
compared to those who did not. In WF, no differences were found for AH thinking and its
components as well as quantitative sensemaking. In PD, only the Attribution component
was different among the two groups of sensemakers, F (1, 289) = 4.09, p < .05. However,
the participants who switched less have higher situational attribution than those who had
switched with the introduction of new information, F (1, 288) = 4.09, p < .05, (M = 4.92,
SD = 1.03 versus M = 4.69, SD = .93). No differences were found in overall AH thinking
and other components as well as quantitative sensemaking.
In summary, several patterns of sensemaking were observed. In general, a
majority of participants changed their sensemaking based on the new information while
others stayed with earlier problem identification. Individual differences explored in this
study did not predict the patterns of sensemaking.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Globalization and advancement in technology adds complexity to the use of
information. The abundance of information available from many sources including the
Internet means that people face often ambiguous and contradictory information.
Individuals must sort through and interpret this overload of information while balancing
conflicting goals and time constraints. In addition, individual characteristics can
complicate this process. Sensemaking is a way to deal with the complexity and overload
of information (Choo, 1998b; O’Reilly, 1980; Weick, 1995). This study was designed to
understand how individual differences influence sensemaking and information use. The
individual differences under study were Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking as well as two
personality variables, the need for cognition and the need for cognitive closure. Two
scenarios set the context in which sensemaking and information use were examined.
This discussion consists of five sections. In the first two sections, understanding
of sensemaking and understanding information use are discussed relative to the study
hypotheses and exploratory questions. Exploratory questions include a qualitative
measure of sensemaking that taps how people explain events with unfolding information
and a memory recall task that assesses the types of information recalled. In the third
section, limitations of the study and suggestions for improvements are outlined. Next,
several theoretical and applied implications are presented. Finally, future directions are
proposed.
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Summary of Findings
Sensemaking
To understand sensemaking, several questions are addressed. The first three are
related to AH thinking, AH thinking and information presentation, and components of
AH thinking. The last two are related to the influence of two personality measures and
memory recall on sensemaking. Analytic and holistic thinkers were expected to use
different information because the importance of context would influence how they make
sense of situations. Similarly, components AH thinking and personality differences were
hypothesized to influence sensemaking. The relationship between memory recall and
sensemaking is also described.
How is AH thinking related to sensemaking?
AH thinking was positively related to initial situational problem identification (PI)
(H1) and decision judgments (H4). People with higher holistic thinking were more likely
to find the problem to be situational and were more likely to make decisions to change
the situation (i.e. changes in the organization). This confirms previous studies that
associate holistic thinking with situational attribution (i.e. Choi et al. 2003) and extended
the relationship to how we identify problems and make decisions.
Unlike previous research that provided all information before judgments were
made, the present study found differences even when partial information was presented.
The results suggest that even with minimal information, people are able to make
judgments because they bring with them past experiences and beliefs that influence their
sensemaking. This is consistent with Klein and colleagues (2007)’s data/frame model in
which past experiences and expertise provide an initial frame for sensemaking. Analytic
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and holistic thinkers have different frameworks and these influence their initial PI and
decisions.
Does the joint effect of AH thinking and information presentation influence sensemaking?
AH thinking together with the manipulation of information presentation affected
PI and decisions. The results showed that the change from initial judgments at Time 1 to
a subsequent judgment at Time 2 was affected by the breadth of information use (H2,
H5). People with higher holistic thinking showed broader information use. When
presented with situational information, holistic thinkers made more situational judgments
and when presented with dispositional information, they made more dispositional
judgments. While people lower in holistic thinking also displayed this pattern of
judgments, it was less pronounced. This is consistent with earlier findings that people
higher in holistic thinking are more inclusive of the context (i.e. Choi et al., 2007;
Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). They were more willing to use both kinds of information to
modify their sense of the scenarios. The findings suggest that the initial frame changes
depend on cognitive patterns and how information was used.
The joint effect of AH thinking and information presentation on Time 2 to Time 3
judgments was not found when additional and contrary information was presented (H3,
H6). The non significant interactions between AH thinking and information presentation
on subsequent judgments showed that AH thinking did not influence judgments on the
longer term. The focus appeared to have shifted from individual cognitive patterns to the
information given. While a majority of the analyses from Time 2 to Time 3 were not
significant, one interaction effect was significant for dispositional decision judgments in
the PD scenario. Scenario differences will be discussed in a later section.
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While most past research measures the effect of AH thinking only once, this
research presents material sequentially to assess effect. The results extend the models of
sensemaking to suggest that individual differences may not have a lasting effect in the
process of sensemaking. The results here suggest that AH thinking matters in the initial
use of the information but as additional information was given, the content becomes more
important. Consistent with the idea of sensemaking, when we are faced with a new
situation, we first make sense with our past experiences and may be more influenced by
our individual characteristics. As more information is received about the situation,
information influences sensemaking more than individual characteristics.
Do the components of AH thinking affect sensemaking?
I compared AH components with PI and decision judgments. Tolerance for
Contradiction did not affect sensemaking (H12 and H13). People with higher Tolerance
for Contradiction were expected to be less polarized between the situational and
dispositional options. Results showed no significant relationships. The use of a more
analytic sample instead of cross-national samples may have influenced the outcome.
Because these participants are likely to see the options as contradictory, they may be less
likely to adopt both options to the same degree as would a holistic sample. The negative
relationship between situational and dispositional PI judgments, r = -.15, p < .01,
suggests that even though the response format allowed for the adoption of both
situational and dispositional approaches, participants in this study saw them as opposing
options. This was also true between situational and dispositional decision judgments, r =
-.16, p < .01. See Table 7.
I also examined components of AH thinking in relation to fundamental attribution
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error (FAE), which refers to making dispositional judgments even when situational
factors are present during sensemaking. A higher rating of disposition judgments
compared to situational judgments reflects FAE. Attribution was the only component of
AH thinking that was related to the difference between disposition and situational PI
during sensemaking, r = -.22, p < .05. See Table 15. Attribution was also negatively
related to the differences in decisions, r = -.14, p < .05. See Table 15. The negative
relationships supported the idea that people with a situational view of causal attribution
were less susceptible to FAE. They adopted situational approaches and were less likely to
indicate problems and solutions to be dispositional. This is consistent with previous FAE
research (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
Does the joint effect of cognitive and personality differences influence sensemaking?
The Need for Cognitive Closure was expected to interact with Attribution (H16)
to make FAE higher for people with a high need for cognitive closure and low situational
attribution. While Hong and colleagues (2000) found that a high need for cognitive
closure moderated the relationship between attribution and the degree of FAE, this study
did not replicate this finding. Because participants worked at their own paces, their need
for cognitive closure may have been lessened. Perhaps the inclusion of ambiguous
information and the addition of time pressures in scenarios would elicit the need for
cognitive closure.
The Need for Cognition was expected to interact with AH thinking (H18) to
influence FAE. FAE was expected to be lower for people with a high need for cognition
and a high AH thinking. The result did not support this expectation. Possibly, information
presented in the scenarios was manageable. Perhaps the addition of information items and
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increased complexity to the scenario may distinguish the responses of people with high
and low need for cognition.
How do final PI and decision judgments relate to types of memory recall?
I used a memory task to tap four types of information recall. The results showed
that confirming information rather than disconfirming information is related to PI and
decision judgments. Those who identified problems to be situational were more likely to
remember situational confirming information. Those who identified problems to be
dispositional were more likely to remember dispositional confirming information. These
patterns showed that people use confirming information during sensemaking. While these
patterns are interesting, we could not conclude the causal direction of a particular
judgment and the confirming information recall. This needs further research.
Qualitative Sensemaking
I used qualitative methods to examine how participants respond when there is
limited information for initial sensemaking and how sensemaking changes with
inconsistent information. Almost all the participants appeared to have an initial frame for
the event. While this could be influenced by the suggestion of causal factors in the
beginning of each scenarios (i.e. director vs. external changes), participants were able to
explain their initial frame even with this limited information. When inconsistent
information was given, a majority of participants made changes in their sensemaking
consistent with the information presented. A substantial percentage, however, ignored the
inconsistent information and stay with their current frame. These patterns of sensemaking
are consistent with forms suggested by Klein and colleagues (2007). Surprisingly, several
responses indicate an opposite pattern of change. These participants’ subsequent
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sensemaking were different from the information presented even though the information
presented was consistent with their previous sensemaking. These patterns may be
consistent with the models of correction for attribution discussed in Gilbert and Malone
(1995) and Choi et al. (1999). Further research in this area is needed to understand the
complexities of sensemaking.
I divided the participants into those who switched with new information received
and those who did not. I compared these two groups on their individual differences. No
significant relationships were found between individual differences and qualitative
sensemaking.
In summary, AH thinking affected initial sensemaking. This means that people
have past experiences, cognitive patterns, belief systems, and expertise that affect their
sensemaking. The different AH frameworks determine how information was used during
sensemaking. People interact with their information environment in a way that changes
their sense to be consistent with ways they value information. The diminishing effect of
AH thinking exemplifies the effect of time in understanding sensemaking. With
additional information, the content of information played a more significant role during
sensemaking. The qualitative data also support the use of information presented to
modify sensemaking. The data revealed that people differ in the way they explain the
same scenarios. While individual differences could not explain this difference, the
memory recall data supports the availability of different information during sensemaking.
Participants focused on confirming information that was consistent with their PIs in the
scenario. The personality variables were not related to sensemaking. Lastly, there is some
evidence that scenario differences might have affected results, again emphasizing the
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importance of context for sensemaking.
Information Management/Use
The second goal was to understand information use. Choo (1998b) suggested
several information characteristics important for information management in
organizations. Among them are amount (number of items), type, and relevance. To
examine how participants use information, I presented information sequentially and
asked participants to select information items from different categories. Next, they rated
the usefulness of dispositional and situational information. Components of AH thinking
and two personality variables were included to understand information selection and
rated usefulness.
How do the components of AH thinking relate to information use?
Attribution was the only component of AH thinking related to the information
management characteristics investigated. While attribution was unrelated to both the
overall items (H9) and dispositional items selected, it was related to the situational items
(H10). This is consistent with the notion that people with situational perspectives of
causal attribution look for situational information. Yet, no difference was found for the
selection of dispositional information items. This supports the earlier finding that people
with both dispositional and situational perspectives focus on dispositional information.
The overall AHS score was not related to the types of information selected (See Table
13). This supports the findings by Choi and colleagues (2003) that overall AH thinking is
not related to dispositional or situational items selection. The present study suggests that
the component of Attribution may be a better predictor of information selection than
overall AH thinking.
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People who had a situational perspective rated overall information and situational
information to be more relevant (H11). Consistent with the result of information
selection, people with a situational perspective also emphasized the relevance of
dispositional information.
None of the AH components were related to the number of categories used in this
study (H12). This is inconsistent with Markus and colleagues (2006) who found Japanese
participants used more diverse categories for explanation of events. They used qualitative
data to explore participants used of categories for explanation while I used a quantitative
approach. A methodological difference may explain this deviation. Several participants
appeared to have misunderstood the instructions and selected one information item from
each category. This resulted in all categories being selected.
Attention was not related to information selection (H7) and information relevance
(H8). Because participants were asked to read carefully all the information presented, this
may have directed their attention and created an atypical attention focus. Previous
research that found differences in attention used animated stimuli with short durations of
presentation. This made attention more selective. Hence, the present scenarios or methods
may not be good for eliciting differences in attention.
How do personality differences relate to information use?
The Need for Cognitive Closure was related to the selected dispositional
information items in an opposite expected direction (H15). Winter and colleagues (1985)
suggested that people with a higher need for cognitive closure make dispositional
attributions as it is easier to reach a conclusion than it is to make situational attributions.
The present study however suggests that this affinity towards attribution is not the result
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of selecting more dispositional information. Instead, people with higher need for
cognitive closure selected less dispositional information and also less situational
information. This is consistent with the findings of Webster and Kruglanski (1994). They
found participants with a higher need for cognitive closure considered less information
when making judgments. The present study confirms that, regardless of available
information, people with a higher need for cognitive closure are less likely to use the
information.
The need for cognition was not related to the number of information items
selected (H17). It was also unrelated to specific types of items – dispositional, situational,
confirming, and disconfirming information (See Table 13). Perhaps the need for
cognition is important for other processes during sensemaking as suggested in the
information recall section below.
Is memory recall related to information use?
I looked at the items selection and relevance to information recall. I found three
patterns for the link between items selections and recall. First, people who selected more
dispositional confirming items also remembered more dispositional confirming
information. Second, those who selected more dispositional disconfirming items recalled
more dispositional disconfirming information. Those who selected more situational
disconfirming items recalled more situational disconfirming information. The two
disconfirming types of items selection were related only to their respective types of
memory recall. These two patterns support earlier research that found that people are
likely to select and remember information they judge as important (Wiley, 2004). Finally,
situational confirming items selection showed a broader overlap with other information
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recall. Not only is it positively related to both confirming and disconfirming situation
information recall, it is also positively related to dispositional confirmation information
recall. These findings provided a better understanding of the effect that information
selection has on information recall.
The above patterns of memory recall with information selection were similar to
those for information relevance. The patterns of relationships suggest that people with a
situational frame consider situational information but also dispositional information
during sensemaking, whereas people with dispositional frame emphasize dispositional
information to the exclusion of situational information. These patterns seem to be
consistent with the finding that holistic thinkers include both context and focal objects
during sensemaking and with earlier research on free memory recall of visual animation
images (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).
In summary, I found situational attributors focused on situational information.
They selected and rated situational items to be more useful. However, dispositional
information was also important for situational attributors. The memory recall data
supported the idea that they also consider disposition information during sensemaking.
Participants’ selection and ratings of situational confirming items and memory recall
patterns suggest broader types of information were considered. While other components
of AH thinking and the need for cognition were not related to information use, people
with high need for cognitive closure selected less information items.
Do individual differences affect types of items recalled?
The results showed that holistic thinking was positively related to situational
confirming and dispositional disconfirming recall of information. Both types of
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information are types of information that suggest the context is the problem. Situational
confirming information indicates the context is the problem while dispositional
disconfirming information suggests the person is not the problem. This is consistent with
Wiley’s (2004) findings that people often experience memory bias in favor of the
information with which they agree.
The Need for Cognition was positively related to the number of dispositional
confirming information recalled, and both situational confirming and disconfirming
information recalled, while the Need for Cognitive Closure was negatively related to
these types of information. These results supported previous findings of the willingness
of people with higher need for cognition to deal with information (Berzonsky & Sullivan,
1992) and people with higher need for cognitive closure to consider less information
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Additionally, the present study looked at the different
types of information. These two personality variables were found to play a role in
memory recall.
Limitations
The first four limitations are related to the study’s scenarios while the last two are
related to the generalizability of results. First, while the feedback from participants in the
pilot studies suggested the equivalence of the scenarios, the scenarios comparison
reported here indicated they were not equivalent. The content differences may have
influenced the results. The roles of the target person in the scenarios were different, a
director versus a line worker. Undergraduate participants appeared to identify more with
the line worker. They may also attribute more responsibility to the director because he is
a person of authority. While differences in scenarios may add complications to

91

interpretations of results they also add richness to different representations of the work
environment. The differences suggest a variety of scenarios may be crucial to represent
the complexity of sensemaking. This has implications for the need to generate different
scenarios that represent the complexity in organizations as people encounter different
problems in their work.
The second limitation of the material is that the scenarios provided both
dispositional information and situational information equated for amount and strength.
While this is a good experimental control, it does not represent how people with different
analytic and holistic tendencies search for information in a non-experimental setting. In
natural environments, they are likely to focus on their preferred kind of information.
Future research can assess how participants choose the information they view instead of
presenting all kinds of information. This would better reflect natural information
management.
The third limitation is that the order of information presentation may affect
sensemaking. In this study, dispositional information was presented first and then
situation information or vice versa. This presentation may have a canceling effect and led
to judgments being less polarized between dispositional and situational judgments at
Time 3. Future research may present information differently. Information in the scenarios
could be presented to be progressively more dispositional or progressively more
situational. This extends the understanding of effects of AH thinking and information
presentation on sensemaking.
The fourth limitation is also related to the scenarios. The scenarios in this study
were designed to tap causal attribution. Thus, Attribution, a component of AH thinking
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may have matched the content of the sensemaking scenarios while other components of
AH thinking may not. This may have contributed to their non-significant relationships.
Using content related to the other components may have yielded different results. Hence,
we should not be quick to conclude that other components were less important for
information use. For example, using visual/video presentation may be more related to the
Attention component and may result in a stronger relationship as shown in previous
research by Masuda and Nisbett (2001; 2006). This method may make background
information more salient for people with broader attention.
The fifth limitation is related to the sensemaking processes in the study.
Sensemaking is a complex phenomenon. The design of this study assumed that the
information presented influenced PI and decision judgments. However, in reality, the
relationship between judgments and information use is probably reciprocal and ongoing
until an action has to be taken. In other words, judgments or current sense of the situation
may also drive information gathering, which in turn may influence the perception of
information relevance. To understand the casual effects of this relationship requires
additional analyses (i.e. a cross-panel analysis).
The final limitation is related to generalizability of the study to cross-cultural
interaction. With the importance of international exchanges in the military,
transportation, commerce, and humanitarian domains, it is important to understand the
present study in a cross-cultural context. The AH thinking concept is borrowed from
cultural psychology. While the results presented here suggest a difference between
analytic and holistic thinkers, we need to be cautious if we wish to generalize these
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results to national group differences. The present study needs to be replicated using
national groups comparison.
Implications
Theoretical Implications
The findings of this study demonstrate the complexity of sensemaking. This study
is an initial look at the complexity of sensemaking and information management for
analytic and holistic thinkers. In order to represent the complex processes of
sensemaking, information presented over time and the ‘sense’ at each of those times was
assessed. Because our understanding of a situation can be a dynamic process, it is crucial
for understanding how AH cognition interacts with the information presented. We need
to make sense of information that is both consistent with and contradicts our view. The
results confirmed the importance of using scenarios that represent the processes involved.
For example, with only two measurement points, we would have concluded that changes
in sensemaking were due to varying use of information by analytic and holistic thinkers.
However, by including addition measurement points, we saw a bigger picture.
Subsequent sensemaking no longer differed by how analytic and holistic thinkers use
information. The information content alone drove sensemaking. A different conclusion
would have been reached without the additional measurement times.
I attempted to link quantitative and qualitative sensemaking data to individual
differences. The qualitative data shows individuals use different forms of sensemaking
when presented with the same scenario. This study supports the Data/Frame model in an
experimental setting. In some cases, participants changed their sensemaking even when
information presented was consistent with their frame. This suggests that while
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elaborating their frames, participants were able to directly reframe their understanding of
the situation. The presence of inconsistent information might not be needed for them to
question their frame. This suggests there might be idiosyncratic patterns that may not be
represented by the model. Further research is needed.
The results support that analytic and holistic thinkers may bring with them
different frameworks of causal attribution and that their frameworks guide the selection
of information during sensemaking. First, people higher in holistic thinking were more
likely to identify situational problems and adopt situational-based solutions even with
limited information. Second, their cognition coupled with the types of information
presented changed their judgments. Nevertheless, this effect did not last long. Third,
holistic thinkers’ focus on situational items supports differences in the information
management process. Lastly, the patterns of recall show simultaneous focus on both
situational and dispositional information while situational items were selected. However,
no relationship was found for dispositional items selection and situational information
recalled. These patterns of recall further emphasize the different information management
processes. The different information needs of analytic and holistic thinkers support the
idea that people bring with them past experiences and knowledge that may bias their
information search processes.
Practical Implications
The AH thinking dimension was borrowed from cross-cultural literature. This
may suggest that sensemaking and information use differences may be important during
cross-cultural interactions. If holistic people need more information, this can limit their
sensemaking when information is limited. Similarly, if analytic people are given more
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information than they would normally seek, it may alter their sensemaking. This study
used U.S. participants who in cross-cultural literature typically make dispositional
attribution. However, in the present study they also could make situational attributions.
They might not have made situational attributions as strongly as dispositional attributions
if they selected their own information. This study suggests that multinational teams may
need to learn how to channel information appropriately to arrive at a common
understanding.
Differing use of information has implications for information sharing in teams
(Lin, Klein, Radford, Choi, & Lien, 2007). In multinational organizations,
multidisciplinary and multinational teams often carry out much of the work. While
national differences can enrich the team’s capacity, they can also complicate the
teamwork and coordination. One critical task facing multinational teams is information
management: making sense and using a myriad of complex information to achieve team
goals and tasks. To do this, each team member must seek, select, organize, interpret, and
share information. Each team member has his or her own knowledge base, mental
models, and dynamic representations of problems. People are continually adding to their
knowledge base, redefining their mental models, and reinterpreting their dynamic
representations of problems using both existing and new information (Hinsz, 1995).
When people work on teams, information and knowledge is exchanged so that a shared
sense of the situation can emerge. With incongruent perceptions of information needs,
information exchange may be limited or overflowed, thereby distorting sensemaking.
Analytic and holistic people may identify cause differently as a result of exposure to an
unfamiliar set of information. The sharing of unaccustomed amounts of information may
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also have a positive effect in providing focus to holistic thinkers and breadth to analytic
thinkers. When there are differences in the selection of information during sensemaking,
the outcome might be compromised or enhanced. Instead of assuming people use
information the same way, understanding the cognitive differences of people from other
nations can further predict communication conflict in multinational teams.
Future Directions
While this study investigated aspects of sensemaking and information use, the
complexity of these processes provided opportunities to explore dynamics beyond the
initial effort. First, I suggested improving the current measure of AH thinking. Then, I
suggested several additional information characteristics and cultural dimensions yet to be
explored in the context of sensemaking. Next, I discussed how contextual factors can be
included to represent the complexity of information use and sensemaking in real world
settings. Lastly, I presented several ideas for naturalistic investigations of sensemaking
and information management.
Analytic-Holistic Thinking Construct
In the present study and in the literature, AH thinking is assumed to be a single
dimension. The Analytic-Holism Scale (Choi et al., 2007) reflects this. However, all
items in this scale tap holistic thinking and none tap analytic thinking. Future research
should include items that tap analytic thinking to explore if a person could be high on
both analytic and holistic thinking. This may extend further understanding of this
construct.
Additional Information Characteristics
Choo (1998a) and O’Reilly (1983) listed many characteristics of information that
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organizations consider when making decisions. This study looked at three: amount, type,
and relevance. Other characteristics of information that still need to be investigated in the
context of sensemaking include saliency, ambiguity, forms, credibility of sources,
accessibility and valence. Using the current paradigm, information presented can be
manipulated in terms of the ambiguity of the content, the sources of information, and
different formats of information presentation (i.e. text, pictorial, base rates, etc.). For
example, presenting information from different sources, such as formal versus informal
sources, replicates information gathering in the real world. Including these characteristics
would give a more comprehensive view of information use that mirrors the complexity of
sensemaking.
Additional Cultural Dimensions
Besides AH thinking, other cultural dimensions, including Tolerance of
Uncertainty and Hypothetical-Concrete reasoning, may influence the way we manage
information and make sense. Tolerance of Uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980), describes how
people function in the face of uncertainty. Uncertainty is stressful for those with low
tolerance and they work to avoid it. They prefer specifics, consider details, abhor
incomplete information, resist plan changes, and feel unsettled until there is a final
decision (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). They prefer formal rules and ritualistic behaviors
to enhance stability (Lane, DiStefano, & Maznevski, 1996). Consensus is valued because
disagreement causes stress when it generates questions and uncertainty (Lane &
DiStefano, 1992). In contrast, those who are high in Tolerance of Uncertainty are
comfortable with ambiguity and incomplete information (Hofstede, 1980). They adapt
readily to change and act with limited information (Hall & Hall, 1990). Rules and rituals
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may be ignored or treated flexibly because they are viewed as ineffectual (Helmreich &
Merritt, 1998). People high in Tolerance of Uncertainty accept dissent and are less
threatened by deviant ideas.
During sensemaking, information is processed to reduce ambiguity (Weick,
1995). People who are low in tolerance for uncertainty may not be comfortable with
frequent changes during sensemaking. Because they prefer certainty to changing plans,
they may not seek information that showed a contradictory view in order to maintain
stability in the process of sensemaking. People who are high in tolerance for uncertainty
may be comfortable when information shifts, resulting in view changes. They are more
likely to take action even with limited information, facilitating the process of
sensemaking. In order to study Tolerance for Uncertainty in the current research
paradigm, information would be manipulated to introduce ambiguity into the situation to
test the effect on sensemaking. Time pressures and overload of information can also be
introduced to increase uncertainty.
Hypothetical-Concrete reasoning may also influence sensemaking. Hypothetical
thinkers use mental playing out of alternative strategies to consider different outcomes
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They separate reasoning from reality to consider options in
an abstract, hypothesis-driven manner using “what if” questions. Concrete thinkers
respect the constraints imposed by context and carefully integrate these constraints into
their thinking (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Reasoning is grounded in past personal and
national experience in similar contexts. Hypothetical thinking uses abstract speculation
while concrete thinking analyzes events in grounded reality.
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As hypothetical thinkers play out scenarios, the sensemaking process is more
flexible and varied and they may generate more hypotheses. These people may have
several frames and eliminate each in a hypothesis driven manner. Concrete thinkers may
be more constrained but more precise in their sensemaking because they may fit
information to previous experiences. While precise, concrete thinkers are highly
committed to a particular course of action based on one interpretation of the information,
they may lack flexibility and the ability to change strategies in light of new information.
Concrete thinkers may use fewer but more elaborate frames during sensemaking.
However, concrete thinkers may view hypothetical thinkers’ sensemaking as groundless.
Hypothetical-Concrete thinkers can be compared in the qualitative forms of sensemaking
they adopt. Different types of information such as if-then kind of reasoning versus base
rates information can be presented to examine if hypothetical and concrete thinkers use
them differently.
Contextual Factors
The selection and relevance of information may not only be biased by individual
differences but also by situational constraints such as goals, decision purposes, time
pressures, and sources of information (O’Reilly, 1983). To investigate the impact of these
constraints, future research might include other aspects of situational constraints beyond
information presentation. Again, these factors would extend the understanding of how
people use information. In addition, we could observe the interplay of individual
differences and the suggested situational constraints on sensemaking. For example, the
scenarios could be augmented by including time pressure and changing goals. In the
present study, individual personality differences did not affect the evaluation of
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information characteristics or sensemaking. Perhaps including time pressure in the
scenarios would enhance individual differences effects. Including a changing and
conflicting goals environment may relate better to Tolerance for Contradiction as it
provides a situation where participants have to make decisions about conflicting goals.
They may differentiate or synthesize goals based on their tolerance for contradiction.
Naturalistic Investigation
Finally, the real test of laboratory outcomes is their ability to predict real world
behaviors (Dobbins, Lane & Steiner, 1988). Hence, future research should investigate
these processes in a naturalistic environment. Choo (1998b) and Bhagat and colleagues
(2002) emphasized the importance of information sharing for organizations to be
effective. Specifically, Bhagat and colleagues (2002) suggested that transfer of tacit
knowledge between organizations may be easier for organizations with higher holistic
thinking employees. The use of technology allows the tracking of information. For
example, with information gathering and sharing over e-mail, transactions can be tracked
objectively in organizations willing to participate in such research. Understanding how
individuals share information and how this affects decisions and organization functioning
would be important for understanding organizational effectiveness. Hence, future
research needs to not only investigate the sensemaking processes at the individual level
but also at the team and organizational level.
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V. CONCLUSION
Often in an organizational context, goals may be ill-defined or lack consensus,
information may be incomplete and ambiguous, decision makers may be pursuing
multiple or competing objectives, and time constraints may be undermining the adequate
use of available information. This study investigated how AH thinking is related to
information management and sensemaking, two processes that are crucial for decision
making and organizational action. When individuals experience high pressure and
complexity they are likely to fall back on cognitive scripts for how to behave. Under
these circumstances, individuals and more importantly, multinational teams, can make
different plans, have different goal priorities, and draw different conclusions. When
teams have different interpretations they differ in sensemaking. Although differences can
lead to difficulties in establishing shared understanding, they can also provide different
views and diverse solutions (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Orasanu & Salas, 1993;
Triandis, Hall, & Ewen, 1965). Understanding AH thinking differences and their effects
is a first step to understanding how multinational teams and organizations might channel
information to arrive at a common understanding, shape communication based on a
group’s information needs, and manage the additional demands for consensus building.
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TABLES
Table 1. Differences between Analytic and Holistic Thinking (Nisbett, 2003)
Analytic Thinking

Holistic Thinking

•

Individualism

•

Collectivism

•

Westerners

•

East Asians

•

Detach from context

•

Orient to whole context

•

Attention: A focus on attributes
of the objects, assign them to
categories

•

Attention to relationships between
focal object and the field

•

Use of formal logic

•

Use experience-based knowledge

•

Reasoning Style: Differentiation

•

Reasoning Style: Dialectical

•

Attribution: Dispositional

•

Attribution: Situational
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Table 2. Design of Scenarios
Scenario
Information Presentation: D-S
Order
Scenario 1Booklet 1:
Scenario 2
Scenario 1D-S Scenario 2D-S
Scenario 2Scenario 1

Booklet 3:
Scenario 2D-S Scenario 1D-S

D-S = Dispositional first, Situation second
S-D = Situational first, Dispositional second
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Information Presentation: S-D
Booklet 2:
Scenario 1 S-D Scenario 2S-D
Booklet 4:
Scenario 2S-D Scenario 1S-D

Questionnaires

Sensemaking Scenarios

Table 3. Overview of Measures
Section
A. Problem Presentation

Response
1. Problem identification in Time 1
2. Information need in Time 1
3. Decision in Time 1
4. Open ended question 1

B. Selection of Information from
Categories

1. Selection of information 1
2. Number of Categories selected

C. Information Presentation 1:
Information suggests Dispositional or
Situational cause

1. Problem identification in Time 2
2. Information need in Time 2
3. Information trust 1
4. Decision in Time 2
5. Open ended question 2
6. Relevance of information 1

D. Information Presentation 2:
Information suggests Dispositional or
Situational cause

1. Problem identification in Time 3
2. Information need in Time 3
3. Information trust 2
4. Decision in Time 3
5. Open ended question 3
6. Relevance of information 2

E. Presentation of all Information

1. Selection of information 2
2. Problem identification in Time 4
3. Information need in Time 4
4. Decision in Time 4
5. Open ended question 4

1. Analytic-Holism Scale
2. The Need for Cognition Scale
3. The Need for Cognitive Closure
Scale
4. The Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale
(exploratory)
5. Memory Recall Task
6. Demographic Sheet

1. Analytic-Holistic scores
2. Need for Cognition scores
3. Need for Cognitive Closure
scores
4. Tolerance for Ambiguity Scores
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5. Types of information recalled
6. Demographic Information

Table 4. Reliabilities of Outcome Measures
Reliability
Outcome Variables
Situational PI
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Dispositional PI
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Situational Decision
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Dispositional Decision
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Information Selection 1
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Information Selection 2
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Categories Selection
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Situational Info Relevance
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation
Dispositional Info Relevance
Combined
Production Dilemma
Westerly Foundation

n

Overall Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4

6
3
3

.63
.74
.67

.72
.81
.60

.65
.79
.64

.74
.84
.62

6
3
3

.79
.89
.84

.88
.93
.89

.83
.93
.86

.81
.93
.84

6
3
3

.69
.81
.73

.75
.76
.74

.71
.72
.67

.73
.79
.66

6
3
3

.71
.78
.73

.75
.73
.74

.67
.67
.67

.66
.66
.66

72
36
36

.92
.87
.87

52
26
26

.84
.73
.74

18
9
9

.89
.84
.82

26
13
13

.86
.80
.76

26
13
13

.86
.84
.78
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Table 5. Participant's Demographics
N=312
Variables
Gender

Male
Female

Frequency
83
229

Percentage
26.6
73.4

Age

18-21
22-25
> 25

281
20
11

90.1
6.4
3.5

Ethnic

Caucasian
African
Asian
Hispanic
Other

202
83
2
8
17

64.7
26.6
.6
2.6
5.4

Childhood
Background

Urban
Suburban
Rural
Other

96
134
74
5

30.8
42.9
23.7
1.6

Year in
School

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

226
57
12
14

72.4
18.3
3.8
4.5

Major

Engineering
Social/Behavioral Science
Natural Science
Business
Humanities/Fine Arts
Education
Health Sciences
Law
Undecided

24
47
32
36
23
17
106
7
16

7.7
15.1
10.3
11.5
7.4
5.4
34.0
2.2
5.1

174
89
11
1

88.1
28.5
3.5
.3

15
62
97
61
45

4.8
19.9
31.1
19.6
14.4

College GPA 3.0-4.0
2.0-2.99
1.0-1.99
0-.99
Work Hours

< 10 hours
< 20 hours
< 30 hours
< 40 hours
> 40 hours
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Table 6. Scenarios Comparison on Outcome Scores
PD
WF
Variables
Category Selection

M
5.81

SD
2.69

M
5.92

SD
2.58

Pillai's
Trace
.00

% Situational Info
Selected 2

64.65

20.51

64.15

18.51

.00

1.00

.19

% Dispositional Info
Selected 2

56.78

24.30

56.39

20.30

.00

1.00

.09

% Overall Info
Selected 1 & 2

56.29

15.60

56.21

15.37

.00

1.00

.02

Situational Info
Relevance

5.10

.96

5.39

.81

.11

.89

39.18**

Dispositional Info
Relevance

4.91

1.10

4.79

1.01

.01

.99

3.91*

Overall Info
Relevance

5.09

.82

5.19

.75

.02

.98

6.54*

-1.62

2.53

-.67

1.86

.10

.90

36.02**

-.97

2.50

-.95

2.03

.00

1.00

.02

Difference in Final PI
Judgments
Difference in Final
Decision Judgments

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01

108

Λ
1.00

F
.77

Table 7. Individual Differences, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments for Combined Scenarios
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

6

7

8

9

10

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

-.12*

1

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

-.09

-.49** 1

8

-.01

.00

.01

-.11

.08

-.39** .34** 1

9

.13*

.01

.15** .09

.02

.06

.08

-.14*

1

10 -.04

.05

-.01

-.08

-.06

.00

-.02

-.08

.05

11

.12*

.03

.12*

.06

.05

-.04

.06

-.10

.43** .08

12

.10

.03

.08

.06

.04

.00

-.08

.01

-.03

13

.17** .03

.20** .12*

.00

.05

.01

-.09

.35** .01

14

.00

-.04

15

.20** .02

16 -.07
17

.07
.06

.17** .07

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1
1

.29** -.36** 1

.01

-.06

-.08

.03

-.06

.03

.10

.01

.00

-.10

.38** -.04

-.12*

-.08

-.10

.00

.01

.00

.42** .12*

.40** .21** .04
.45** .04

.43** .14*

.17** .12*

.00

.02

.12*

-.14*

.64** -.07

18 -.02

.08

-.03

.03

-.14*

.10

-.05

-.10

-.07

19

.00

.00

.02

.04

-.07

-.04

.09

-.07

.34** .07

20

.11

.02

.10

.11

.01

.05

-.13*

-.10

.04

21

.10

.43** -.01

.62** .03

1
-.05

.08

.02

.12*

.06

-.03

.06

.02

-.04

.27** -.05

.11

-.08

.01

-.15** .04

-.02

-.10

.07

23

.14*

.05

.19** .05

-.02

.01

.05

-.03

.27** -.11

24

.02

.09

-.03

-.14*

-.06

.02

-.06

.07

1

.71** -.08
-.02

.36** .06
.29** .06

.35** .12*

.09

.01

.63** -.07
-.06

.41** -.05

.28** -.07

.74** -.45** .34** .20*

.36** .13** .11

1

.80** -.15** 1

.37** -.02

.28** .01

.20** -.28** .81** .10

22 -.04

.10

12

1

.23** .08
-.02

11

1

.32** -.05

1

.36** .17** .44** .06
.02

.04

.65** -.03

.67** -.07

.01

.46** -.05

.66** -.01

.62** -.12** .67** -.01

.47** .02

.42** .11

.50** -.17** .67** -.18** .43** -.05
-.04

1

.38** -.39** 1
1

.21** -.06

.41** .05

1

.77** -.10

.37** .14** .19** -.09

1

.82** -.16** 1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure

7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. Combined: Problem Identification Sit T1
10. Combined: Problem Identification Dis T1
11. Combined: Problem Identification Sit T2
12. Combined: Problem Identification Dis T2

13. Combined: Problem Identification
14. Combined: Problem Identification
15. Combined: Problem Identification
16. Combined: Problem Identification
17. Combined: Decision Sit T1
18. Combined: Decision Dis T1
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Sit T3
Dis T3
Sit T4
Dis T4

19. Combined: Decision Sit T2
20. Combined: Decision Dis T2
21. Combined: Decision Sit T3
22. Combined: Decision Dis T3
23. Combined: Decision Sit T4
24. Combined: Decision Dis T4

24

Table 8. Hypotheses 2 and 3: Predicting Problem Identification (PI) Judgment at Time 2 and Time 3

Predictor Variables
Step 1
Sit/Dis PI (T1)
Step 2
Sit/Dis PI (T1)
Info Presentation 1 (IP1)
AH Scores
Step 3
Sit/Dis PI (T1)
Info Presentation 1
AH Scores
AH Scores X IP1
Predictor Variables
Step 1
Sit/Dis PI (T2)
Step 2
Sit/Dis PI (T2)
Info Presentation 2 (IP2)
AH Scores
Step 3
Sit/Dis PI (T2)
Info Presentation 2
AH Scores
AH Scores X IP2

Situational PI Time 2
R2∆
F∆
B

R

R2

.43

.19

.19

71.15**

.57

.32

.14

30.73**

.58

.33

.01

5.13*

R

R2

.42

.18

.18

66.50**

.51

.26

.09

.52

.26

.00

Dispositional PI Time 2
R2∆
F∆
B

SE

R

R2

.51**

.06

.29

.08

.08

28.02**

.38**

.49**
.75**
.22*

.06
.10
.10

.77

.60

.51

196.14**

.44**
-2.14**
.13

.05
.11
.11

.06
.92
.14
.20

.78

.61

.01

9.25**

.05
1.03
.16
.22

SE

R

R2

.44**
.99
.47**
-.67**
Dispositional PI Time 3
R2∆
F∆
B

.33**

.04

.04

.001

.001

17.62**

.41**
.47**
.13

.04
.09
.08

.53

.28

1.73

.42**
-.53
.02
.22

.04
.77
.11
.17

.53

.29

.49*
-1.33
-.01
.45*
Situational PI Time 3
R2∆
F∆
B

Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01
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SE
.07

SE

.39

.03

.05

.28

60.70**

.46**
-1.88**
.04

.06
.17
.13

.01

.77

.47**
-.85
.15
-.22

.06
1.18
.18
.26

Table 9. Hypotheses 5 and 6: Predicting Decision Judgment at Time 2 and Time 3

Predictor Variables

Situational Decision Time 2
R2∆
F∆
B
R2

SE

R

Dispositional Decision Time 2
R2 R2∆
F∆
B

SE

.41

.19

.19

74.78**

.50**

.06

.38

.15

.15

53.06**

.47**

.07

.66

.43

.24

64.29**

.48**
1.11**
-.06

.05
.10
.10

.75

.56

.42

146.81**

.47**
-1.71**
.15

.05
.10
.10

.66

.44

.01

4.89*

.48*
-.96
-.29*
.45*
Situational Decision Time 3
R2
R2∆
F∆
B

.05
.94
.14
.20

.76

.57

.01

SE

R

.47

.22

.22

87.62**

.41**

.04

.57

.33

.11

24.81**

.57**
.74**
.09

.58

.33

.01

.58**
-.62
-.06
.29

R
Step 1
Sit/Dis Decision (T1)
Step 2
Sit/Dis Decision (T1)
Info Presentation 1 (IP1)
AH Scores
Step 3
Sit/Dis Decision (T1)
Info Presentation 1
AH Scores
AH Scores X IP1
Predictor Variables

R
Step 1
Sit/Dis Decision (T2)
Step 2
Sit/Dis Decision (T2)
Info Presentation 2 (IP2)
AH Scores
Step 3
Sit/Dis Decision (T2)
Info Presentation 2
AH Scores
AH Scores X IP2

2.36

Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01
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6.20*

.47**
.69
.41**
-.52*
Dispositional Decision Time 3
R2 R2∆
F∆
B

.05
.97
.15
.21

.21

.05

.05

14.58**

.19**

.05

.50
.11
.10

.50

.25

.20

41.50**

.52**
-1.37**
-.13

.57
.15
.12

.05
.89
.14
.19

.51

.26

.01

3.87

.53**
.79
.11
-.47

.06
1.11
.17
.24

SE

Table 10. Hypotheses 5 and 6: Predicting Decision Judgment at Time 2 and Time 3 for Individual Scenario

Predictor Variables
R
Step 1
Dis Decision (T1)
Step 2
Dis Decision (T1)
Info Presentation 1 (IP1)
AH Scores
Step 3
Dis Decision (T1)
Info Presentation 1
AH Scores
AH Scores X IP1
Predictor Variables

Step 2
Dis Decision (T2)
Info Presentation 2 (IP2)
AH Scores
Step 3
Dis Decision (T2)
Info Presentation 2
AH Scores
AH Scores X IP2

SE

R

Dispositional Decision Time 2 (PD)
R2 R2∆
F∆
B
SE

.43

.18

.18

69.62**

.51**

.06

.34

.11

.11

39.23**

.37**

.06

.67

.45

.27

74.57**

.51**
-1.58**
.36*

.05
.14
.14

.50

.25

.14

27.80**

.35**
1.11**
.08

.05
.15
.15

.68

.46

.01

3.97*

.51** .05
.99** 1.29
.64** .20
-.55*
.28
Situational Decision Time 3 (WF)
R2
R2∆
F∆
B
SE

.50

.25

.00

.30

R
Step 1
Dis Decision (T2)

Dispositional Decision Time 2 (WF)
R2∆
F∆
B
R2

R

.35**
.05
.34
1.42
-.002
.22
.17
.31
Dispositional Decision Time 3 (PD)
R2 R2∆
F∆
B
SE

.36

.13

.13

44.67**

.33**

.05

.15

.02

.02

6.65*

.50

.25

.13

24.95**

.52**
-1.17**
-.17

.05
.17
.15

.37

.14

.17

.50

.25

.00

.03

.52**
-.95
-.14
-.05

.05
1.40
.21
.30

.40

.16

.02

Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01
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.14*

.05

20.70**

.35**
-1.24**
-.09

.06
.20
.17

6.79*

.35**
2.76
.34
-.86*

.06
1.55
.23
.33

Table 11. Individual Differences, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments for Production Dilemma
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

6

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

8

-.01

.00

.01

9

.11

.00

10

.01

.13*

.01

11

.11

-.03

.12*

.07

.08

12

.04

.03

.02

-.01

.04

13

.16** -.01

.16** .09

.09

.03

-.06

14 -.03
15

.08

.21** .02

7

8

9

10

-.12*

1
-.49** 1

-.11

.08

-.39** .34** 1

.16** .07

-.01

.02

.04

-.10

1

-.09

-.01

-.05

-.06

-.23** 1

-.01

.04

-.09

.32** -.08

-.02

-.06

.00

-.13*

-.06

-.07

.35** -.11*

-.02

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

.36** -.02

-.08

.08

-.05

-.15** .34** .00

.14*

.03

-.04

-.12*

.40** -.14*

23

-.15*

-.07

-.05

-.01

-.03

-.19** .36** -.05

1

.14*

.40** -.13*

16 -.08

.07

17

.10

.03

.10

.08

.00

.03

.02

-.09

.66** -.20** .31** -.08

18

.01

.11*

-.02

.03

-.13*

.09

-.02

-.13*

-.22** .51** -.02

19

.02

-.04

.03

.08

-.02

.00

-.02

-.04

.26** -.08

20

.04

-.01

.05

.05

.00

.03

-.10

-.08

-.07

21

.08

-.35** 1
.66** -.31** 1

.22** -.27** .76** -.39** 1
.39** -.10

.23** -.10

.00

.10

.05

.01

.05

-.06

-.04

.29** -.06

.14*

-.09

-.01

-.18** .03

.07

-.07

-.11

23

.13*

.06

.15** .04

.01

.04

-.05

-.03

.30** -.13*

24

.03

.12*

-.02

-.12*

-.04

.04

-.07

-.13*

.31** -.07

.25** -.04

.11

.26** -.10

.23** -.03

.34** -.14*

.19** -.13*

.67** -.43** .27** .00

.23** -.30** .71** -.03

22 -.05

.02

1

.23** -.16** 1

.24** -.03

.34** -.06

-.05

-.09

.11

.59** -.27** .52** -.20** .39** -.11*
-.29** .59** -.24** .57** -.11*

1

.36** -.40** 1
.47** -.13*

.29** -.10

.15*

.44** -.29** .57** -.30** .34** -.17** .41** -.12*

.15** -.30** .53** -.26** .58** -.15** .32** -.07

1
-.26** 1
.73** -.25** 1

.23** -.26** .79** -.29** 1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure

22

1

-.07

.06

13

.36** -.45** 1

.21** .09
-.03

12

1
-.09

-.05

11

7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. PD: Problem Identification Sit T1
10. PD: Problem Identification Dis T1
11. PD: Problem Identification Sit T2
12. PD: Problem Identification Dis T2

13. PD: Problem Identification
14. PD: Problem Identification
15. PD: Problem Identification
16. PD: Problem Identification
17. PD: Decision Sit T1
18. PD: Decision Dis T1
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Sit T3
Dis T3
Sit T4
Dis T4

19. PD: Decision Sit T2
20. PD: Decision Dis T2
21. PD: Decision Sit T3
22. PD: Decision Dis T3
23. PD: Decision Sit T4
24. PD: Decision Dis T4

24

Table 12. Individual Differences, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments for Westerly Foundation
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

-.12*

1

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

-.09

-.49** 1

8

-.01

.00

.01

-.11

.08

-.39** .34** 1

9

.09

.02

.06

.06

.04

.06

.08

-.11

1

10 -.08

-.07

-.03

-.07

-.01

.01

.02

-.07

.20** 1

11

.08

.09

.07

.03

-.02

-.07

.07

-.07

.31**

12

.14*

.02

.12*

.12*

.03

.02

-.08

.01

-.02

.23** -.21** 1

13

.10

.06

.13*

.09

-.10

.04

.08

-.06

.19**

.09

14

.03

.03

.01

.04

-.02

-.05

-.05

-.04

.12*

.34** .21** .16** .07

15

.11

.02

.16** .04

.01

-.02

.04

-.05

.22**

.00

16 -.02

.03

-.04

.00

-.05

-.11*

.00

.06

.12*

.37** .20** .15** .06

.17** .10

.00

.00

.16** -.13*

.54** -.03

-.06

.03

.58** .01

17

.16** .08

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

-.03

.19** 1
.40** .02
.40** .05
.33** -.02

1

.01

-.10

.07

.31** .02

19 -.03

.04

.00

-.02

-.09

-.06

.17** -.07

.28**

.13*

20

.14*

.04

.12*

.13*

.01

.05

-.11*

.04

.20** -.20** .79** -.01

21

.05

.03

.09

.04

-.07

.04

.10

-.03

.17** -.05

.03

-.04

.03

-.06

.03

-.11*

-.08

.16**

.31** .16** .22** .01

23

.09

.02

.16** .04

-.05

-.03

.15** -.02

.12*

-.07

24

.00

.02

-.02

-.09

-.05

-.01

.17**

.30** .14*

-.02

.27

.69** -.38** .41** .19

22 -.02

.28** .06
.23** .07
.11

1

.78** .02

.28** -.01

-.03

-.09

1

.68** .05

.01

.17

.55** -.04
.73

1

.37** -.02
-.03

1

.43** .18** .40** .05
-.02

.17** .01

.64** -.03
.02

.69** -.12*

.05

.01

.38** .03

.38** .13*

.39** -.01

.71** .05

1

.43** -.29** 1

.37** -.03

.69** .07

.48** -.10
.61

1

.31** -.06

1

.36** -.01

.37** .04

1

.68** -.10

.33** .16** .26** -.02

1

.75** -.12*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure

24

1

18 -.05

.09

14

7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. WF: Problem Identification Sit T1
10. WF: Problem Identification Dis T1
11. WF: Problem Identification Sit T2
12. WF: Problem Identification Dis T2

13. WF: Problem Identification
14. WF: Problem Identification
15. WF: Problem Identification
16. WF: Problem Identification
17. WF: Decision Sit T1
18. WF: Decision Dis T1
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Sit T3
Dis T3
Sit T4
Dis T4

19. WF: Decision Sit T2
20. WF: Decision Dis T2
21. WF: Decision Sit T3
22. WF: Decision Dis T3
23. WF: Decision Sit T4
24. WF: Decision Dis T4

1

Table 13. Individual Differences and Information Selection
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

-.09

-.49** 1

8

-.01

.00

.01

-.11

.08

-.39** .34** 1

9

-.02

-.07

-.04

.02

-.08

.03

-.09 1

10

.03

-.01

.04
.06

-.03

.04

-.03

.03

-.09 .90** 1

11 -.07

-.12*

.01

-.04

.00

-.12*

.03

-.06 .89** .61** 1

12

.02

-.01

.08

.10
.12*

-.01

13

-.04
.02

.00

.02

-.19** .07
-.16* .06

-.08 .70** .74** .51** .93** 1

14 -.03

-.09

.07

-.02

-.04

-.19** .06

-.04 .72** .55** .74** .93** .72** 1

15

.00

.00

.07

.08
.12*

-.04

16

-.05
.00

-.02

.03

-.12** .04
-.08
.02

-.09 .82** .89** .58*

17 -.07

-.10

.03

-.06

-.03

-.15** .05

-.04 .83** .61** .88** .81** .62** .88** .91** .66** 1

18

.05

.09
.08

-.02

.06

-.01
.04

.02

19

.02

.00

-.21** .08
-.19** .08

-.04 .34** .34** .28** .77** .83** .59** .45** .46** .37** .92** 1

20

.02

-.06

.10

.02

-.03

-.19** .06

-.03 .37** .31** .36** .79** .63** .84** .50** .42** .49** .91** .67** 1

21

.08

-.03

-.05

.00

.01

.02

-.17** .07
-.19** .06

-.05 .39** .36** .33** .75** .70** .69** .50** .48** .43** .83** .74** .79** 1

22

.18** .05
-.01 -.01

23

.12*

.05

.17** .06

-.05

-.12*

-.08 .33** .33** .26** .63** .66** .50** .43** .44** .34** .69** .71** .54** .88** .33** 1

24 -.01

.01

-.04

-.03

.04

-.17** .10

.01 .20** .19** .17** .55** .61** .41** .28** .27** .23** .71** .81** .49** .30** .88** .15** 1

25

.01

-.11

.13*

.02

-.04

-.18** .11*

-.01 .33** .29** .31** .67** .54** .70** .43** .38** .41** .76** .56** .83** .85** .47** .48** .38** 1

26

.02

.01

.03

.02

-.02

-.15** -.01

-.05 .30** .24** .30** .67** .52** .72** .41** .33** .41** .79** .58** .86** .50** .82** .43** .45** .43** 1

26

1
-.12* 1

.02

-.07 .76** .70** .67** 1

-.07 .90** .83** .80** .89** .82** .83** 1
.82** .87** .64** .91** 1

-.04 .39** .36** .34** .85** .80** .78** .52** .48** .47** 1

-.02 .29** .25** .27** .71** .67** .64** .39** .35** .37** .87** .82** .77** .46** 1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure
7. The Need for Cognition

8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. Combined: Numbers of Category Selected
10. PD: Numbers of Category Selected
11. WF: Numbers of Category Selected
12. Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)
13. PD: % of Information Selected (1&2)
14. WF: % of Information Selected (1&2)

15. Combined: % of Information Selected 1
16. PD: % of Information Selected 1
17. WF: % of Information Selected 1
18. Combined: % of Information Selected 2
19. PD: % of Information Selected 2
20. WF: % of Information Selected 2
21. Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2
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22. Combined: % of Dis Information Selected 2
23. PD: % of Sit Information Selected 2
24. PD: % of Dis Information Selected 2
25. WF: % of Sit Information Selected 2
26. WF: % of Dis Information Selected 2

Table 14. Individual Differences and Information Relevance
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

8

-.01

.00

.01

9

.10

.06

10

.12*

.07

11

.06

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1
-.12*

1

-.09

-.49** 1

-.11

.08

-.39** .34** 1

.15** .02

-.02

-.11*

.04

-.09

.16** .02

-.01

-.11*

.05

-.07

.92** 1

.03

.11** .01

-.04

-.09

.02

-.09

.90** .65** 1

1

12

.13*

.08

.18** .03

-.05

-.11*

.05

-.08

.88** .79** .81** 1

13

.04

.06

.08

-.06

-.02

-.07

-.03

-.07

.87** .81** .77** .66** 1

14

.15** .09

.22** .02

-.03

-.09

.05

-.04

.77** .79** .59** .90** .56** 1

15

.05

.01

.09

-.03

.05

-.10

.03

-.07

.73** .81** .49** .51** .86** .47** 1

16

.06

.04

.09

.04

-.06

-.10

.03

-.10

.79** .59** .86** .86** .61** .56** .43** 1

17

.01

.10

.04

-.07

-.08

-.01

-.10

-.05

.76** .56** .83** .61** .83** .47** .44** .62** 1

18

.13*

.03

.17** .05

.02

-.11

.06

-.11*

.98** .90** .87** .84** .83** .74** .71** .75** .69** 1

19

.02

.12*

.08

-.12*

-.10

-.03

-.03

.84** .75** .78** .80** .79** .69** .60** .74** .75** .70** 1

20

.12*

.06

.15** .03

.00

-.11

.07

-.08

.88** .98** .61** .73** .78** .73** .80** .55** .52** .90** .64** 1

21

.10

.10

.15** -.03

-.04

-.08

-.01

-.03

.78** .82** .58** .76** .70** .77** .65** .56** .52** .68** .86** .67** 1

22

.11

-.01

.15** .06

.03

-.08

.04

-.11

.85** .61** .95** .76** .69** .57** .45** .80** .73** .88** .61** .59** .52** 1

23

-.05

.12*

.00

-.16** -.09

-.04

-.03

.70** .51** .77** .65** .68** .45** .41** .72** .77** .56** .89** .46** .52** .54** 1

-.08

-.10

23

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure

7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. Combined: Overall Info Relevance
10. PD: Overall Info Relevance
11. WF: Overall Info Relevance
12. Combined: Sit Info Relevance

13. Combined: Dis Info Relevance
14. PD: Sit Info Relevance
15. PD: Dis Info Relevance
16. WF: Sit Info Relevance
17. WF: Dis Info Relevance
18. Combined: Confirming Info Relevance
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19. Combined: Disconfirming Info Relevance
20. PD: Confirming Info Relevance
21. PD: Disconfirming Info Relevance
22. WF: Confirming Info Relevance
23. WF: Disconfirming Info Relevance

Table 15. Individual Differences and Difference in Final Problem Identification and Decision Judgments
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

8

-.01

.00

9

-.16** .04

-.22** -.06

-.11*

-.08

.00

.07

10

-.16** .04

-.21** -.06

-.12*

-.05

.02

.04

.85** 1

11

-.08

-.12** -.02

-.05

-.08

-.02

.08

.70** .22** 1

12

.11*

-.01

.14*

.03

.10

.04

.04

-.01

-.52** -.38** -.45** 1

13

.09

-.03

.14*

.01

.07

-.02

.11

.07

-.48** -.50** -.21** .84** 1

14

.09

.01

.07

.03

.08

.10

-.08

-.10

-.32** -.05

15

-.07

.03

-.14*

.03

-.08

-.05

-.01

-.02

.71** .57** .53** -.41** -.37** -.25** 1

16

-.06

.04

-.10

.01

-.08

-.05

.06

-.03

.55** .64** .15** -.23** -.32** .00

17

-.05

.01

-.11

.04

-.04

-.03

-.09

-.01

.54** .20** .72** -.42** -.25** -.44** .72** .19** 1

18

.11

-.02

.16** .03

.06

.03

.09

-.01

-.36** -.19** -.40** .64** .50** .50** -.48** -.28** -.49** 1

19

.06

-.06

.14*

.01

.03

.01

.11

.01

-.26** -.22** -.19** .51** .58** .17** -.40** -.37** -.24** .82** 1

20

.12*

.04

.10

.03

.07

.04

.02

-.04

-.30** -.07

.01

.01

-.11

19

20

1
-.12*

1

-.09

-.49** 1

.08

-.39** .34** 1
1

-.54** .71** .22** 1
.82** 1

-.46** .48** .17** .64** -.34** -.05

-.54** .74** .21** 1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change

6. The Need for Cognitive Closure
7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. Combined: Difference in PI T4
10. PD: Difference in PI T4

11. WF: Difference in PI T4
12. Combined: Abs Difference in PI T4
13. PD: Abs Difference in PI T4
14. WF: Abs Difference in PI T4
15. Combined: Difference in Decision T4
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16. PD: Difference in Decision T4
17. WF: Difference in Decision T4
18. Combined: Abs Difference in Decision T4
19. PD: Abs Difference in Decision T4
20. WF: Abs Difference in Decision T4

Table 16. Hypotheses 16 and 18: Predicting Fundamental Attribution Error
Dispositional PI Time 4
2
Predictor Variables
R
R
R2∆
F∆
B
SE
Step 1
Sit PI (T4)
.15
.02
.02
7.02** -.21** .08
Step 2
Sit PI (T4)
NFCC Score
Attribution Score
Step 3
Sit PI (T4)
NFCC Score
Attribution Score
Attribution X NFCC
Predictor Variables
Step 1
Sit PI (T4)
Step 2
Sit PI (T4)
NfCog Score
AH Score
Step 3
Sit PI (T4)
NfCog Score
AH Score
AH Score X NfCog

.20

.04

.02

3.16*

-.17*
-.20
-.14

.08
.11
.08

.21

.04

.00

.52

-.17*
-.24*
-.07
-.02

.08
.12
.12
.03

R

Dispositional PI Time 4
R
R2∆
F∆
B
2

.15

.02

.02

.16

.02

.00

.16

.03

.01
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7.02**

SE

-.21**

.08

.28

.08*
-.01
-.12

.08
.11
.15

.71

-.19*
-.89
-.74
.18

.08
1.05
.75
.22

Table 17. Individual Differences and Situational-Dispositional/Confirming-Disconfirming Selection and Relevance
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

8

-.01

.00

.01

-.11

.08

-.39** .34** 1

9

.10

-.02

.18** .06

-.02

-.12*

.07

-.06

10

-.01

-.03

.11

-.01

-.11

-.20** .04

-.03

.42** 1

11

-.01

-.04

-.03

.00

.05

-.20** .08

-.01

.35** .36** 1

12

.05

.13*

.05

-.02

-.07

-.10

-.03

-.04

.35** .36** .46** 1

13

.16** .06

.24** .05

-.02

-.07

.05

-.11*

.47** .29** .26** .28** 1

14

.03

.10

.11*

-.04

-.13

-.08

.00

-.02

.28** .47** .21** .31** .64** 1

15

.08

.00

.07

.04

.05

-.12*

.06

-.08

.24** .25** .52** .28** .65** .49** 1

16

.00

.12*

.03

-.09

-.09

-.09

-.05

-.03

.22** .23** .27** .53** .59** .60** .57** 1

16

1
-.12*

1

-.09

-.49** 1
1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure

7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. Combined: % Confirming Sit Info Selected
10. Combined: % Disconfirming Sit Info Selected
11. Combined: % Confirming Dis Info Selected
12. Combined: % Disconfirming Dis Info Selected

13. Combined: Confirming Sit Info Relevance
14. Combined: Disconfirming Sit Info Relevance
15. Combined: Confirming Dis Info Relevance
16. Combined: Disconfirming Dis Info Relevance
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Table 18. Individual Differences and Information Recall
1

2

3

4

1

1

2

.57** 1

3

.72** .20** 1

4

.59** .19** .21** 1

5

.26** -.25** .06

-.11

6

-.05

.12*

-.10

-.01

7

.03

-.02

.18** -.04

8

-.01

.00

.01

9

.00

-.06

.05

10

.11*

.05

.10

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1
-.12*

1

-.09

-.49** 1

-.11

.08

-.39**

.01

.00

-.17** .17** .04

1

.06

.04

-.06

.18** 1

.34** 1
.02

-.04

11

.15*

-.04

.20**

.10

.05

-.16** .21** -.09

.26** .13*

1

12

.00

-.12*

.06

.09

-.02

-.14*

.14*

.05

.15** .14*

.41** 1

13

.03

-.05

.10

.06

-.06

-.11

.20** -.04

.57** .32** .73** .51** 1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Overall AH Score
2. Attention
3. Causal Attribution
4. Contradiction
5. Perception of Change

6. The Need for Cognitive Closure
7. The Need for Cognition
8. Tolerance for Ambiguity
9. Dispositional Confirming Items Recalled
10. Dispositional Disconfirming Items Recalled

11. Situational Confirming Items Recalled
12. Situational Disconfirming Items Recalled
13. Total Items Recalled
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Table 19. Information Recall, Information Selection, Information Relevance, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1

1

2

.18** 1

3

.26** .13*

1

4

.15** .14*

.41** 1

5

.57** .32** .73** .51** 1

6

.12*

.02

.24** .22** .24** 1

7

.14*

.10

.02

8

.11*

.00

.27** .19** .22** .95** .40** 1

9

.09

.06

.08

.19** .18** .68** .41** .42** 1

10

.17*

.08

.02

.06

.13*

.41** .96** .35** .36** 1

11

.01

.11*

.03

.03

.12*

.41** .69** .35** .36** .46** 1

12

.17** .13*

.14*

.10

.24** .47** .32** .42** .39** .27** .31** 1

13

.13*

.00

-.01

.11*

14

.20** .13*

.17** .08

.26** .46** .30** .47** .29** .26** .28** .89** .66** 1

15

.10

.00

.17** .39** .27** .28** .47** .21** .31** .82** .58** .64** 1

.11*
.07

.06

.06

.14*

16

17

.20** .13** .04

.02

.15** .28** .51** .24** .25** .52** .28** .64** .84** .65** .49** 1

.09

-.03

.09

.26** .39** .22** .23** .27** .53** .61** .82** .59** .60** .57** 1

.16** .07

.06

.24** -.02

19

.02

.18** .05

.24** .14*

-.06

-.01

.09

-.09

.35** -.11

20 -.10

-.04

-.03

-.06

-.10

.16

-.05

21

.04

.08

-.01

.11*

-.03

.24** -.04

.11

20

21

.28** .49** .24** .26** .43** .42** .66** 1

17

18 -.05

19

.46** 1

16

.13** -.03

18

-.02

.16** .10
-.01

-.05

.05

.29** .08

.36** .17** .05
-.08

.05

.26** .09

.29** .06

.22** .01
.08

.30** .19** .11*
.08
.08

1

.31** .18** -.39** 1

.20** .16** .09

.22** .11

.10
.05

.23** .11

.57** -.30** 1
-.26** .58** -.29** 1

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
1. Dispositional Confirming Items Recalled
2. Dispositional Disconfirming Items Recalled
3. Situational Confirming Items Recalled
4. Situational Disconfirming Items Recalled
5. Total Items Recalled
6. Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2
7. Combined: % of Dis Information Selected 2

8. Combined: % Confirming Sit Info Selected
9. Combined: % Disconfirming Sit Info Selected
10. Combined: % Confirming Dis Info Selected
11. Combined: % Disconfirming Dis Info Selected
12. Combined: Sit Info Relevance
13. Combined: Dis Info Relevance
14. Combined: Confirming Sit Info Relevance
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15. Combined: Disconfirming Sit Info Relevance
16. Combined: Confirming Dis Info Relevance
17. Combined: Disconfirming Dis Info Relevance
18. Combined: Problem Identification Sit T4
19. Combined: Problem Identification Dis T4
20. Combined: Decision Sit T4
21. Combined: Decision Dis T4

Table 20. Forms of Sensemaking
Codes
Combined
%
Code 1
14.3

Westerly Foundation
%
10.3

Production Dilemma
%
18.3

Code 2

5.7

3.8

7.7

Code 3

3.8

2.9

4.8

Code 4

42.0

51.3

32.7

Code 5

16.3

16.7

16.0

Code 6

3.2

1.9

4.5

Code 7

1.3

.6

1.9

Code 8

5.3

4.8

5.8

Code 9

.8

.3

1.3

6.6

6.4

6.7

.6

1.0

.3

Not Coded
Withholding
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Table 21. Means and Standard Deviations
Variables

N

M

SD

312
305
276
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312
312

19.61
3.32
3.04
4.64
4.43
4.80
4.70
4.65
3.30
3.31
8.24
4.86
3.95
5.11
4.26
5.49
4.50
5.53
4.39
4.82

3.66
.54
.71
.49
.94
.99
.85
.78
.69
.65
2.86
.86
1.14
1.03
1.50
.81
1.27
.95
1.31
1.02

Combined: Decision Dis T1

312

3.80

1.08

Combined: Decision Sit T2

312

4.75

1.15

Combined: Decision Dis T2

312

4.04

1.34

Combined: Decision Sit T3

312

5.15

.99

Combined: Decision Dis T3

312

4.31

1.17

Combined: Decision Sit T4

312

5.24

1.08

Combined: Decision Dis T4

312

4.27

1.22

PD: Problem Identification Sit T1

312

4.94

1.15

PD: Problem Identification Dis T1

312

3.72

1.50

PD: Problem Identification Sit T2

312

5.22

1.34

PD: Problem Identification Dis T2

312

3.99

1.83

PD: Problem Identification Sit T3

312

5.63

1.11

PD: Problem Identification Dis T3

312

4.25

1.72

PD: Problem Identification Sit T4

312

5.68

1.24

PD: Problem Identification Dis T4

312

4.07

1.77

PD: Decision Sit T1

312

4.85

1.37

PD: Decision Dis T1

312

3.89

1.42

PD: Decision Sit T2

312

4.71

1.50

PD: Decision Dis T2

312

3.94

1.65

PD: Decision Sit T3

312

5.08

1.32

Age
High School GPA
College GPA
Overall AH Score
Attention
Attribution
Tolerance for Contradiction
Perception of Change
The Need for Cognitive Closure
The Need for Cognition
Tolerance for Ambiguity
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Problem Identification
Combined: Decision Sit T1

Sit T1
Dis T1
Sit T2
Dis T2
Sit T3
Dis T3
Sit T4
Dis T4
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Variables

N

M

SD

PD: Decision Dis T3

312

4.29

1.53

PD: Decision Sit T4

312

5.13

1.50

PD: Decision Dis T4

312

4.15

1.62

WF: Problem Identification Sit T1

312

4.78

1.16

WF: Problem Identification Dis T1

312

4.19

1.40

WF: Problem Identification Sit T2
WF: Problem Identification Dis T2

312
312

5.01
4.53

1.18
1.67

WF: Problem Identification Sit T3

312

5.35

1.05

WF: Problem Identification Dis T3

312

4.74

1.44

WF: Problem Identification Sit T4

312

5.38

1.09

WF: Problem Identification Dis T4

312

4.71

1.52

WF: Decision Sit T1

312

4.80

1.28

WF: Decision Dis T1

312

3.70

1.34

WF: Decision Sit T2

312

4.79

1.36

WF: Decision Dis T2

312

4.15

1.60

WF: Decision Sit T3

312

5.22

1.14

WF: Decision Dis T3

312

4.33

1.47

WF: Decision Sit T4
WF: Decision Dis T4
Combined: Numbers of Category Selected
PD: Numbers of Category Selected

312
312
312
312

5.34
4.40
5.87
5.81

1.19
1.51
2.37
2.69

WF: Numbers of Category Selected

312

5.92

2.58

Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)

312

56.25

14.35

PD: % of Information Selected (1&2)

312

56.29

15.60

WF: % of Information Selected (1&2)

312

56.21

15.37

Combined: % of Information Selected 1

312

52.01

17.62

PD: % of Information Selected 1

312

51.87

19.45

WF: % of Information Selected 1

312

52.15

19.19

Combined: % of Information Selected 2

312

60.49

15.30

PD: % of Information Selected 2

312

60.71

17.06

WF: % of Information Selected 2

312

60.27

16.41

Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2

312

64.40

16.79

Combined: % of Dis Information Selected 2

312

56.58

19.01

PD: % of Sit Information Selected 2

312

64.64

20.51

PD: % of Dis Information Selected 2

312

56.78

24.30

WF: % of Sit Information Selected 2

312

64.15

18.51

WF: % of Dis Information Selected 2

312

56.39

20.30

Combined: Overall Info Relevance

312

5.14

.71

PD: Overall Info Relevance

312

5.09

.82

WF: Overall Info Relevance

312

5.19

.75
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Variables

N

M

SD

Combined: Sit Info Relevance

312

5.24

.78

Combined: Dis Info Relevance

312

4.85

.90

PD: Sit Info Relevance

312

5.10

.96

PD: Dis Info Relevance

312

4.91

1.10

WF: Sit Info Relevance

312

5.39

.81

WF: Dis Info Relevance

312

4.79

1.01

Combined: Confirming Info Relevance

312

5.26

.70

Combined: Disconfirming Info Relevance

312

4.74

.96

PD: Confirming Info Relevance

312

5.12

.84

PD: Disconfirming Info Relevance

312

5.01

1.04

WF: Confirming Info Relevance

312

5.40

.74

WF: Disconfirming Info Relevance

312

4.48

1.17

Combined: Difference in PI T4

312

-1.14

1.72

PD: Difference in PI T4

312

-1.62

2.53

WF: Difference in PI T4

312

-0.67

1.86

Combined: Abs Difference in PI T4

312

2.01

1.14

PD: Abs Difference in PI T4

312

2.51

1.63

WF: Abs Difference in PI T4

312

1.51

1.26

Combined: Difference in Decision T4

312

-0.96

1.76

PD: Difference in Decision T4

312

-0.97

2.50

WF: Difference in Decision T4

312

-0.95

2.03

Combined: Abs Difference in Decision T4

312

1.96

1.16

PD: Abs Difference in Decision T4

312

2.15

1.60

WF: Abs Difference in Decision T4

312

1.77

1.37

Combined: % Confirming Sit Info Selected

312

66.99

17.68

Combined: % Disconfirming Sit Info Selected

312

55.77

24.76

Combined: % Confirming Dis Info Selected

312

59.98

20.11

Combined: % Disconfirming Dis Info Selected

312

45.25

26.25

Combined: Confirming Sit Info Relevance

312

5.28

.74

Combined: Disconfirming Sit Info Relevance

312

4.93

1.05

Combined: Confirming Dis Info Relevance

312

5.24

.80

Combined: Disconfirming Dis Info Relevance

312

4.56

1.10

Dispositional Confirming Items Recalled

312

2.88

1.62

Dispositional Disconfirming Items Recalled

312

.80

.75

Situational Confirming Items Recalled

312

2.70

2.02

Situational Disconfirming Items Recalled

312

.53

.75

Total Items Recalled

312

8.53

3.75
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FIGURES
[1] Individual
Characteristics:
Analytic-Holistic
Thinking & Personality
Differences

[3] Sensemaking
Outcomes:
Problem Identification

[2] Internal &
External
Environment:
Information
Presentation

& Decision

Figure 1. A Framework of Individual’s Sensemaking Process

Problem
Noticing

Information
Gathering

Interpretation

Figure 2. Weick’s General Model of Sensemaking
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Action

Performance

Figure 3. Sensemaking Activities represented in the Data Frame Model (Klein et al.,
2007)

Section A

Problem
Presentation

Section B

Categories of
Information
Presentation

Section C

Section D

Information
Presentation 1

Information
Presentation 2

Figure 4. Sections in Each Sensemaking Scenario
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Section E

Presentation
of All
Information

Situational PI Judgment at Different Level of AHS

Mean of Situational PI
Judgment at Time 2

7.00
6.00

HighAHS
LowAHS

5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
Disposition

Situation
Information Presentation 1

Figure 5. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Situational PI Judgment

Dispositional PI Judgment at Different Level of AHS

Mean of Dispositional PI
Judgment at Time 2

7.00
6.00
5.00

HighAHS
LowAHS

4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
Disposition

Situation
Information Presentation 1

Figure 6. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional PI Judgment
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Situational DecisionJudgment at Different Level of AHS

Mean of Situational Decision
Judgment at Time 2

7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00

LowAHS
HighAHS

3.00
2.00
1.00
Disposition

Situation
Information Presentation 1

Figure 7. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Situational Decision Judgment

Mean of Dispositional Decision Judgment at
Time 2

Dispositional Decision Judgment at Different Level of AHS
7.00
6.00
5.00

HighAHS
LowAHS

4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
Disposition

Situation
Information Presentation 1

Figure 8. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional Decision
Judgment
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Dispositional Decision Judgment at Different Level of AHS (WF)

Mean of Disposition Judgment at
Time 2

7.00
6.00
5.00

HighAHS
LowAHS

4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
Disposition

Situation
Information Presentation 1

Figure 9. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional Decision
Judgment (WF)

Mean of Dispositional Judgment at
Time 3

Dispositional Decision Judgment at Different Level of AHS (PD)
7.00
6.00
5.00
LowAHS

4.00

HighAHS

3.00
2.00
1.00
Disposition

Situation
Information Presentation 2

Figure 10. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional Decision
Judgment (PD)
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Sensemaking Assessment Development
1) Pilot Study 1: Interview with participants

I first interviewed nine

undergraduate participants. The goals of these interviews were to find relevant scenarios
for undergraduates, to collect information that can be use in the scenarios, and to
understand the use of information by participants. In each interview, participants were
asked to recall a complex event in their life where they had to seek information and make
sense of multiple perspectives to come to a conclusion about the event. During the
interviews, participants were asked how the event unfolded, the strategies they used for
searching information, the types of information that facilitated their understanding, how
they acted at each decision points, and their final decision making.
When participants had difficulty in providing an event, hypothetical events were
presented for exploratory discussion. These included conflict with a roommate, disputes
in a working environment, job search after graduation, finding an apartment, and
financial difficulty in an organization. I looked for events that have two contrasting
options. For example, in the apartment search, participants were questioned on
characteristics of an apartment versus attributes of a potential roommate. They were
asked to provide both supporting and non-supporting information for picking the
apartment based on its characteristics or attributes of the potential roommate.
While the interviews provided possible scenarios such as selecting a major,
choosing between two colleges, and plans after high school, they lacked the contrast
between dispositional versus situational factors (i.e. picking between two majors).
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However, some scenarios such as conflict at work, and conflict with roommates provided
content useful for developing research scenarios.
2) Pilot Study 2: Information development

In order to allow for the testing of

the proposed hypotheses, several types of information were created iteratively for each
scenario. The selection of information for the scenarios included both Situational and
Dispositional information as explained below.
Three initial scenarios were developed to provide a contrast between dispositional
and situational information. The scenarios titled, ‘Financial Mess’, ‘Production
Dilemma’, and ‘Westerly Foundation’ all presented a problematic situation and
contrasting perspectives that suggested both dispositional and situational causes. The
situational causes included the dynamic changes in the organization and its external
environment. ‘Financial Mess’ and ‘Production Dilemma’ were from previous research
(Lin, 2004). These scenarios were modified for the purpose of the present study while
‘Westerly Foundation’ was created for this study.
To develop the scenarios, I developed information that suggested two opposing
causes: dispositional and situational. Dispositional attribution was operationalized as
finding causal factor(s) as internal to a person (i.e. personality, feelings, and values).
Therefore, dispositional information was operationalized as information about an
individual. For example, “Andy is a troublemaker.” Situational attribution was
operationalized as finding causal factor(s) as external to a person (i.e. surrounding people
and environment). Situational information was operationalized as information about the
changing environment surrounding the person and the organization as a whole. For
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example, “The economy is facing a recession.” The scenarios presented dilemmas and
allowed participants to engage in sensemaking.
‘Financial Mess’ involved an organization facing financial problems. Some
information focused dispositional concerns with a new, inexperienced young hire (i.e.
Kevin does not like to take risks) while other information pinpointed the problem to the
changing environment surrounding the person and the organization (i.e. the retirement of
the Marketing Manager, the economy, the lack of leadership). ‘Production Dilemma’
involved a chaotic production department and a CEO who wanted a fair report on the
activities of the department. Some information pinpointed the problem to a worker in the
production department (i.e. Andy became less motivated to work) while others pointed to
the changing situation surrounding the person and the organization (i.e. the changes that
were being implemented, the economy, the lack of training). ‘Westerly Foundation’
involved a non-profit organization that was facing a shortage of funds. Some information
located the problem with the current director (i.e. Michael does not have good social
skills) while others pointed to the changing environment surrounding the person and the
foundation (i.e. policy changes, the economy, history of the foundation).
In order to evaluate dispositional and situational information, 19 undergraduates
were asked to rate how relevant each information item was in reference to dispositional
cause and situational cause. Instructions asked participant to judge whether each
information item support or refutes that the person is the cause or situation is the cause.
Participants rated item from +3 (Strongly Support) to -3 (Strongly Refutes). If an
information item was irrelevant to the cause, they were asked to mark ‘X’ and rate ‘0’ if
an information item was relevant but does not indicate whether it supported or refuted a
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cause. Participants first judged information items against one cause and then judged the
same items against the other cause. Items rated high on one cause and low in another in
support or refute were retained. These items were used in scenarios for information
manipulation. Items that were rated non applicable or irrelevant were used as fillers (i.e.
introduction and ending). Ambiguous items were rephrased for clarity.
3) Pilot Study 3: Evaluation of scenarios and information

Scenarios

were revised after Pilot Study 2. They were balanced so that both situational and
dispositional causes were reasonable. Several graduate students (N= 5) reviewed the three
scenarios. They also evaluated the information for each scenario as described above.
They were asked about the balance and strength of information in each scenario, and their
relevance for undergraduate students. This evaluation helped in refining the scenarios.
Changes were made iteratively with the feedback of each graduate student.
The graduate students were also asked which two of the three scenarios, were
most suitable for the study. ‘Production Dilemma’ and ‘Westerly Foundation’ were
chosen while ‘Financial Mess’ was judged as too complicated as there were more
individuals involved in the story. ‘Production Dilemma’ and ‘Westerly Foundation’ were
also judged as more parallel, comparable in terms of format of story, length, and
readability.
4) Pilot Study 4: Sensemaking Assessment Package development

In

order to test the hypotheses and answer research questions, the scenarios had to present
information in an unfolding manner. The purpose of these scenarios was to tap the
outcome measures: Problem identification, Information need, Decision, Information trust,
Information selection, and Information relevance. The purpose of Pilot Study 4 was to
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test the sensemaking scenarios with Pilot Study 3 scenarios divided into sections and with
response measures incorporated into these sections.
In Section A of each scenario (see Table 2 and Appendix B), a problem was
presented (i.e. the Production Department is in trouble or Westerly Foundation is facing a
shortage of funds). Two possible causes were presented, a person in the organization (i.e.
Andy, or Michael) or situational changes surrounding the organization (i.e. the changes in
the company). Participants responded to problem identification, decision, and information
need questions. Hence, Section A measured these three outcome scores. There were two
problem identification scores, one represented situational cause and the other represented
dispositional cause. Participants were asked to rate independently the extent to which
they thought that the person and the situational changes were the problems by rating ‘1’
(Not at all) to ‘7’ (Most Likely). There were also two decision scores for each scenario.
One choice represented taking decision towards the individual and the other represented
decision towards the situation. These were also rated independently. For example,
participants rated how likely they would take each of these actions, ‘To give warning to
Andy’ and ‘To make changes in the company.’ Information need in this study measured
the extent participants still needed information to make sense and make decision. This
section provided the baseline of problem identification, decision, and information need.
In Section B, participants chose information that they believed would help better
understand the situation. This assessed the number of information items chosen. It also
included the number of categories of information needed. There were nine categories
with 2-5 information pieces in each category. Section B provided two outcome scores for
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information selected and number of categories used. This was the first time information
selection was measured.
Section C provided the first information presentation manipulation. Information
was presented to suggest one problem (disposition or situational). Participants then make
judgments of problem identification, decision, information need, and information trust.
They were also asked to judge the relevance of information presented by rating items
from ‘1’ (Not at all) to ‘7’ (Very Relevant). Problem identification, decision, and
information need were measured the second time. Two other outcomes measures,
information trust and information relevance, were measured for the first time.
Information trust measured the extent participants trusted the information presented to
them. Information relevance measured the extent each information item was relevant.
In Section D, the second information presentation was presented. When Section C
presented dispositional cause, Section D presented situational cause and vice versa. This
section provided the third measure of problem identification, decision, and information
need, and the second measure of information trust and information relevance.
During Pilot Study 4, an additional condition provided a mixed set of information
and asked participants to evaluate information. From this pilot testing, the third section of
information presentation was incorporated in the second and third section of each
scenario. This section was dropped from the final research tool.
In Section E, the last section, participants were presented all the information and
were asked to select information they would use in their recommendation. Then they
made the final judgment on problem identification and decision. Participants were asked
to list additional information that they would like to receive. This gave the fourth
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measure of problem identification, decision, and information need. This section also
gave the second measure of information selection.
In the sequential sections of the scenarios, Open Ended Questions queried what
participants thought happened in the scenario. These questions tap the qualitative
sensemaking, specifically by examining the different forms of sensemaking presented in
the Data Frame Model (Klein et al. 2007). These open ended were asked four times in
each scenario.
To evaluate this developed material in Pilot Study 4, 21 undergraduates from a
senior level psychology class were observed and timed while completing the task. After
completing the task, they were asked about the balance of information, redundancy of
questions, the flow of scenarios, length and difficulty of the measure, and for
improvements for the measure. Comparisons were also made between the two scenarios.
Changes were made iteratively after feedbacks.
After Pilot Study 4, several changes were made. Redundant questions were
removed from the original measure, while information need was asked for problem
identification as well as action, 66.7% of the participants gave the same ratings for both.
For this reason, these questions were asked once for problem identification in the final
version.
After checking responses between problem identification and action for
redundancy, it was found that most participants did not rate them the same. 55.6% gave
different ratings between problem identification and decision judgments. Therefore, the
original format of these questions was retained. The categories for information selection
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remained nine categories but the range of information item was changed to 3-5 pieces in
each category.
5) Pilot Study 5: Testing of All Measures

The revised sensemaking assessment

scenarios, together with the other measures were given to undergraduate participants.
Time of completion was recorded. A memory recall task was included in this study. This
task was to measure the kind of information items participants recalled.
6) Pilot Study 6: Final Sensemaking Assessment Package

After the Pilot Study

5, the third section of information presentation was incorporated in the second and third
section of each. The final scenarios were as described in Pilot Study 4 with these
exceptions: removal of redundant questions, the range of categories for information
selection was changed to 3-5 pieces in each category, Section E was dropped, and a
memory recall task was added. [Note: Original Section F is the new Section E]. Two
items were added for each type of problem identification and decision, making three
dispositional problem identification items, three situational problem identification items,
three dispositional decision items, and three situational decision items.
The final experimental booklet each contained versions of the two scenarios with
causal version counterbalanced for order and the memory recall task. The Dispositional
version starts with the information presentation that indicates the cause to be an
individual (i.e. Andy or Michael) and the other version indicates the changes that are
happening in the organization to be the cause. In each scenario, there were thirteen items
in each of the two information presentation manipulation, making it a total of 26 items. In
the information presentation that suggested dispositional cause, there were eleven
dispositional items and two situational items. In the information presentation that
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suggested a situational cause, there were eleven situational items and two dispositional
items. The memory recall task a participant received was related to the first scenario the
participant received. Hence, half the participant received the memory recall task for
Westerly Foundation and half received Production Dilemma. See Appendix B for
scenarios. See Appendix D for memory recall task.
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Appendix B
“Production Dilemma”
A. The CEO of your company, Brilliant Electronics Incorporated (BEI) recognizes that their
Production Department is in trouble. Some people say that Andy Smith, a worker in the
production, is disrupting work and others argued that the fault lies with the many changes
underway in the company not with any one person. Your job is to investigate and report to the
CEO so he can resolve the problem.
How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in BEI

2.

Characteristics of Andy

1

3.

How the organization adjusted

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Andy, the employee

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Change in the company’s situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Andy’s traits

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem in the Production Department.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

A lot
7

6

What do you think happened?

How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).

1. Makes changes in BEI

Not Likely
1
2

3

4

5

Most Likely
6
7

2. Replace Andy with another worker

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Change organization to adjust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Gives warning to Andy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Adapt company to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. Assigns Andy to another task

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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B. Mark ‘X’ for items that will best help you understand the problem. Select from lists A through
I or just a few; select any number of items or no items from each list. Remember, time is short.
A. Company information:
The financial status of the company
Organizational and physical structure of
the company
The mission statement and goals of the
company
Company’s history
Current changes in the company
B. Employees information:
Employees’ job satisfaction
Turnover rate
Pay and compensation
Employees’ job performance
C. Department information:
The current orders that the department is
handling
Department’s history
The goal and vision of the department
D. Andy Smith’s information:
Level of education
Past performance records
Evaluation by peers and subordinate
Personality & background information
Andy’s family background

E. Supervisor’s information:
Level of education
Supervisors past performances
Evaluation by peers and subordinate
Personality & background information
Supervisor’s family background
F. Competitor’s information:
The number of competitors
Current changes with the competitors
Market shares compared to BEI
Collaborations with BEI
G. Market’s information:
General economy
Rules and regulations for the industry
Related industries
Price of the raw material
H. Customer’s information:
Customers’ product
Liaison from customer’s company
Customer’s satisfaction with BEI
I. Work group information:
Group composition
Competency of each group member
Group performance

C. First, you talked to some workers. You were not able to gather all the information you wanted.
Only the information below is available:
BEI produces electronic components for car stereos. It has been in business in downtown
Dayton, Ohio for over 20 years. The company started with about 30 employees. Today, there are
over 100 employees, mostly in the Production Department. These employees are organized into
small work groups. BEI has good market reputation and it has had great relations with its
customers.
Recent implementation in the department was a big change for Andy Smith, the
production line worker. At 46, Andy did not feel he should have to adapt to a new task
assignment. He is a senior worker that had been in the company since the beginning. He knows a
lot about the production process. Hence, he feels he can direct his coworkers. He felt that things
were fine the way they were and that changing tasks were complicating things.
Andy became less motivated to work – he came later and later to work and took longer
breaks. He became less efficient, barely meeting the minimum requirement. Andy felt his actions
were justified as he was only reflecting his coworkers’ feeling of being downgraded. His
immediate supervisor, Chris Lester was very busy, therefore, did not give him specific feedback.
The management felt that the new customer should help the company financially and that the
changes were necessary.
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Chris is doing all he could. He feels Andy is not committed to the job and company. He
had heard that Andy was looking for jobs with BEI’s competitors. He sees Andy as hot headed
and a troublemaker. To improve production changes were necessary. Chris does not understand
the resentment.
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in BEI

2.

Characteristics of Andy

1

3.

How the organization adjusted

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Andy, the employee

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Change in the company’s situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Andy’s traits

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem in the Production Department.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

A lot
7

6

A lot
7

How much do you trust the information that was presented to you?
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

What do now you think happened?

Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).

1. Makes changes in BEI

Not Likely
1
2

3

4

5

Most Likely
6
7

2. Replace Andy with another worker

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Change organization to adjust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Gives warning to Andy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Adapt company to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. Assigns Andy to another task

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below.
Not at all
Relevant
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

At 46, Andy did not feel he should have
to adapt to a new task assignment.
Andy is a senior worker that had been in
the company since the beginning.
The new implementation was a big
change for Andy Smith, a production
line worker.
Andy’s immediate supervisor, Chris was
very busy, therefore, did not give him
specific feedback.
Andy felt his actions were justified as he
was only reflecting his coworkers’
feeling of being downgraded.
Andy knows a lot about the production
process.
Andy felt that things were fine the way
they were and that changing tasks was
complicating things.
The management felt that the new
customer should help the company
financially and that the changes were
necessary.
Andy is perceived as a person who is
not committed to the job and company.
Andy became less motivated to work –
he came later and later to work and took
longer breaks.
Andy became less efficient, barely
meeting the minimum requirement.
It was mentioned that Andy was looking
for jobs with BEI’s competitors.
Andy is perceived as hot headed and a
troublemaker.

Very
Relevant

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

D. You received additional from your conversation with Chris Lester, the Production Manager:
Six months ago the long-term supervisor of Production was assigned to a new position in
management. The company replaced the supervisor with a young recent business graduate, Chris
Lester. The management met with and explained the plan for changes to production workers. The
more competent employees were selected and trained to operate the new machines. The company
attracted a new customer with great potential for growth. Chris decided on changes to help keep
customers happy. To speed up production, the department needed new machinery. Problems
occurred after the implementation. Production was slower because the new machines were
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different and the trained employees were still getting used to them. Andy Smith was unhappy
with these changes. He and other workers were reassigned with some training. Chris understood
that change would take time but would be better for the company in the long run.
Chris was facing an overwhelming situation. He wished the employees were more patient
and understanding with the changes. He was also under a lot of pressure from the top to layoff
people because the recent recession had hurt the company. He wanted to succeed at his new job
and he also hoped the company would be able to retain long-term employees.
The production department is in chaos and this worries the CEO. He is afraid that the
employees will strike or slow down production. He fears these might interfere with keeping the
new and long-term customers. He wants to know what is happening and he wants to resolve the
problem.
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in BEI

2.

Characteristics of Andy

1

3.

How the organization adjusted

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Andy, the employee

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Change in the company’s situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Andy’s traits

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem in the Production Department.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

A lot
7

6

A lot
7

How much do you trust the information that was presented to you?
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

What do you now think happened?
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Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Makes changes in BEI

2.

Replace Andy with another worker

1

3.

Change organization to adjust

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Gives warning to Andy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Adapt company to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Assigns Andy to another task

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below.
Not at all
Relevant
1.
2.
3.
4.

Chris decided on changes to help keep
customers happy.
The more competent employees were
selected and trained to operate the new
machines.
Six months ago the long-term supervisor
of Production was assigned to a new
position in management.
Andy Smith and other workers were
reassigned with some training.

To speed up production, the department
needed new machinery.
6. Production was slower because the new
machines were different and the trained
employees were still getting used to
them.
7. Chris wanted to succeed at his new job
and he also hoped the company would be
able to retain long-term employees.
8. The management met with and explained
the plan for changes to production
workers.
9. The company replaced the supervisor
with a young recent business graduate,
Chris Lester.
10. Andy Smith was unhappy with these
changes.
11. The company attracted a new customer
with great potential for growth.
12. Chris was facing an overwhelming
situation.

Very
Relevant

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

5.
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13. The management had pressured to layoff
people because the recent recession had
hurt the company.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

E. The production department is in chaos and this is worrying the CEO. He is afraid that if this
continues the company might lose its customers. He wants to know what happened and he wants
to resolve the problem. Because figuring out the situation is important, you decide to review all
the information in order to use them to support your recommendations. Please select information
that is relevant for your report by marking ‘X’ in the boxes below.
Chris wanted to succeed at his new job and he also hoped the company would be able to retain
long-term employees.
Andy is a senior worker that had been in the company since the beginning.
Andy felt that things were fine the way they were and that changing tasks was complicating
things.
Andy’s immediate supervisor, Chris was busy, therefore, did not give him specific feedback.
The management felt that the new customer should help the company financially and that the
changes were necessary.
Andy is perceived as hot headed and a troublemaker.
Andy knows a lot about the production process.
Andy became less efficient, barely meeting the minimum requirement.
Andy is perceived as a person who is not committed to his job and company.
The management had pressured to layoff people because the recent recession had hurt the
company.
Changes were made in order to keep the new customer happy.
The more competent employees were selected and trained to operate the new machines.
At 46, Andy did not feel he should have to adapt to the new task he was assigned.
The new implementation was a big change for Andy Smith, a production line worker.
A month ago the long-term supervisor of Production was assigned to a new position in
management.
Chris was facing an overwhelming situation.
Andy became less motivated to work.
The company replaced the supervisor with a young recent business graduate, Chris Lester.
The company attracted a new customer with great growth potential.
Andy felt justified in the way he was acting as he was only reflecting his coworkers’ feeling
of being downgraded.
Production was slower because the new machines were different from the old ones and the
trained employees needed to get used to them.
Plan for changes were explained to production workers.
It was mentioned that Andy was looking for other jobs with BEI’s competitors.
Andy Smith and other workers were reassigned with some training.
Andy was unhappy with the changes.
The company had to speed up production and new machinery was needed to anticipate the
customer’s request.
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How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in BEI

2.

Characteristics of Andy

1

3.

How the organization adjusted

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Andy, the employee

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Change in the company’s situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Andy’s traits

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem in the Production Department.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

A lot
7

6

How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Makes changes in BEI

2.

Replace Andy with another worker

1

3.

Change organization to adjust

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Gives warning to Andy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Adapt company to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Assigns Andy to another task

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Summarize what you now think had happen with BEI’s Production Department and what would
you do if you were the CEO?

If any, what other information would you like to know? Please list them.
1.
______________________________________________________________________
2.
______________________________________________________________________
3.
______________________________________________________________________
4.
______________________________________________________________________
5.
______________________________________________________________________
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“Westerly Foundation”
A. You are an advisor for non-profit organizations. The Westerly Foundation is a non-profit
organization that awards scholarships to college students. There is now a shortage of funding that
might reduce next year’s awards. Some people think the Director, Mr. Michael Smith, is not
managing the funds well while others think that external factors and changes are the problem.
Your job is to understand the situation and recommend actions.
How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in Westerly

2.

Characteristics of Michael

1

3.

How the organization has adjusted

4.
5.
6.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Michael, the director

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change in the foundation’s
situation
Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem with the scholarship funding.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

A lot
7

6

What do you think happened?

How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).

1.

Make changes in Westerly

2.

Replace Michael with another
director
Change organization to adjust

3.
4.

Assigns Michael to another
position

Not Likely
1
2

3

4

5

Most Likely
6
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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5.

Adapt foundation to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Train Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

B. Mark ‘X’ for items that will best help you understand the problem. Select from lists A through
I or just a few; select any number of items or no items from each list. Remember, time is short.
Previous directors’ past performances
Evaluation by peers and subordinate
Personality & background information
Previous directors’ family background

A. Foundation information:
The financial status of the foundation
Organizational and physical structure of
the foundation
The mission statement and goals of the
foundation
Foundation’s history
Current changes in the foundation

F. Other Foundations’ information:
Number of similar foundations
Current changes with the other
foundations
Funds of other foundations compared to
Westerly
Collaborations with Westerly

B. Employees information:
Employees’ job satisfaction
Turnover rate
Pay and compensation
Employees’ job performance

G. External environment’s information:
General economy
Rules and regulations for charitable
organization
Taxation rules
University’s policy on scholarships

C. Hiring Process information:
Candidate requirement
Interview committee
Number of applicants

H. Donors’ information:
Donors’ contribution
Other foundation(s) donors funded
Donors’ satisfaction with Westerly
Foundation

D. Michael Smith’s information:
Level of education
Past performance records
Evaluation by peers and subordinate
Personality & background information
Michael’s family background

I. Work group information:
Group composition
Competency of each group member
Group performance

E. Previous Directors’ information:
Level of education

C. First, you talked to Michael Smith, the present Director. You were not able to gather all the
information you wanted. Only the information below is available:
Westerly Foundation was founded in 1983 to help students finance their college
education. Each year the foundation receives many applicants for scholarships. Westerly awards a
full year scholarship to applicants that best fulfill the academic and financial criteria. Recipients
continue to receive the scholarship if they maintain the required GPA. In the past, many
recipients benefited from this scholarship.
Michael Smith is currently the Director of Westerly Foundation. Three years ago,
Michael was in between jobs when the foundation offered him the director’s position. His
expertise did not lie within non-profit organizations though he has a degree in Financial
Management. Nevertheless, Michael seemed to be up to the challenge.
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For the past years, the foundation has had difficulty maintaining its scholarship program.
When Michael took over he changed the strategy for getting funds. Instead of relying on a few
big donors, he felt the foundation should approach moderate donors to increase funds. Many in
the organization dislike that Michael was running the foundation like a business. The new
strategy to approach moderate donors was risky, required more planning and coordinating, and
took resources that could go to scholarships. It also cost money for brochures to attract donors.
Although the foundation had relied on several big donations, many employees still think the old
strategy works better.
An employee recalled a recent event that might have lowered the funds. Michael had a
conflict with one of the foundation’s biggest donors. She felt that Michael does not have the
social skill needed to communicate with potential donors. Because of this, Michael had to change
the fund raising strategy. She believes that Michael does not understand the foundation’s goals
and its philosophy.
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in Westerly

2.

Characteristics of Michael

1

3.

How the organization has adjusted

4.
5.
6.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Michael, the director

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change in the foundation’s
situation
Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem with the scholarship funding.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

A lot
7

6

A lot
7

How much do you trust the information that was presented to you?
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

What do you now think happened?
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Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Make changes in Westerly

2.

1

3.

Replace Michael with another
director
Change organization to adjust

4.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Assigns Michael to another position

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

Adapt foundation to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

Train Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below.
Not at all
Relevant
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Three years ago, Michael was in between
jobs when the foundation offered him the
director’s position.
Michael had a conflict with one of the
foundation’s biggest donors.
Many in the organization dislike that
Michael was running the foundation like a
business.
Michael has a degree in Financial
Management.
Michael’s expertise did not lie within non
profit organizations.
The new strategy to approach moderate
donors was risky, required more planning
and coordinating, and took resources that
could go to scholarships.
Many employees still think the old strategy
works better.
Michael seemed to be up to a challenge.
It also cost money for brochures to attract
donors.
Michael felt the foundation should approach
moderate donors to increase funds.
The foundation relies on several big
donations.
Michael does not understand the
foundation’s goals and its philosophy.
Michael does not have the social skill needed
to communicate with potential donors.
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Very
Relevant

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

D. You received additional information from your conversation with some employees:
Before Michael took over the foundation, two previous directors faced many challenging
situations associated with the scholarship funds. Organization policies were mostly set up by Mr.
Spector, the first director. He decided to approach some key donors in supporting the foundations
effort. Being very personable, he was successful in getting large donations. The key donors have
high praise for Mr. Spector. Then, there were increases in universities tuition before Mr. Spector
retired. Funding may have been affected by this increase. Mr. Tanner, the second director,
continued the policy and effort of Mr. Spector. Due to recession the funds started dropping under
Mr. Tanner’s management. To solve the problem, some funds were put in a high-risk investment
and this did not return a profit. Unable to change the situation, Mr. Tanner decided to resign. Mr.
Tanner felt that Michael was a good candidate. His only concern is that Michael is new to
fundraising.
Several employees speculated that two similar foundations established this past year
affected the donation to their foundation. Since it was also an election year, some donors might
have contributed less. Recent tax policy on charitable donations may have changed donation
patterns of the key donors.
The shortage of funds worries the Board of Directors. They are concerned about the
foundation’s ability to provide scholarships. They feared that this might affect deserving students
as well as the foundation’s goals. They want to know what happened and how they should
manage the problem.
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).
Not Likely
1
2

1.

Changes in Westerly

2.

Characteristics of Michael

1

3.

How the organization has adjusted

4.
5.
6.

Most Likely
6
7

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Michael, the director

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change in the foundation’s
situation
Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem with the scholarship funding.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

A lot
7

6

A lot
7

How much do you trust the information that was presented to you?
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5
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What do you now think happened?

Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).

1. Make changes in Westerly

Not Likely
Likely
1
2

Most
3

4

5

6

7

2. Replace Michael with another director

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Change organization to adjust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Assigns Michael to another position

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Adapt foundation to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. Train Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below.
Not at all
Relevant
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Organization policies were mostly set
up by Mr. Spector, the first director.
Two similar foundations established
this past year affected the donation to
Westerly Foundation.
The key donors have high praise for Mr.
Spector.
Before Mr. Smith took over the
foundation, two previous directors faced
many challenging situations associated
with the scholarship funds.
Mr. Tanner felt that Michael was a good
candidate.
Mr. Tanner continued the policy and
effort of Mr. Spector.
Being very personable, Mr. Spector was
successful in getting large donations.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

6

1

Due to recession the funds started
dropping under Mr. Tanner’s
management.
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Very
Relevant

2

3

4

1

7
2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Mr. Tanner only concern is that Michael
is new to fundraising.
There was an increase in university
tuitions.
Some funds were put in a high-risk
investment and this did not return a
profit.
Since it was also an election year, some
donors might have also contributed less.
Recent tax policy on charitable
donations may have changed donation
patterns of the key donors.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

E. The funds for the foundation are low and this might affect the effort to provide next
year’s scholarships. As the foundation is for a good cause, many involved hope to solve
the problem. Because figuring out the situation is important, you decide to review all the
information in order to use them to support your recommendations. Please select
information that is relevant for your report by marking ‘X’ in the boxes below.
Organization policies were mostly set up by Mr. Spector, the first director.
Michael does not have the social skill needed to communicate with potential donors.
Mr. Tanner continued the policy and effort of Mr. Spector.
Being very personable, Mr. Spector was successful in getting large donations.
There was an increase in university tuitions.
Mr. Tanner felt that Michael was a good candidate.
Mr. Tanner only concern is that Michael is new to fundraising.
Recent tax policy on charitable donations may have changed donation patterns of the key
donors.
Michael does not understand the foundation’s goals and its philosophy.
Since it was also an election year, some donors might have also contributed less.
Some funds were put in a high-risk investment and this did not return a profit.
The key donors have high praise for Mr. Spector.
It also cost money for brochures to attract donors.
Michael seemed to be up to a challenge.
Michael’s expertise did not lie within non profit organizations.
The foundation relies on several big donations.
Many employees still think the old strategy works better.
Many in the organization dislike that Michael was running the foundation like a business.
Two similar foundations established this past year affected the donation to Westerly
Foundation.
The new strategy to approach moderate donors was risky, required more planning and
coordinating, and took resources that could go to scholarships.
Michael has a degree in Financial Management.
Michael felt the foundation should approach moderate donors to increase funds.
Before Mr. Smith took over the foundation, two previous directors faced many challenging
situations associated with the scholarship funds.
Michael had a conflict with one of the foundation’s biggest donors.
Three years ago, Michael was in between jobs when the foundation offered him the director’s
position.
Due to recession the funds started dropping under Mr. Tanner’s management.
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How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).
Not Likely
Likely
1
2

1. Changes in Westerly

Most
3

4

5

6

7

2. Characteristics of Michael

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. How the organization has adjusted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Michael, the director

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Change in the foundation’s situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the
problem with the scholarship funding.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

A lot
7

6

How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most
likely).

1. Make changes in Westerly

Not Likely
1
2

3

4

5

Most Likely
6
7

2. Replace Michael with another director

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Change organization to adjust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Assigns Michael to another position

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Adapt foundation to the situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. Train Michael’s management skill

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Summarize what you now think had happen with Westerly’s funding situation and what would
you recommend as an advisor?

If any, what other information would you like to know? Please list them.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C
Qualitative Sensemaking Coding
Initial Frame
(Response 1)

Info Presentation 1
(IP1) (Dis or Sit)

Response 2

Dispositional
=
Dispositional
Info
Situational

Info Presentation 2 Response 3
(IP2) (Dis or Sit)

Response 4

Code

≠
Situational
Info

Dispositional

-

Code 1

Situational

-

Code 4

=
Situational
Info

Dispositional

-

Code 7

Situational

-

Code 6

=
Dispositional
Info

Dispositional

-

Code 1

Situational

-

Code 9

≠
Dispositional
Info

Dispositional

-

Code 5

Situational

-

Code 8

Dispositional

Dispositional

Code 2

Dispositional

Situational/Both

Code 3

Dispositional
Dispositional
≠
Situational
Info
Situational
Both/Need
Info/Not Sure
Dispositional
= Consistent

?
=
≠
≠ Inconsistent

=
≠
=
≠

Dispositional
Dispositional
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Descriptions of Qualitative Sensemaking Codes
Code 1: Consistent All the Way [R1=IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3; R1≠IP1≠R2=IP2=R3]
This code is given when participants did not change in their sense making. They remained with
their initial frame from beginning to end even when information presented contradicted their
view. These are people who explained away contradictory information or they kept elaborating
their initial frame by seeking information consistent with their frame. For example, these
participants would consistently identify the problem to be situational, dispositional/person, or
both across all open ended responses.
Code 2: Open Then Consistent All the Way [R1?IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3; R1?IP1≠R2=IP2=R3]
This code is given when participants did not have an initial frame or respond to initial frame as
both person and situation or either person or situation as the problem. Participants may indicate
they need more information or just restate the problem when they do not have an initial frame;
they want to remain open to changes in their sensemaking. Then participants changed or have a
frame after the first information presentation and stayed with that frame throughout the remaining
responses. For example, they may change from saying both were the problem to situation or
dispositional being the problem for the rest of the scenario. They may not have a frame to begin
with but then adopt one and stayed consistent with the frame the rest of the scenario.
Code 3: Consistent Then Change [R1=IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3 (R2≠R3); R1≠IP1≠R2=IP2=R3 (R2≠R3)]
This code is given when participants have an initial frame; did not change with both information
presentations but changed at the last open ended response. For example, these participants would
consistently identity the problem to be situational, dispositional, or both and then switched to
dispositional/both, situational/both, or, situational/dispositional, respectively.
Code 4 & 5 changed with the direction of information presented
Code 4: Consistent With Information Presentation (IP) 1 And Change With IP 2.
[R1=IP1=R2≠IP2=R3]
This code is given when participant initial frame was same as the content of information
presentation 1. For example, when a participant indicated the person to be the problem and
received dispositional information in the first information presentation; the frame was consistent
with information received. The second response given was also consistent with the first
information given. Sensemaking did not change but frame is elaborated. Because the current
frame was consistent with the previous information, the second information presentation would
automatically be inconsistent with the current frame. Participants then changed their current
frame to be consistent with the second information presentation. The current frame was
questioned and a new frame was adopted. For example, before the second information was given,
the problem was the person but now the problem is situational.
Code 5: Inconsistent With IP 1, Changed with IP 1 And Changed With IP 2.
[R1≠IP1=R2≠IP2=R3]
This code is given when a participant initial frame was different as the content of information
presentation 1. For example, when a participant indicated the person to be the problem and
received situational information in the first information presentation. The frame was inconsistent
with information received. Upon receiving the inconsistent information, participants switched
their frame/explanation to be consistent with the information received. For example, they
switched from dispositional explanation to situational explanation upon receiving situational
information. Hence, they adopted a new frame (re-framing). Because the current frame was
consistent with the previous information, the second information presentation would
automatically be inconsistent with the current frame. Again, participant would switch their
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frame/explanation to be consistent with the second information received. Again, they switched to
adopt a new frame (re-framing). For example, participant would switch from situational
explanation to dispositional explanation upon receiving dispositional information.
Code 6 - 9 changed with the direction Opposite of information presented
Code 6: Consistent with IP 1, Changed Opposite of IP [R1=IP1≠R2=IP2=R3]
This code is given when a participant’s initial frame was the same as the content of information
presentation 1. For example, when a participant indicated the person to be the problem and
received dispositional information in the first information presentation. The frame was consistent
with information received. But frame was changed at the second open ended response. Here, the
second information presented would be consistent with the current frame. Participants then
remained with the same frame consistent with the second information presentation.
Code 7: Consistent but Changed Opposite of IP at both Information Presentations
[R1=IP1≠R2=IP2≠R3]
This code is similar to participants who have a pattern of Form 6 but these participants changed
their frame opposite to both the Information Presentation. For example, when information
presentation was situational, participants switched frames to dispositional and vice versa. While
participants with Form 6 went with one and opposed the other, participants with Form 7 opposed
both information presentations.
Code 8: Inconsistent with IP 1, Changed with IP 1 But Not IP 2. [R1≠IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3]
This code is similar to Form 5 where participants’ initial frames were not consistent with the first
information received but changed in the second response with the information presented. For
example, they switched form dispositional explanation to situational explanation upon receiving
situational information. Hence, they adopted a new frame (re-framing). Because the current frame
was consistent with the previous information, the second information presentation would
automatically be inconsistent with the current frame. Differ from Form 5, participants did not
switch their frame/explanation to be consistent with the second information received. They
remained the same as their second frame.
Code 9: Inconsistent with IP 1, Did Not Change with IP 1 But Changed With IP 2.
[R1≠IP1≠R2=IP2≠R3]
This is similar to Form 8 with inconsistent initial frames compared to information received except
that participants did not change in the second frame based in the information they received. For
example, they begin with and stayed with dispositional explanation upon receiving situational
information. Because the current frame is inconsistent with the previous information, the second
information presentation would automatically be consistent with the current frame. Participants,
however, changed their explanation on the third frame even when the information received was
consistent with the second information presentation. For example, participants would switch from
dispositional explanation to situational explanation upon receiving dispositional information.
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Appendix D
Earlier in this session, you were presented with the Production Dilemma scenario.
The CEO of your company, Brilliant Electronics Incorporated (BEI) recognizes that their Production
Department is in trouble. Some people say that Andy Smith, a worker in the production department, is
disrupting work and others argued that the fault lies with the many changes underway in the company not
with any one person. Your job is to investigate and report to the CEO so he can resolve the problem.
Instructions
In the scenario, you were presented with information about Andy and about the changes in the Production
Department. In the space provided below, write down as many pieces of information as you can remember.
You can write them in any order with one piece of information on each line. If you need more lines use the
back to continue.

1.

________________________________________________________________________

2.

________________________________________________________________________

3.

________________________________________________________________________

4.

________________________________________________________________________

5.

________________________________________________________________________

6.

________________________________________________________________________

7.

________________________________________________________________________

8.

________________________________________________________________________

9.

________________________________________________________________________

10.

________________________________________________________________________

11.

________________________________________________________________________

12.

________________________________________________________________________

13.

________________________________________________________________________

14.

________________________________________________________________________

15.

________________________________________________________________________

16.

________________________________________________________________________

17.

________________________________________________________________________

18.

________________________________________________________________________

19.

________________________________________________________________________

20.

________________________________________________________________________
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Earlier in this session, you were presented with the Westerly Foundation scenario.
You are an advisor for non-profit organizations. The Westerly Foundation is a non-profit organization that
awards scholarships to college students. There is now a shortage of funding that might reduce next year’s
awards. Some people think the Director, Mr. Michael Smith, is not managing the funds well while others
think that external factors and changes are the problem. Your job is to understand the situation and
recommend actions.
Instructions
In the scenario, you were presented with information about Michael and about the external factors and
changes in the foundation. In the space provided below, write down as many pieces of information as you
can remember. You can write them in any order with one piece of information on each line. If you

need more lines use the back to continue.
1.

________________________________________________________________________

2.

________________________________________________________________________

3.

________________________________________________________________________

4.

________________________________________________________________________

5.

________________________________________________________________________

6.

________________________________________________________________________

7.

________________________________________________________________________

8.

________________________________________________________________________

9.

________________________________________________________________________

10.

________________________________________________________________________

11.

________________________________________________________________________

12.

________________________________________________________________________

13.

________________________________________________________________________

14.

________________________________________________________________________

15.

________________________________________________________________________

16.

________________________________________________________________________

17.

________________________________________________________________________

18.

________________________________________________________________________

19.

________________________________________________________________________

20.

________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix E

Coding System for Memory
[If present, code ‘1’; if absent, code ‘0’]. Coding for this system is mutually exclusive
for some codes, that is, an item that is coded ‘1’ will have ‘0’ for other codes. This is true within
the Attributional codes and within the Confirming/Disconfirming codes. Coding between
Attributional Codes and Confirming/Disconfirming codes are not mutually exclusive. That is for
each statement you code for an Attributional code and a Confirming/Disconfirming code.
Attributional Codes:
Dispositional: Information that is related to internal attributes o a person such as personality,
beliefs, feelings, physical attributes, etc.
•

Dispositional [Target]: There is a target person in each story (WF: Michael Smith, PD:
Andy Smith). This code is present when dispositional information is requested for the
target person. [DT]
Example: “Michael did not have social skills,” “Andy came late and took longer breaks,”
“Michael ran the company like business”
•

Dispositional [Non-Target]: In each scenario there are other people that are non target
person (WF: other directors and employees, PD: Chris and other employees). This code is
present when dispositional information is requested for a non-target person. [DNT]
Example: “The second director failed,” “The old director was good with donors,” “Some
employees were not trained,” “Chris was overwhelmed”
Situational: Information that is related to external factors of a person (i.e. events surrounding the
person, industry and organizational information, economy, etc.). This code is present when
situational information is requested. [S]
Example: “The change in economy,” “The company hired a young business grad,” “BEI took
in new customer”
Confirming/Disconfirming Codes:
Confirming: Confirming information is information that is consistent and supports a current
sense of a situation. This is operationalized as information that confirms a cause to be the
problem.
Example: “Andy is a troublemaker” supports an individual to be the problem.
“The economy is facing a recession” supports the situation to be the problem.
Disconfirming: Disconfirming information is information that is inconsistent and can shift the
current sense of a situation. This is operationalized as information that refutes a cause to be the
problem.
Example: “Andy knows a lot about the production process” refutes an individual to be the
problem.
“The management met with and explained the planned changes to production workers”
refutes the situation to be the problem.
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Appendix F
Rate each item on the scale ranging from1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Strongly Disagree
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

1.

An individual who is currently honest will stay honest in the future.

2.

Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes are
not known.
Everything in the universe is somehow related to each other.

3.
4.
5.

We should consider the situation a person is faced with, as well as his/her
personality, in order to understand one’s behavior.
Nothing is unrelated.

6.
7.

A person who is currently living a successful life will continue to stay successful.
Any phenomenon entails a numerous number of consequences, although some of
them may not be known.

8.

Even a small change in any element of the universe can lead to significant
alterations in other elements.

9.

The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

10. Future events are predictable based on present situations.
11. When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to
compromise and embrace everyone's opinions.
12. Everything in the world is intertwined in a causal relationship.
13. It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes.
14. Current situations can change at any time.
15. The whole, rather than its parts, should be considered in order to understand a
phenomenon.
16. It is not possible to understand the parts without considering the whole picture.
17. If an event is moving toward a certain direction, it will continue to move toward that
direction.
18. Every phenomenon in the world moves in predictable directions.
19. It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts.
20. It is more important to pay attention to the whole context rather than the details.
21. It is desirable to be in harmony, rather than in discord, with others of different
opinions than one’s own.
22. Choosing a middle ground in an argument should be avoided.
23. It is important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right/wrong,
when one’s opinions conflict with other’s opinions.
24. We should avoid going to extremes.
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Appendix G
INSTRUCTIONS:
For each of the statement below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you
by circling a number. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristics of you (not at all like you) please
circle “1”; if the statement is extremely characteristics of you (very much like you) please circle “5”.
Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristics nor extremely characteristic of you;
if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit. Please keep the
following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below:

Extremely
Uncharacteristics
1

Somewhat
Uncertain
Uncharacteristics
2
3

Somewhat
Characteristic
4

Extremely
Characteristic
5

1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
1
2
3
4
5
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
1
2
3
4
5
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
1
2
3
4
5
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my
thinking abilities.
1
2
3
4
5
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth
about something.
1
2
3
4
5
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
1
2
3
4
5
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
1
2
3
4
5
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
1
2
3
4
5
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve heard them.
1
2
3
4
5
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
1
2
3
4
5
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
1
2
3
4
5
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
1
2
3
4
5
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
1
2
3
4
5
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
1
2
3
4
5
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important
but does not require much thought.
1
2
3
4
5
16. I feel relieve rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
1
2
3
4
5
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.
1
2
3
4
5
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
1
2
3
4
5

163

Appendix H
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with each
according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following
scale, using only one number for each statement.
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately disagree
3 = Slightly disagree

4 = Slightly agree
5 = Moderately agree
6 = Strongly agree

1

In case of uncertainty, I prefer to make an immediate decision,
whatever it may be.

1

2

3

4 5 6

2

When I find myself facing various, potentially valid, alternatives,
I decide in favor of one of them quickly and without hesitation.

1

2

3

4 5 6

3

I never been late for work or for an appointment

1

2

3

4

4

I prefer to decide on the first available solution rather than to
ponder at length what decision I should make.

1

2

3

4 5 6

5

I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place.

1

2

3

4

6

Generally, I avoid participating in discussions on ambiguous and
controversial problems.

1

2

3

4 5 6

7

When I need to confront a problem, I do not think about it too
much and I decide without hesitation

1

2

3

4 5 6

8

When I need to solve a problem, I generally do not waste time in
considering diverse points of view about it.

1

2

3

4 5 6

9

I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as
myself.

1

2

3

4 5 6

10

Generally, I do not search for alternative solutions to problems
for which I already have a solution available.

1

2

3

4 5 6

11

I feel uncomfortable when I do not manage to give a quick
response to problems that I face.

1

2

3

4 5 6

12

I have never hurt another person’s feelings

1

2

3

4

13

Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state of
uncertainty.

1

2

3

4 5 6

14

I prefer activities where it is always clear what is to be done and
how it need to be done.

1

2

3

4 5 6

15

After having found a solution to a problem I believe that it is a
waste of time to take into account diverse possible solutions.

1

2

3

4 5 6

16

I prefer things that I am used to over those I do not know, and
cannot predict.

1

2

3

4 5 6
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5

5

5

6

6

6

Appendix I
INSTRUCTIONS:
Please do not spend too much time on the following items. There are no right or wrong answers
and therefore your first response is important. Circle your answers and please be sure to answer
every question.
1. A problem has little attraction for me if I don’t think it has a solution.
2. I am just a little uncomfortable with people unless I feel that I can
understand their behavior.
3. There’s a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything.

True
True

False
False

True

False

4. I would rather bet 1 to 6 on a long shot than 3 to 1 on a probable winner.

True

False

5. The way to understand complex problems is to be concerned with their
larger aspects instead of breaking them into smaller pieces.
6. I get pretty anxious when I’m in a social situation over which I have no
control.
7. Practically every problem has a solution.

True

False

True

False

True

False

8. It bothers me when I am unable to follow another person’s train of thought.

True

False

9. I have always felt that there is a clear difference between right and wrong.

True

False

10. It bothers me when I don’t know how other people react to me.

True

False

11. Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic
rules.
12. If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the
clear and definite work of someone like a surgeon or X-ray specialist.
13. Vague and impressionistic pictures really have little appeal for me.

True

False

True

False

True

False

14. If I were a scientist, it would bother me that my work would never be
completed (because science will always make new discoveries).

True

False

15. Before an examination, I feel much less anxious if I know how many
questions there will be.

True

False

16. The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in the last piece.

True

False

17. Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things I’m not
supposed to do.
18. I don’t like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming
out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answers.
19. I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total
waste of time.
20. Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition.

True

False

True

False

True

False

True

False
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Appendix J

Information Sheet
1. Age:

_______ Years

2. Gender:

_______ Male

3. Place of Birth

_____________________________(City, State, Country)

4. Place of childhood (0-18 years old) years: Urban _____

_____Female

Suburban_____

Rural _____

Other: _________
3. Academic major:

_________________

4. Grade point average (High School)

________

5. Grade point average (College)

________

6. Your year in school:

Year 1 (Freshman)

____

Year 2 (Sophomore)

____

Year 3 (Junior)

____

Year 4 (Senior)

____

7. Nationality/Ethnic/Cultural background: Please circle
(1) African American (2) Caucasian American (3) Asian American (4) Native American
(5) Hispanic American (6) Other: __________
List the job(s) you previously and currently have, beginning with the most current.
Job Title

Hours work per week

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Thank you for your help
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